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Thesis Summary 
 
This empirical study tests the short-term stock abnormal returns associated with cross-border M&A 
announcements. Our countries of interest are the US and Japan. This thesis contains three empirical 
chapters. In the first two empirical chapters, we test the announcement effects of acquirers and 
targets according to acquirer and target industry characteristics and deal characteristics. We find that 
the factors that explicitly related to synergistic effects show significant explanatory power for the 
abnormal returns. In contrast, the explanatory power of the factors that are associated with agency 
motive tend to be mixed. In the third empirical chapter, we test the explanatory power of acquirer 
and target financial characteristics to the announcement returns. We find that some of the variation 
in the abnormal returns can be explained by the financial characteristics of the firms.  
 
Our test provides several contributions to the M&A literature. Firstly, we show that investors are 
more likely to be influenced by multiple factors in response to M&A announcements. In addition, 
investors can have inconsistent interpretation to the same information. Secondly, we employ F-F-C 
four-factor CAPM that has less misspecification problems for our test compared with the standard 
CAPM. Also, we use the adj. BMP t-statistic to overcome the potential upward bias associated with 
the BMP t-statistic. Inconsistent with previous studies, we find that cross-border M&As do not 
always generate positive ARs for acquirers. Finally, we find that the market shows inconsistent 
reaction to the M&A announcements made by the US and Japanese acquirers. However, when we 
control for the deal characteristics and financial characteristics of acquirers and targets, we find 
some common patterns of the abnormal returns.  
 
Keywords: cross-border M&As, shareholders’ wealth, deal characteristics, financial characteristics, 
short-term event study.  
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Chapter One 
Introduction to the Thesis 
 
1.0 Introduction  
 
In the recent decades, cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) has become an 
important form of foreign direct investment. The number of cross-border M&As has 
increased substantially from 3,442 in 1990 to 10,044 in 2015, and the annual transaction 
value increased more than 600% from 98 billion to 721 billion US dollars during the 
time (World investment report, 2016).  
 
Conceptually, as domestic M&As, cross-border M&As create value by: 1) reallocating 
operate assets towards their best possible use, and 2) increasing the operating efficiency 
of scale and scope. However, this concept only holds under rational conditions, and the 
concept cannot explain value destroying M&As commonly observed by previous 
researchers. Therefore, agency cost and management hubris have been used to explain 
the negative market reaction around M&A announcements and the poor performance 
of newly acquired firms (see, e.g., Jensen, 1986; Roll, 1986; Berkovitch and Narayanan, 
1993; Seth et al., 2002).  
 
Compared with domestic M&As, cross-border M&As are more likely to create value 
due to: 1) the segmentation across markets, 2) the differences in regulatory 
arrangements across countries, and 3) the function of reducing cost of capital by 
lowering production cost asymmetry and risk-sharing (see, e.g. Houston and Ryngaert, 
1994; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Hagendorff et al., 2008). At the same time, the 
difficulties of corporate control and information asymmetry associated with the 
geographical distance as well as culture distance can add substantial costs to cross-
border acquirers (see, e.g. Buch and DeLong, 2004; Rossi and Volpin, 2004; Hwang, 
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2011; Erel et al., 2012).  
 
Due to the increase in potential risks and value creation opportunities, it is important to 
test the effectiveness of domestic M&A theories in the cross-border M&As. In addition, 
cross-border M&A also challenges investor’s perception of foreign investment 
opportunity value, given the long geographic and culture distance. Thus, the cross-
border M&A study also provides a good platform to test market efficiency. While a 
considerable number of cross-border M&A studies have been published in the last 
decade, our understanding of the factors that determine the change in shareholders 
wealth is still limited. As Bris and Cabolis (2008) documented, the difference between 
the cross-border M&As and domestic M&As is still not well understood by researchers. 
  
In addition to the limited understanding of the cross-border specific factors, we also 
argue that the M&A research discipline is still immature. There are two important 
limitations in prior studies. Firstly, the result of M&As can normally be explained by 
multiple theories. For instance, both synergistic effect (see, e.g. Sharma and Ho, 2002; 
Lambrecht, 2004) and market for corporate control (see, e.g. Hagendorff et al., 2008; 
Aggarwal et al., 2011) have been used to explain the positive abnormal stock returns 
around domestic M&A announcements. However, the previous studies have not 
provided a comprehensive justification for the determinants of M&As. This problem 
also creates room for selective use of theories. Secondly, some previous studies bind 
each explanatory variable with a single interpretation. However, the indication of 
variables can be significantly influenced by market environment and economic 
structure. For instance, Jensen (1986) and Masulis et al. (2007) use the free cash flow 
as a determinant of management entrenchment. They suggest that excess cash holding 
can incentivise managerial power and thereby introduce high agency costs in the M&A 
deals. However, McConnell and Servaes (1995) suggests that the effect of free cash 
flow should be assessed based on the external investment opportunity as excess cash 
 13 
 
holding can prevent underinvestment when the market is growing.1  
 
These two limitations (amongst others) suggest that alternative explanations are needed 
for the results associated with cross-border M&As. Furthermore, when we compare the 
inconsistent results from previous studies, we cannot always determine whether the 
inconsistencies are due to the selective use of certain theories or the different underlying 
features of the data. In addition, the inconsistent methodologies used in the previous 
studies further increase the difficulty to compare the evidence provided in previous 
studies. For instance, Travlos (1987) finds that cash payment results in higher abnormal 
return to bidders. He argues that cash payment reduces the free rider problem. Harford 
et al. (2012) find that bidders experience higher abnormal returns when they use equity 
to finance M&As. The result indicates that the equity payment can be a sign of low 
agency cost. Thus, even though previous M&A studies provide rich evidence and 
theories in explaining investor behaviour associated with M&A announcement, the 
inconsistent use of methodologies, and the selective use of theories mean that a 
systematic study is needed. For this reason, we are motivated to provide a study that 
empirically and systematically examine the investor behaviour in cross-border M&As. 
 
1.1 Research objectives  
 
Section 1.0 introduced several issues surrounding the previous M&A studies. In order 
to address the weaknesses in previous studies, this study is designed to serve the 
following purposes.  
 
i) Previous studies have not provided consistent explanation for the variability of 
the abnormal returns following cross-border M&A announcements. Often this 
is due to the use of different specifications of the pricing model. In our case, we 
                                                   
1 The study of Servaes (1995) focuses on capital structure instead of M&As. This may be the reason 
why the concept of Servaes (1995) is rarely tested in M&As studies.    
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use equilibrium-type CAPMs to generate the abnormal returns. We then test the 
agency theory, synergy theory, market for corporate control and cost of 
information asymmetry by using the proxies from acquirer’s and target’s 
industry characteristics, financial characteristics and M&A deal characteristics. 
By comparing our results, our study can provide important insights of the factors 
that determine investor behaviour associated with cross-border M&A 
announcement.  
 
ii) Secondly, this study tests the power of the M&A theories in the cross-border 
manner involving two of the world’s largest economies. The abnormal returns 
associated with M&A for these two countries will likely be less affected by 
information transparency and protective legislations compared those of less 
developed countries. In addition, we believe that the cross-border M&A events 
provide a useful platform to allow us to test acquirers and targets’ abnormal 
returns in relatively deep markets that are less affected by thin trading. This 
setting also allows us to examine issues that relate to information transmission. 
For example, we can test how quickly the effects of the announcements die out 
and whether investors can price in the M&A before announcements. By 
documenting the characteristics of the abnormal returns, our result can also 
provide useful insights about stock market efficiency.      
1.2 Contributions of my Research to Empirical Work  
 
This study contributes to the M&A research discipline in the following ways.  
 
i) After we have systematically tested the M&A theories, we find that factors 
related with synergy theory show strong explanatory power for announcement 
returns. More importantly, we find that acquirer and target abnormal returns 
cannot be explained by single determinant. Rather, the market response varies 
by acquirer’s previous performance, acquirer’s industry characteristics and the 
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characteristics of the M&A. For instance, we find that leverage ratio, as a 
common used free cash flow indicator, is positively related with abnormal 
returns when the US acquirers initiate conglomerate M&As. In contrast, 
leverage shows negative correlation with abnormal returns when the US 
acquirers initiate vertical M&As. It implies that in vertical M&As, the 
indication of leverage ratio is shifted from agency cost to cash flow reservation 
for future investment opportunity, where the low leverage ratio can reduce the 
possibility of underinvestment. Thus, if the market examines the value of 
M&As by using the financial ratios of acquirers, the interpretation of the same 
financial ratio can change as the M&A characteristics change. Our finding 
implies that future M&A research may need to consider the interconnection 
between explanatory variables and construct a more dynamic test model.   
 
ii) We explain the inconsistent announcement returns associated with country 
specific factors (see, e.g. Siegel et al., 2011). We show that when we control for 
the acquirer’s financial characteristics, type of M&As and industry 
characteristics, the investor behaviour becomes more consistent across the US 
and Japan.  
 
1.2 Thesis Layout  
 
The thesis is organised as follows. Chapter Two discusses the existing literature of 
empirical studies of M&As. In Chapter two, we present prior research work on share 
price behaviour associated with of M&As, and also discusses the limitations in the 
previous studies. Chapter Three presents our research methodology. The chapter also 
presents our data source, event distribution and statistical summary of our data. Chapter 
Four reports our empirical findings associated with the US and Japanese acquirers’ 
stock returns. In this chapter, we also test the effect of acquirer’s industry characteristics 
and deal characteristics on acquirer’s stock returns. Chapter Five reports our empirical 
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findings associated with the US and Japanese targets’ stock returns. We also test the 
effect from the industry and deal characteristics. Chapter Six reports our empirical tests 
associated with the financial characteristics of acquirers and targets. Chapter Seven 
concludes this thesis and outlines the limitations. We also recommend potential areas 
for further research. 
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Chapter Two 
Literature Review 
 
2.0 Introduction 
This chapter documents theories and concepts underpinning the previous studies on 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As). Previous studies point out factors from three 
dimensions that explain the abnormal returns (ARs) of acquirers and targets: the M&A 
motives, the resistance to facilitate successful M&As, and the stock market efficiency 
to price in the M&A announcement. The motive determines the potential value creation 
by M&As. The resistance determines the wealth transfer between acquirers and targets. 
The market efficiency determines to what extent the change of acquirers and targets 
value can be incorporate into the announcement returns. In practices, the factors in three 
dimensions jointly influence the outcome of M&As. As most previous studies only 
focus on factors from one dimension, it can cause significant difficulty to examine the 
inconsistent evidences presented in the previous studies. As a result, the previous 
studies provide limited contribution to explain the ARs associated with M&As. This 
problem becomes more significant when inconsistent methods are employed in the 
previous studies. Thus, by contrasting the theories and concepts proposed in the 
previous studies, we also point out the limitations in the M&A research discipline.  
 
This chapter is organized as follows: section 2.1 reviews the relevant literatures with 
regard to the motives of M&As. Section 2.2 discusses the impact related to the 
resistance of target firm to engage in the M&As. Section 2.3 discusses the informational 
efficiency when price in M&A announcements. Section 2.4 and 2.5 discusses the 
method of payment and merger wave, and their relationships with M&A motives and 
resistance. Section 2.6 provides conclusion of this chapter.  
 
 
 18 
 
2.1 Motives for M&A  
 
Assume the market is not perfectly efficient, following the announcement of an M&A, 
the share price is likely to alter to incorporate the future performance changes of 
acquirers and targets. The motives that are often put forward in M&As as their 
informational effect can influence outcome expectation. As a result, the motive of 
M&As is commonly used to explain ARs surrounding the announcement period (see, 
e.g. Morck et al. 1990; Berkovich and Narayanan, 1993). The various types of motives 
purposed in previous studies and their informational effects are discussed below.  
 
2.1.1 Synergy motive  
The efficiency theory suggests that M&As are mainly motivated by synergistic effect 
where acquirers intend to construct better operating portfolios that increase the 
corporate efficiency of the combined entity. This synergy motive can also be 
incorporated into the theory of maximizing shareholders value. If investors also 
perceive that the acquirers will benefit from the synergistic effect, a positive AR is 
expected around the announcement day (see, e.g. Berkovich and Narayanan, 1993; 
Sharma and Ho, 2002; Hankir et al., 2011; Erel et al., 2015). Two types of synergy 
motives have been proposed in the previous literatures: the operating synergy and the 
financial synergy.   
 
Operating synergy  
The concept of operating synergy suggests that M&As can unify two firms’ corporate 
resources to reduce the marginal production cost. In horizontal and vertical M&As, the 
operating efficiency can be improved by economies of scale or scope that result in 
complementary effect of production lines, reduce the cost of the inventory management 
and increase in distribution networks efficiency (Sharma and Ho, 2002; Lambrecht, 
2004; Lewis and Webb, 2007).  
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Inconsistent with the prediction of synergy motive concept, empirical studies show that 
the M&As do not always lead to the synergistic effect when combining resources. 
Sharma and Ho (2002) find that the corporate acquisitions show insignificant and 
sometimes negative impact on post-acquisition operating performance for the 
combined entity. Behr and Heid (2011) find that M&As tend to result in profitability 
deterioration due to the decline in operational efficiency. It is worth noting that the 
inconsistent estimation of post-acquisition performance can lead to the inconsistent 
M&A outcome measurements. Chatterjee and Meeks (1996) argue that the change of 
accounting practices explains the inconsistent post-acquisition profitability in various 
periods. Sharma and Ho (2002) further suggest that the choice of performance 
indicators can explain the inconsistent results in the previous studies. The study shows 
that the performance indicators can change to various directions and provide contradict 
implications to the performance change after M&As.2 Furthermore, various accounting 
measurements also lead to the different conclusions about the financial benefits of the 
M&As. For instance, Sharma and Ho (2002) measure cash flow on total assets by using 
the book value of total assets, whereas Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) use the 
market value of total assets.  
 
The existence of unrealizable synergistic effects in domestic M&As may also explain 
why many empirical studies find the ARs of the acquirers are typically insignificant or 
negative. For instance, Rau and Vermaelen (1998) find that the US acquirers experience 
insignificant and negative CARs, and similarly, Moeller et al. (2005) find that acquirers 
tend to suffer from significant losses on their stock value. Some studies therefore 
explain negative ARs by the bidders’ managerial entrenchment or hubris (see 
Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Harford, et al, 2012).   
 
In contrast to domestic M&As, empirical studies find that the cross-border M&As are 
                                                   
2 For instance, they find that the efficiency indicators (e.g. return on assets) tend to reveal efficiency 
descending after M&As whilst cash flow indicators (e.g. Cash flow from operations/ total assets) tend 
to show the increase in profitability of the combined entity. 
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more likely to generate significant and positive ARs to the bidders (see e.g. Doukas and 
Travlos, 1988; Francis et al., 2007). The more substantial AR may be explained by 
market segmentation (see, e.g. Erel et al., 2012), and thereby the scale effect can lead 
to higher value creation in the cross-border M&A (see, e.g. Buch and Delong, 2004; 
Campa and Hernando, 2006). 
 
Eun et al. (1996) and Gubbi et al. (2010) further report a reverse internalization pattern 
(i.e. acquirers take over the intangible asset from target to improve their existing 
product lines) in cross-border M&As. The two studies provide the evidence of the 
reverse internalization from two perspectives. Eun et al. (1996) find that acquirer’s 
CARs can be explained by acquirer’s R&D intensity. In their study, the acquirer’s R&D 
intensity has been interpreted as the capability of internalizing target R&D resources. 
Seth et al. (2002), on the other hand, use the target R&D spending as the proxy of 
reverse internalization.3They find that the intangible asset value of target firm positively 
and significantly correlates with the AR of acquirers. The reverse internalization may 
also explain the evidence of cross-border acquisition between emerging and developed 
economy. Kiymaz (2004), Hagendorff et al. (2008) and Boubakri et al. (2008) find that 
acquirers from emerging economies yield higher ARs in cross-border M&As than those 
from developed economies. All three studies emphasize that the acquirers can be benefit 
from voluntarily adopting the more efficient management from targets to increase the 
market value of their assets.   
  
Financial synergy  
  
Lewellen (1971) and Leland (2007) suggest that acquirers can benefit from 
conglomerate M&As that reduce the default risk and increase in debt capacity. 
                                                   
3 Seth et al. (2002) measure the target intangible asset ratio by using formula 
Target R&D,advertising and marketing expenditures
Annual sale revenue of target
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Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Beladi et al. (2013) suggest that vertical M&As can reduce 
the contract cost and cash flow uncertainty. Levy and Sarnat (1970), Shih (1994) and 
Leland (2007) indicate that the reduce in cash follow uncertainty and increase in debt 
capacity provides firms the opportunities to issue cheap debt and to construct an optimal 
capital structure. However, the effect of financial synergy associated with of 
diversification is difficult to be tested empirically.  
 
Laeven and Levine (2007) and Chollet et al. (2011) emphasize that conglomerate 
M&As can also create complementary effect in the acquirer and target firm’s operating 
portfolio. Milbourn et al. (1999) further suggest that the increase in production line 
diversification can encourage the development of acquirer’s management capability, 
and thereby increases the operating efficiency of the combined entities in the long-run. 
Despite the difficulty to isolate the effect of financial synergy, the empirical studies also 
show inconsistent evidence of the shareholder wealth changes associated with 
conglomerate M&As. For instance, Sharma and Ho (2002), Megginson et al. (2004) 
and Doukas and Kan (2008) find that the diversification through M&A reduces the 
acquirer’s business focus and leads to a significant reduction in its operating cash flow. 
This evidence is consistent with the finding of Lang and Stulz (1994), who find that the 
Tobin's Q of the joint entities in diversification M&A is significantly smaller than their 
peers. 
  
Target’s fund cost reduction can be another type of financial synergy. Erel et al. (2015) 
and Khatami et al. (2015) indicate that M&A can relieve target’s financial constraints, 
and thereby increases its corporate efficiency and reduces the cost from 
underinvestment. Francis et al. (2008) further suggest that the reduction of target fund 
cost can explain the significant and positive CARs of acquirers in the cross-border 
M&A. They find that the combined entities realize significant higher post-merger 
operating performance improvement when firms from integrated financial markets with 
lower cost of capital acquiring targets from segmented financial markets. 
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In domestic M&As, the potential loss of synergistic effect and the improvement of 
financial structure may explain the inconsistent evidence of investor behaviours. 
Sherman and Pettway (1987) find that acquirers benefit from a positive but insignificant 
CARs after the diversification M&As. In contrast, Morck et al. (1990), Laeven and 
Levine (2007) and Akdogu (2009) provide evidence that acquirers experience the 
significantly negative stock returns when the M&As are characterized as diversification. 
Furthermore, Morck et al. (1990) and Laeven and Levine (2007) further argue that as 
diversification M&As are likely to result in value decrease of acquirers, these M&As 
can be motivated by empire building. We will further discuss the literature about agency 
cost in section 2.1.3.    
 
In cross-border M&As, the evidence of investor behaviour is still inconsistent. Francis 
et al. (2008) find that acquirers experience significantly higher CARs when they acquire 
targets from segmented financial market. Even so, Santos et al. (2008) still show that 
acquirers are likely to experience diversification discount in cross-border M&As. Scott 
(1977) and Doukas and Kan (2006) test the distribution of financial synergistic value 
between bondholders and shareholders. They find that the value of acquirers’ 
outstanding bonds is significantly increased after the financial conglomerates. They 
argue that the increase in bond value results in a wealth shift from the shareholders to 
the bondholder. Thus, the effects of financial synergy do not appear to impact the stock 
returns of acquirers in both domestic and cross-border M&As. 
  
It is worth noting that most empirical studies show the positive and significant CARs 
experienced by targets regardless the returns of acquirers and regardless the domestic 
or cross-border M&As. (see e.g. Berkovich and Narayanan, 1993; Betton, 2009; Hankir 
et al., 2011). Even when Ahern (2012) and Moeller et al. (2005) adjust the impact from 
size effect to the stock returns, targets still experience significantly higher returns than 
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acquirers.4 Berkovich and Narayanan (1993) and Seth et al. (2002) further find that 
target firms may still experience positive and significant CARs even in value 
destruction M&As. 5  
  
2.1.2 Market power motive  
 
Stigler (1964) suggests that M&As can be used as a method to increase the market 
shares and gain control of the market place. Lambrecht (2004) suggests that the 
combined entity with an increased amount of market shares can be benefit from 
monopoly and monopsony, and thereby increase its bargaining power to the upstream 
and downstream.  
  
The empirical studies provide inconsistent evidence of the explanatory power of market 
power motive. Shahrur (2005) finds that significant and positive CARs are experienced 
by acquirers’ corporate suppliers and customers when acquirers make the M&A 
announcements. This evidence challenges the market power motive concept, as the 
increased market power of the combined entities should impose negative impacts to the 
profit margin of acquirers’ suppliers and customers. On the other hand, the increased 
stock prices of acquirers’ suppliers and customers is in line with the concept of synergy 
motive, as the more efficient combined entities will benefit the demand of their 
suppliers and surplus of their customers. Hankir et al (2011) employ a similar approach 
to measure the market response to the market power change. They find that acquirer 
and its competitors experience significant stock value increase. With an assumption that 
the post-acquisition restructuring will reduce the size of the combined entity and 
thereby increase the market share of every firm in acquirer’s industry, they argue that 
                                                   
4 The idea of adjusting the size effect on the return difference is that if the wealth distribution is not 
significantly associated with the size of acquirer and target, the target should experience higher stock 
return due to their small capitalization.  
5 Both Berkovich and Narayanan (1993) and Seth et al. (2002) define the value destruction M&As by 
the negative total CARs (sum of bidder’s CARs and target’s CARs) 
 24 
 
market power can be a major motive to initiate M&As.6 They further argue that the 
change in market power also explains the size effect, as the bargaining power change is 
more significant to the smaller acquirers.7 The conflict results between Shahrur (2005) 
and Hankir et al (2011) may be resulted by their indirect measurements of market power 
changes. Accordingly, the evidence provided by both studies is not solid to examine the 
concept of market power motive.  
 
Hagendorff et al. (2008) find that the size of the M&A deals does not affect CARs of 
the acquirers. Based on this evidence, they argue that the market power motive does 
explain the CARs of bidders. Consistent with Hagendorff et al. (2008), Devos et al. 
(2008) find that the increase in financial synergies and market power only have weak 
explanatory power to the CARs following M&As. Behr and Heid (2011) and Hankir et 
al. (2011) further argue that the market power should not be regarded as the 
predominant acquisition motive. 
  
2.1.3 Market for corporate control    
 
The concept of market for corporate control suggests that acquisition can be motivated 
by taking over the low effective management in the targets to improve their operating 
efficiency (Manne, 1965). As a result, acquirers can be benefit from the increase in 
market value of the acquired assets. Some previous studies have also used this concept 
to explain the commonly exhibited positive and significant CARs of target firms (see, 
e.g. Akhigbe and Martin, 2000; Malmendier et al., 2016).8 Market for corporate control 
                                                   
6 The corporate restructurings of the combined entities are commonly exhibited, As the restructurings 
can reduce the size of combined entity, the M&A should also increase the market share of acquirers’ 
competitors in the short term (when there is no new competitors entering into this market).     
7 The size effect here is referring to the empirical evidence (see e.g. Moeller et al. 2004) that shows the 
acquisitions initiated by smaller firms tend to generate higher abnormal returns to the acquirers.  
8 Notice that, the positive return of targets can be explained by many other concepts, for instance, 
target revaluation (see, e.g. Bradely et al., 1983). We will further discuss target returns in section 2.5.  
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is also an important reason why governments support M&A activity as it conceptually 
improves the overall market efficiency.   
 
Early empirical studies support the view that market for corporate control motivates the 
outperformed firms to takeover inefficient targets. Rege (1984), Comment and Schwert 
(1995) and North (2001) find that firms with ineffective corporate governance and 
exhibited higher agency costs are more likely to be acquired. In addition, North (2001) 
indicates that once the low efficient firm is acquired, the acquirer is likely to replace 
target’s managers to implement more effective control. Martin and Mcconnell (1991), 
Safieddine and Titman (1999) and Mathews (2007) suggest that the threat of being 
taken over will discipline the top managers of firms, and thereby significantly improve 
firms’ financial performance. This evidence provides an indirect support to the motive 
of market for corporate control.  
 
Notice that, several previous studies have documented so called “financial arbitrage” 
motive in domestic and cross-border M&As. They suggest that the trend of cross-border 
M&As can be explained by currency appreciation (see, e.g. Froot and Stain, 1991; 
Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991) and stock price misevaluation (see, e.g. Shleifer and 
Vishny, 2003; Baker et al., 2009). The financial arbitrage predicts that the appreciation 
of acquirers’ local exchange rate or stock values can significantly facilitates initiating 
cross-border M&As. However, the profit from arbitraging short-term exchange rate 
increase and stock price misevaluation (either overvaluing acquirers or undervaluing 
targets) should be relatively small comparing with the cost of M&A transaction and 
performance change associated with restructuring. Thus, a more possible explanation 
is that the outperformed company (in the sense of high Tobin’s Q) and outperformed 
economy (in the sense of appreciation of its currency) can create more value from 
market for corporate control.   
 
Despite the evidence showing that market for corporate control explains the trend of 
M&As, in practice, acquirers tend not to have strict rules for measuring the exact gains 
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from replacing inefficient management. Neither can they ensure the extent to which 
efficiency can be improved. For instance, Maksimovic et al. (2010) find that the 
efficiency of using target assets does not change significantly after post-acquisition 
restructuring. Thus, the acquisitions motivated solely by the improvement of targets’ 
corporate governance can be somewhat risky, and thereby the market for corporate 
control should not be considered as a predominant motive. Furthermore, acquirer may 
suffer from its over-confidence to improve the target corporate governance, and it has 
been documented as hubris motive. We will further discuss the hubris motive in section 
2.1.4. 
  
In cross-border M&As, market for corporate control can be a more substantial motive 
as Doidge et al. (2007) show that the corporate governance has higher variation at a 
country level. Lel and Miller (2015) find that the threat of M&As significantly increases 
CEO turnovers of the firms from poor shareholder protection countries. In addition, 
when acquirers and targets operate under different corporate governance arrangements, 
the corporate control transaction from acquirers to the targets can generate higher 
corporate efficiency improvement and result in more significant and positive stock 
market response (Hagendorff et al., 2008; Aggarwal et al., 2011). Hernando et al. (2009) 
and Erel et al. (2012) find that firms from country with better accounting disclosure 
system are more likely to acquire targets from less developed markets, and acquirers in 
these M&As are more likely to realize positive CARs. In addition, the less efficient 
enterprises in concentrated market (Hernando et al., 2009) and the enterprises in the 
less regulated market (Caiazza et al., 2012) are more likely to be the targets in cross-
border M&As. Consistent with the market for corporate control, Kiymaz (2004) also 
shows that US acquirers experience higher CARs when they takeover targets from 
developing countries.  
 
Notice that, the market for corporate control may not be the only theory that can explain 
the positive acquirers stock returns in the cross-border M&As when taking over targets 
from less regulated market. Regulatory arbitrage suggested by Karolyi and Taboada 
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(2015) may also explain the evidence as the acquirers from countries with stricter 
regulations can benefit from allocating capitals to less regulated markets to create more 
investment opportunities. Thus, the effect of market for corporate control in the cross-
border M&As should be further tested.    
2.1.3 Agency motive  
 
Agency theory also seeks to explain the motive of M&As. As the power of managers 
and their compensation plans are commonly tied to the size of a firm, managers can use 
M&As to increase their own wealth. The motive that is attributed to agency problem, 
empire-building tendency and managerial entrenchment is often documented as agency 
motive in the previous studies. The concept of agency motive anticipates a potential 
shift of the wealth from shareholders to the managers. Thus, if investors capture the 
existence of agency motive, negative CARs should be arisen (Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993). In addition, targets may also be benefit from weak acquirers’ 
shareholder value protection. As a result, the agency motivated M&As can also lead to 
a wealth shift from acquirers to targets, and higher CARs of the target firms are 
expected (Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf, 2011).  
 
Based on the different proxies used to measure the agency cost, empirical studies 
provide evidence shows inconsistent implications to the effect of agency motive. The 
free cash flow is a proxy that is commonly used to determine the degree of agency cost 
in a firm. Under the free cash flow hypothesis, firms with substantial free cash flow 
provide their managers a high degree of freedom to invest in negative net present value 
projects including M&As to serve for their own wealth (Jensen, 1986). Harford (1999) 
also concludes that rich free cash flow firms are more likely to make value destroying 
M&As. However, McConnell and Servaes (1995) show that free cash flow can prevent 
underinvestment when firms experiencing external investment opportunities. Thus, if 
acquirers foreseen the significant synergy from the integration, managers may increase 
cash holding to prevent the financial constraints. Huang et al. (2013) further suggest 
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that the rate of cash holding is positively correlated with the degree of investors’ 
protection in a firm. The two contradictory interpretations of free cash flow may explain 
the study results of Andrade and Stafford (2004), who test empire-building behaviour 
through expansion priority of the firms with high free cash flow. 9  They find no 
significant evidence to support that the potential agency problematic firms are more 
likely to choose merger (empire-building) than non-merger investment. They argue that 
the acceptance of negative NPV projects may due to an overabundance of available 
cash flows rather than the agency motive. 
  
The choice of target (private or public) and financing method have also been used as 
proxies to identify the agency motive. Fuller et al. (2002) and Harford et al. (2012) find 
that acquirers who disproportionately avoid private targets exhibit lower performance 
synergy and more negative announcement returns. They argue that the managers’ 
avoidance of private targets is due to their higher interests in empire-building rather 
than value creation. Harford et al. (2012) suggest that the high ownership concentration 
of the private target could potentially create a new body of large shareholder who would 
monitor the behaviour of managers. However, this idea may be biased by self-selection 
problem, where acquirers cannot effectively acquire private targets in a hostile manner 
as would otherwise be possible in the secondary market. In addition, the choice of 
payment method and target public status can also be related with other factors such as 
merger waves resulted by industry IPOs (Aktas et al, 2016), and thereby Harford et al. 
(2012) may over simplify this issue with the agency theory. The informational effect of 
the payment method and merger wave will be further discussed in the later sections.   
 
The optimal business boundary is another method to test the agency motive. If the 
motive of an acquisition is empire building, bidders should keep a high retention rate 
of newly acquired assets in order to maximize the size of the integrated firm. 
                                                   
9 In this study, Andrade and Stafford (2004) compare firms’ preference to make a non-merger 
investment and merger.   
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Maksimovic and Phillips (2001) and Maksimovic et al. (2011) find significantly high 
closure and sell ratios for the joint entity. This finding is inconsistent with the empire-
building motive. Gorton et al. (2009) suggest that empire-building is not the sole motive 
for acquisitions.10 They argue that the less efficient performance will result in an 
undervaluation of the acquirer’s share price, and increase the likelihood of being a 
future target. Thus, the threat of being taken over may exceed the desire to increase 
management power.   
  
More recent evidence (e.g. Humphrey and Vale, 2004; Lambrecht, 2004) implies that 
agency motive, if it exists, should not be a dominant motive for initiating M&As. The 
concept of co-existence of multi motives explains the ambiguous correlation between 
agency characteristics of bidders and their CARs. Maksimovic et al. (2011) suggest that 
the overbidding activity and the corresponding negative CARs are associated with the 
misevaluation of potential synergy and the over-confidence of managing the new 
acquired assets rather than the management self-interest. Ozkan (2012) shows that 
although CEOs benefit from increase in compensation after the cross-border 
acquisitions, the bidders do not always experience negative and significant CARs. 
 
2.1.4 Hubris motive 
 
Hubris motive is a theoretical hypothesis proposed by Roll (1986) suggests that 
overconfident acquirers can pay more than the economic value for acquiring target 
firms. Thus, acquirers can suffer from the ‘winner’s curse’. This hypothesis aims to 
explain the evidence of acquirers’ negative stock returns with no significant sign of 
agency motive. This hypothesis argues that the negative stock returns of acquirers are 
resulted by their hubristic managers who overestimate their capacity to create value 
from acquisitions. As hubris managers still intend to act in the shareholder’s interest, 
                                                   
10 The paper used positioning motive and defensive motive as the alternative name of synergy and agency motive.  
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the negative announcement returns will not show a strong correlation with management 
entrenchment and empire building (Malmendier and Tate, 2008). In the later studies, 
the hubris hypothesis has also been used to explain irrational continuous bidding. The 
hubris may cause acquirers to refuse responding the negative stock market signals and 
to believe that investors do not fully understand the economic value of the integration 
(Aktas et al., 2009). Croci and Petmezas (2015) and Malmendier et al. (2011) show that 
the CEO over-confidence explains the M&A frequency.  
 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) find that announcement returns of acquirers with over-
confident CEOs are significantly more negative than that with non-overconfident CEOs. 
In addition, the study suggests that the negative announcement returns are not resulted 
by the agency motive, since the overconfident CEOs also take a high proportion of 
shares ownership in their own companies. However, as the hubris motive is a theoretical 
explanation of the value destroying acquisitions occurring without agency motive 
patterns, the hubris hypothesis lacks projecting the direct causal relationship between 
over-confidence CEOs and value destroying M&As. Furthermore, Banerjee et al. (2015) 
show that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act significantly reduce the risk exposure of 
overconfident CEOs. Thus, the explanatory power of hubris motive may change over 
time. 
 
In contrast to hubris motive, Aktas et al. (2009) suggest that the overbidding is 
associated with the pattern of learning. They suggest that CEOs will improve their target 
selection and the post-acquisition restructuring abilities from the market reactions of 
previous acquisitions. Such improvement will add value to the M&A projects, and 
thereby allow CEOs to accept higher bidding prices and transfer part of synergistic gain 
to targets. However, this theoretical explanation is also lack of support from empirical 
evidence, and would not appear to hold unless acquirers can precisely measure the 
potential synergetic value. Moreover, the value adding only explains the bidding 
premium involved in M&As, but fails to explain the negative CARs. Cai and Vijh (2007) 
use the liquidation hypothesis to explain the overbidding of the acquirer. They argue 
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that shares and options holding by acquirer’s CEOs are not liquid assets at the time of 
the M&A. In order to increase the long-term value of their holdings, CEOs might offer 
a takeover premium to exchange for the undervalued shares of target by paying the 
relatively overvalued shares. This hypothesis follows a similar pattern as financial 
arbitrage, and thereby should not be considered as a dominant motive for M&As.    
  
The cross-holding hypothesis is another explanation of why shareholders of the bidding 
firms tend to initiate value destruction acquisitions. Matvos and Ostrovsky (2008) 
suggest that even though over-bidding will transfer the wealth from bidder to target, 
external (institutional) shareholders who own both companies’ shares will act more 
passively (i.e. not exercise their voting rights to against acquisitions) on the potential 
negative returns due to the compensation from the increase of target shares value. 
However, Harford et al. (2011) indicate that cross-holding imposes an insignificant 
effect on an acquisition decision. Furthermore, they find that most shareholders of the 
acquirers only hold a small fraction of target shares, and such small fraction does not 
hedge the loss from the value destruction. Even in some rare cases that shareholders 
hold substantial shares of both target and acquirer firms, the acquirer does not bid more 
aggressively than others.   
  
Merger wave or economic shock have also been used to explain the over-bidding 
pattern. Akdogu (2011) argues that firms need to acquire new assets in response to 
economic shocks, and fail to do so will reduce their competitive edge. Thus, acquirers 
will accept the negative CARs, since they realize that to lose the target to a rival will 
impose a more significant cost to their future performance. Bradley et al. (1983) support 
for this view with the evidence showing that significantly negative CARs exhibited 
when acquirers have lost their biddings. However, this explanation is inconsistent with 
the evidence provided by merger wave studies, as acquirers are more likely to 
experience positive CARs in the early period of merger waves. Furthermore, the 
concept proposed by Akdogu (2011) cannot explain the over-bidding in non-wave 
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periods.11   
 
As the conclusion of the reviews of M&A motive studies, we show that the concepts of 
M&A motive are a set of theoretical explanations for the market behaviours of the 
announcement returns. As a result, the measurement of motives becomes a critical issue 
in most empirical studies. The use of different estimation methods can be an important 
source of contradiction. For instance, Laeven and Levine (2007) suggest the negative 
market response is resulted by the agency motive. However, Maksimovic et al (2011) 
suggest that acquirers with negative CARs do not passively retain all assets acquired in 
a merger, and thereby the negative CARs are not necessarily resulted by the agency 
motive. In the study of synergy motive, this problem even becomes more difficult. 
Studies use both post-acquisition performance and announcement return to measure the 
synergy motive, and makes the empirical results less comparable across different 
studies. This kind of self-explained study design cannot provide solid evidence to 
identify M&A motives. In other words, the motive theories cannot accurately depict the 
theoretical situation, and the empirical tests are not powerful enough to capture the 
predicted effects. It can also be the case that several theoretical predictions are at work 
in a given situation. The job of the empiricist is to unbundle the theoretical predictions 
and to come up with a set of valid empirical tests.  
2.2 Resistance of M&As  
 
Empirical studies (see, e.g. Ruback, 1983; Lys and Vincent, 1995) show that resistance 
of M&As not only increase the chance of withdraw, but also has a close relationship 
with takeover premium. If the market can efficiently anticipate the potential 
overbidding activity from resistance, the resistance should at least partially explain the 
negative CARs experienced by acquirers and the positive CARs experienced by targets. 
This section will review the previous studies that focus on bidding resistance and the 
                                                   
11 We will further discuss the merger wave effect in section 2.3.  
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corresponding bidding. In addition, this section will discuss the informational effects 
when the stock market perceives takeover resistance.  
 
2.2.1 Tender offer, bargaining power and takeover premium 
 
The bidding premium and CARs of the negotiation based merger agreement and auction 
based tender offer has been evaluated by several M&A studies (e.g. Baron, 1983; 
Travlos, 1987). The main difference between merger and tender offer is the participants 
of the competitors. The merger deal normally takes place between acquirers and targets. 
The tender offer represents the type of deals, where acquirers directly purchase target 
shares from shareholders. As a result, the third-party bidders can easily participate into 
the biding competition. The tender offer mechanism is resulted either from the external 
competition, where multiple bidders enter into the bidding competition, or from target 
hostility, where target managers reject the initial offer and force acquirers to directly 
negotiate with the target shareholders (Eckbo, 2009). Most countries’ antitrust laws 
require bidders to publish pre-merger notifications when bidders’ target share 
purchasing excesses a certain amount (threshold). In addition, many countries’ business 
acquisition laws (e.g. the U.S. Williams Act) require tender offer to open for certain 
period of time to allow target shareholders to receive higher bids. Thus, some 
theoretical studies (e.g. Baron, 1983; Burkart, 1995) suggest that tender offer will 
potentially increase the resistance for each single bidder, and thereby increase the final 
premium of the deal. As a result, the acquirers who bid through tender offer are more 
likely to receive negative CARs.  
 
The empirical studies (e.g. Betton et al., 2008; Betton et al., 2009; Eckbo, 2009) show 
that deals with merger agreement do not always involve lower premiums than the tender 
offers. 12  Eckbo (2009) suggests that the potential involvement of the third-party 
                                                   
12 Betton et al. (2008) reported that the tender offer generally pays a lower premium than merger deal 
when they used M&A samples from1980 to 2002. Betton et al. (2009), however, showed that the tender 
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competitors can also threaten bidders in a merger deal, since the target is permitted to 
reject the initial agreement after they receive more valuable offers. Thus, the 
‘ambiguous’ boundary between merger deals and tender offers explains why the 
acquirers use the overbidding strategy to prevent the potential competitors even in a 
friendly merger deal. Burkart (1995) and Aktas et al. (2010) also indicate that in a less 
competitive market, where few competing bidding offers can be observed, bidders will 
still offer premiums to respond to the pressures from potential competitors. Even so, 
Schwert (2000) finds a significant correlation between the hostility and the usage of 
tender offer. However, the study also finds mixed results for the correlation between the 
hostility and the bidding premium. The study shows that the low success rate un-
negotiated tender offers pay a slightly lower premium in their average sample 
transactions. Meanwhile, deals characterized as hostile by Dow Jones News Retrieval 
(DJNR) and Security Data Company (SDC) show a higher average premium in the data 
sample. Thus, Schwert (2000) suggests that the inconsistent premiums are associated 
with the bargaining power rather than the hostility of the acquisition. Cai and Vijh 
(2007) and Aktas et al. (2010) also draw the same conclusion when they evaluate the 
correlation between auction cost of target firm (the degree of seeking liquidation) and 
the final bidding premiums. In addition, Eckbo (2009) finds that the average premiums 
of the M&A in 1980s (when most of the hostile bids took place) are significantly lower 
than in 1990s. He argues that the hostility is only the response to the low premium 
offered in the initial bid, and the initial bid premium is the most important parameter 
that affects the characteristic of the deal.  
 
Grossman and Hart (1980) propose a theoretical model that explains the correlation 
between the free-rider problem and the takeover premium.13 In this model, all the 
                                                   
offers pay higher premium (2.9% higher in initial bid and 5.7% higher in final bid) when they used a 
sample period from 1973 to 2002.  
13 To illustrate, suppose the v is the value increase of the target after acquisition, and p is the price 
given by the tender offer. Assume the value of target share is equal to zero. When target shareholders 
receive a tender offer, the expected value of the share becomes: Prob (Success/Retain)v. Suppose the 
target is owned by large amount of non-cooperative shareholders, and neither of whom has a 
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potential synergistic value will be transferred to the target shareholder if the bidder 
successfully acquires the target.14 However, in practice, the free rider problem may not 
be as severe as the model suggests. Indeed, the high degree of ownership dispersion is 
rare in modern corporations. Holderness (2006) and La Porta et al. (1999) indicate that 
across world major economies, relatively few firms are widely held by non-cooperative 
shareholders. On the other hand, the large shareholders are commonly observed across 
all small, medium and large capitalization firms.  
 
The ambiguous impact on the bidding premium can explain the inconsistent CARs 
associated with various takeover methods. Schwert (2000) finds that the deals 
characterized as tender offer, auction and hostile have an insignificant impact on the 
CARs of acquirers. He also suggests that the indistinguishable CARs between friendly 
merger and hostile takeover may be the result of ambiguous definition of what a hostile 
takeover is. Since the takeover premium is incorporated into the M&A bargaining, the 
hostility may only be associated with the low premium that the bidder is willing to pay. 
Bradley (1980) finds that the bidding firm receives significant and positive CARs in 
the successful tender offers. This study assumes the tender offer functions as the 
takeover for corporate governance, and argues that positive CARs are associated with 
the expectation of more efficient usage of target resources. Betton et al. (2007) and 
Betton et al. (2008) also find that the bidding firms receive significantly negative CARs 
in the merger deal and positive CARs in the tender offer. Although both studies do not 
provide the direct explanation of why the returns of merger deal and tender offer are 
different, both studies suggest that the auction method (toehold) may influence the 
premium and the observed CARs.15 
                                                   
substantial amount of shares that influence the successful of the acquisition. Thus, the expected value 
of target share after M&A becomes v. Based on this expectation, the best strategy of the existing 
shareholders is to restrict the tender offer (since the rational tender value p offered by rational bidder 
will be less than v). 
14 If all target shareholders restrict to tender their shares, the offer cannot success.  
15 Bidder’s abnormal returns by using the tender offer are insignificantly positive in Betton et al. 
(2007) and Betton et al. (2009), but significantly positive in Betton et al. (2008) 
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2.2.2 Toehold and Termination fees 
 
Toehold and termination fees are two typical methods that are used by bidder to prevent 
the success of the M&A. Toehold refers to the bidding strategy that the bidder purchases 
target outstanding stock before announcing the takeover intention. Termination fee 
exists in friendly merger deals, where the target firms agree to compensate bidders when 
the target decided to terminate the merger deal.    
 
Toehold (pre-offer ownership stake in the target) is commonly used in tender offers.16 
Chowdry and Jegadeesh (1994) propose a theoretical model suggests that the usage of 
toehold can reduce the free-rider problem in the tender offers, and thereby increase the 
successful rate of biddings and reduce the final premiums.  
 
Betton and Eckbo (2000) test the function of toeholds in the bidding contests. This 
study finds a significantly negative correlation between the usage of toehold and the 
final premium of the deal. This empirical evidence is consistent with the theoretical 
model. In addition, this study finds that the toeholds will significantly increase the 
single-bid success rate and reduce the hostile response from the target. Betton and 
Eckbo (2000) suggest that the toehold provides the competitive advantage to the 
bidders, and thereby reduces the potential bidding competition and the subsequent final 
premium. Betton et al. (2007) suggest that toeholds impose an expectation on the 
auction outcome, and thereby increase the willingness of the entrenched target 
managements to accept the offer. Betton et al. (2009) also find that the usage of toehold 
is negatively correlated with the final premium of the acquisition. In addition, they find 
that the use of toehold has declined steadily in friendly merger environment of the early 
1980s, but still is the norm in hostile bids. They argue that the toehold, especially short-
                                                   
16 Betton et al. (2009) reported that toehold M&A has declined steadily since the early 1980s, and now 
is rarely used in friendly merger, but still commonly used in the hostile tender offer.  
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term toehold has been treated as a signal of hostility17, where toehold can potentially 
impose a cost on the entrenched target managers by increasing the probability that the 
initial bidder wins the deal. Therefore, the usage of toehold is more likely to cause the 
target to reject friendly merger negotiations.  
 
Betton and Eckbo, (2000) and Betton et al., (2009) show that toehold bidders 
experience a significantly higher average CARs compared with zero-toehold bidders. 
The result of both studies implies that the market has incorporated the effect of toeholds 
into the announcement returns. In addition, the commonly used toehold strategy in the 
hostile tender offers may explain the different CARs between the merger deal and the 
tender offer.  
 
Termination fees have been commonly applied in recent merger deals. The initial 
function of termination fee is to protect the shareholders’ wealth of both bidder and 
target.18 Since the termination fee increases the breaking up cost of the target, it not 
only increases the successful rate of the merger deal, but also violates the wealth of the 
target shareholder to choose the highest bidding price. The effects of the termination 
fees are often tested under two contradictory hypotheses: the agency hypothesis, and 
the efficiency hypothesis. The agency hypothesis assumes that the target managers use 
the termination fee to lock up their personal profit on certain merger deal, and to 
eliminate the possibility that the hostile bidders may replace the current management 
after the successful takeover. 19  Thus, agency hypothesis suggests that to use the 
termination fee will result in a negative effect to target shareholders’ welfare. The 
efficiency hypothesis assumes that the termination fees act as the compensation to the 
                                                   
17 This evidence is inconsistent with the empirical finding of Betton and Eckbo (2000), which showed 
the toehold negatively correlated to the target hostility. The contradictory evidence may come from the 
inconsistent definition of hostility. Betton and Eckbo (2000) also showed that toeholds are mainly used 
in tender offer, and this evidence consist with the argument of hostile effect in Betton et al. (2009) 
18 The termination fee is mainly used to protect bidder’s wealth. However, in recent years, more and 
more bidder fee grants have been observed in the merger deals (Bates and Lemmon, 2003).  
19 Hartzell et al. (2003) observed side payments to target management in ‘friendly’ merger deals.  
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bidding cost from bidders, and encourage potential bidders to initiate the M&A 
(Berkovitch and Khanna, 1990). Thus, the efficiency hypothesis suggests that 
termination fee will benefit the target shareholders by encouraging more potential 
bidders.  
  
Bates and Lemmon (2003) and Officer (2003) indicate that termination fees granted by 
targets impose substantially positive impact on the deal completion. Both studies show 
that acquirers with an offer of termination fee provide an average higher premium to 
the target. In addition, they show that target firms that provide termination fee 
agreement receive 3% higher CARs. On the other hand, they also find that the deals 
with termination fee would not impose a significant influence on the CARs of the 
bidders. Thus, they suggest that the usage of termination fee serves to target 
shareholder’s wealth by encouraging more potential bidders. Andre et al. (2007) also 
evaluate the effect of termination fee under agency and efficiency hypotheses. The 
study finds that the termination fee does not correlate with the directors’ post acquisition 
compensation such as position retaining or golden parachutes, and concludes that 
termination fee has been used as a contractual device to serve target shareholders. On 
the other hand, the study finds that the use of termination fee does not impose a 
significant effect on the final premium and the target CARs.20 This study argues that 
the termination fee and bidding premium are jointly established during the negotiation 
process, and thus the market will not react differently to the level of termination fees in 
the deal.  
 
Jeon and Ligon (2011) evaluate the effect of various size of termination fee in the 
merger deal. They find that the low and medium levels of termination fees exhibit the 
significantly positive correlation with the completion of the deal. However, the high-
level termination fees exhibit the significant and negative effect on the completion of 
the high premium deals. They find that the market in general does not react to the 
                                                   
20 This study did not test the bidder’s CARs.  
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information of termination fee, but will show negative response to the target CARs if 
they use ‘unreasonable’ high level of termination fees. The study argues that the 
provision of high value termination fees determines the agency problem in the target 
firms. However, this explanation is inconsistent with the common practices that higher 
terminations can provide stronger effect to lock up the deals. Moreover, it is 
unreasonable to believe that the target managers tend to ‘use’ high value termination 
fee to break up the merger deals. Thus, a more realistic explanation is that the existence 
of high premium merger deal indicates the high value of the target. Thus, the low 
completion rate may be the result of strong bidding competition and causing target to 
end the current merger deal to seek higher premiums.  
   
2.2.3 Defensive strategies from targets  
 
The defensive mechanisms are normally used when a firm is under the threat of being 
a hostile takeover target. This mechanism serves the interest of both target management 
and the shareholders. Essentially, shareholders can adopt the defensive strategy to 
prevent the firm value disruption by hostile acquisitions. Target management may use 
the defensive mechanism to remain entrenched in the sense that target CEOs are more 
likely to be replaced after the acquisitions (see e.g. Barclay and Holderness, 1991). 
Several M&A studies suggest that the usage of the defensive mechanism implies the 
agency problem in the firm, and thereby reduces the potential bidding premium (e.g. 
Manry and Stangeland, 2004). However, Bradley et al. (1983) argue that firms with 
defensive mechanisms will still receive high CARs due to the market anticipation that 
the low effective management will ultimately be replaced in the future. Comment and 
Schwet (1995) and Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf (2011) suggest that the defensive 
mechanisms can increase the bargaining power of the targets, and thereby potentially 
increase the final takeover premium. As a result, the defensive mechanisms will give 
rise to the positive CARs. The defensive mechanisms can be classified into two types: 
the general defensive mechanisms that affect all potential acquirers, and the specific 
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mechanisms that aim at specific bidders. The following section will introduce the 
dominant anti-takeover strategies of both types, and evaluate their influences on the 
bidding premium and the announcement returns.  
 
Poison Pill  
 
Poison pill (shareholder rights plan) is a typical general defensive mechanism that 
discourages all the potential bidders. Poison pill dilutes the acquirer’s shareholding by 
issuing the rights of purchasing cheap shares to the existing shareholders. As a result, 
the poison pill increases the difficulty of acquirers to acquire over 50% target shares. 
Since the nature of the pill is akin to a dividend, the pill can be adopted anytime without 
shareholder vote. 
 
Recent empirical studies show inconsistent results on whether the effect of poison pill 
will impose a significant effect on the final premium and the bidder’s CARs. Comment 
and Schwert (1995) find that poison pill does not reduce the likelihood of being 
acquired. Instead, the target with poison pill will significantly increase the takeover 
premium. On the other hand, the study also finds a significantly positive correlation 
between the firm size and the probability to adopt poison pill. This evidence weakens 
the argument that poison pill imposes a direct effect on the final bidding premium, since 
the pill can possibly be a proxy of the relative size effect (see Leland, 2007), where the 
larger targets normally own more bargaining power over the smaller ones. Danielson 
and Karpoff (2006) provide a positive correlation between the likelihood of being taken 
over and short-term pill adoption. In addition, they find that targets with poison pill 
receive significantly higher CARs than no-pill targets. Thus, they suggest that the 
poison pill has been used as a bargaining tool rather than the defensive strategy to add 
barrier to the potential bidders. Betton et al. (2009) find a contradictory result of the 
effect of poison pill. They show that poison pill significantly increases the probability 
of no bidder wins outcome. In addition, they find that poison pill will not impose a 
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significant effect on the bidding premium and bidder’s CARs. Both findings of this 
study are inconsistent with Comment and Schwert (1995). The inconsistent results may 
come from the simultaneous existence of several bidding and defensive strategies. For 
instance, Officer (2003) finds that when bidders initiate M&As towards the targets with 
poison pill, bidders appear to acquire significantly greater toeholds.   
 
Change of Capital Structure and Share Repurchase   
 
Share repurchase and increase in short-term leverage ratio are two defensive 
mechanisms that discourage all the potential bidders. In practice, these two strategies 
are often used at the same time. Stulz (1988) provides a control model, which suggests 
that managers can increase their voting control via issuing debts to repurchase shares. 
As a result, the repurchase increases the cost to the hostile bidder to acquire target shares. 
Sinha (1991) provides a theoretical model that assumes the share repurchase as a kind 
of reinvestment to the firm. He suggests that share repurchase will increase the 
acquisition cost to allocate the external resource to investment in the firm explicitly.  
 
Gervey and Hanka (1999) and Safieddine and Titman (1999) provide the consistent 
evidence that proves the leverage ratio has been used to deter the hostile takeovers. In 
addition, both studies suggest that the high leverage ratio will increase the bidding 
premium on a successful bid. Billett and Xue (2007) find that firms conduct share 
repurchase when they anticipate the high probability to become takeover targets. In 
addition, the study finds that firms that conduct share repurchase does not reduce their 
probability to be acquired. Thus, this study argues that share repurchase is served as a 
bargaining power mechanism rather than a defensive mechanism.  
 
Unlike the poison pill that can be launched at any time when the firm receives hostile 
takeover offers, the share repurchase mechanism requires the target firms to have 
certain extent of cash flow or to have the ability to issue debt. Billett and Xue (2007) 
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find that the size and the extent of free cash flow significantly influence the probability 
of target to conduct a share repurchase. These requirements may make the studies of 
share repurchase very detailed and context specific. In addition, the size and free cash 
flow can also impose effects on both bidding premium and announcement return. Thus, 
the more recent studies tend not to include the short-term share repurchase in their 
testing variables.  
 
Greenmail  
 
Greenmail is a type of defensive mechanism that aims at specific acquirers. Greenmail 
refers to the activity that target management repurchases the target’s shares from the 
hostile acquirer. Giammarino et al. (1997) suggest that greenmail potentially increases 
the takeover premium by eliminating a lower value bidder from the competition, and 
thus encouraging new potentially higher valued bidder. In addition, the study finds that 
firms with more free cash flows are more likely to use greenmail as a strategy to prevent 
the disrupted takeover. Thus, the study argues that greenmail can also reduce the free 
cash flow (agency) problem of the target.   
  
Since greenmail requires the target firms to pay a premium to the hostile acquirers, 
several studies (e.g. Ang and Tucker, 1988) indicate that the usage of greenmail exhibits 
the agency problem of the target. Manry and Nathan (1999) find that firms with higher 
level of external board directors are less likely to pay high premium greenmail. Manry 
and Stangeland (2004) find that firms with lower operating performance near the 
takeover announcement are more likely to use greenmail to deter the hostile takeover. 
The evidence from both studies confirms the agency hypothesis that entrenched 
management tends to sacrifice shareholders’ wealth to maintain their job position.   
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2.2.4 Bargaining power and bidding premium 
 
Schwert (2000) suggests that bargaining power difference between acquirers and targets 
determines the final takeover premium. Cai and Vijh (2007) find that target CEOs may 
voluntarily accept low takeover premium due to the willingness to liquidize their 
shareholding in the short term. The study suggests that the targets CEOs’ illiquidity 
discount reduces their bargaining power, and thereby reduces the resistance for being 
taken over. Gupta et al (1997) find that the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, 
and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) imposes a significant effect on the smaller 
firms’ willingness to be acquired. The study finds that after 1989, the acquisition 
between large acquirers and smaller targets results in higher CARs to the acquirers and 
lower CARs to the targets due to the bargaining power change. Ahern (2012) evaluates 
the synergy distribution in the vertical M&A, and tests the correlation between 
bargaining power differences in the supply chain and the distribution of total CARs. 
The study finds that when the bidder belonging to the industry owns higher bargaining 
power than that of the targets, the acquirers tend to experience higher CARs.  
 
Although many empirical studies find the consistent result to support the bargaining 
power hypothesis, the hypothesis seems to be not consistent with the size effect, which 
suggests that smaller acquirers tend to receive higher ARs.21 Moeller et al. (2004) 
suggest that the large acquirers tend to pay higher premium and experience higher post 
acquisition restructuring cost. Thus, the increase in bargaining power is not able to trade 
off cost increase, and thereby the large acquirers are more likely to experience negative 
ARs. 
 
                                                   
21 Although bargaining power can depend on many other factors, the smaller firms generally have less 
bargaining power than larger firms.  
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2.2.5 Resistance in cross-border M&As  
 
The information efficiency barriers will increase the resistance of cross-border M&As 
due to the long geographical and cultural distance between the acquirers and the targets. 
Buch and Delong (2004), Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008) and Siegel et al. (2011) suggest 
that difference in language significantly hold back the cross-border merger activities. 
Focarelli and Pozzolo (2008) and Siegel et al. (2011) further argue that the culture 
distance imposes a significantly negative effect on the international investment flows. 
Kiymaz (2004) suggests that the exchange rate may also affect the wealth of the 
bidding. However, considering that the M&A deal clear date is normally later than the 
announcement date, the exchange rate may not impose significant effect on the CARs 
near announcement date.    
  
Risk reduction mechanisms show various effects on the cross-border M&As. Mantecon 
(2009) finds that toehold does not impose significant effect on the acquirers’ CARs. 
Rather, bidders operate acquired assets in a joint venture experience significant and 
positive CARs. Boubakri et al. (2008) find that bidders acquiring with tender offer 
experience higher returns than using mergers, although both methods lead to positive 
and significant long-term CARs.  
 
Several studies find that regulation environment of target firms influence the acquirers’ 
wealth in cross-border M&As. Buch and Delong (2004) show that poor information 
transparency in the target country significantly discourages the takeover activities. In 
contrast, Kiymaz (2004) and Hagendorff et al. (2012) show that bidders tend to pay 
higher premium to the target in more favourable economic condition. The high 
premium may explain the finding from Kiymaz (2004), Hagendorff et al. (2008) and 
Boubakri et al. (2008), where targets with low shareholder’s protection environment 
experience CARs. These studies argue that the higher returns are the compensation to 
the shareholders of acquiring firms to bear the additional risks. 
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As a conclusion, the previous theoretical and empirical studies show that the resistance 
and hostility may only be a response to the initial bidding premium of the acquirers, 
and thereby the final premium and CARs may not correlate with the target resistance. 
Although the bidding and defensive strategies can impose a significant effect on the 
premium, the simultaneously existence of various strategies may distort the results of 
the empirical studies. In addition, most studies of takeover resistance dismiss the 
potential synergy from the M&As, where positive and significant CARs may correlate 
with the synergistic effect of M&As. In cross-border M&As, acquirers may experience 
higher resistance and risks than domestic M&As (see, e.g. Buch and Delong, 2004; 
Focarelli and Pozzolo, 2008). Many bidding strategies may not be able to impose 
significant effect on reducing the risks in biddings. However, empirical studies show 
inconsistent relationship between risks and CARs. Boubakri et al. (2008) and Mantecon 
(2009) suggest that bidders experience higher CARs in lower risk biddings, whereas 
Hagendorff et al. (2008) and Boubakri et al. (2008) find that shareholders experience 
higher CARs to compensate for the risks bearing.  
 
2.3 Measurement of M&A announcement effect     
 
If the market is efficient, the CARs observed during the M&A announcement period 
should be contributed by the expectation of the change performance after the M&A and 
the wealth transfer due to the takeover premium. However, a number of studies (e.g. 
Hong and Stein, 1999; Jegadeesh and Titman, 2002) suggest that investors commonly 
overreact or underreact to the market information. In the field of M&A studies, for 
instance, Moeller et al. (2004) and Moeller et al. (2005) show that acquisitions initiated 
during 2000 and 2001 result in extremely high stock value destruction. Moeller et al. 
(2005) argue that “losses this large are unlikely to be explained by the acquisition 
alone…acquiring firm shareholders would have been better off if management had 
burned the cash or shares used to pay for the acquisition…” (:765). This evidence 
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explicitly suggests the existence of overreaction in the announcement returns. Thus, the 
following section will review the previous studies that focus on the rationality of 
investors and their responding to the M&A announcement.  
 
2.3.1 Efficient market hypothesis and Announcement return measurement  
 
The efficient market hypothesis and the behavioural hypothesis have been widely used 
to explain the stock returns in the capital market. The efficient market hypothesis 
suggests that the stock price will correctly and instantly react to the market information, 
whereas the behavioural hypothesis suggests that current changes in the stock price are 
mainly resulted by the previous over- or under-reactions.  
 
Fama (1965) tests the predictability of future stock price. The study concludes that the 
stock price follows a random walk pattern, where the future stock price does not 
correlate with the previous movement. The study suggests that the change in stock price 
is only resulted by the new information.  
 
The evidence against the random walk pattern is documented by later studies. Lo and 
Mackinlay (1988) find positive serial correlation in the weekly holding period returns, 
and this positive serial correlation is especially strong for the small capitalization 
stocks. This evidence shows an under-reaction pattern in the short-term stock returns, 
which challenges the random walk hypothesis. However, the study also shows the 
pattern of under-reaction disappears in the sub sample of large capitalization firms in a 
monthly based observation interval. Therefore, the study argues that the result does not 
necessarily reject the efficient market hypothesis, instead imposes restrictions upon 
asset pricing models.  
 
Jegadeesh (1990) shows the serial correlation in the returns of medium holding period, 
which is highly significant in the twelve-month returns. He suggests that the empirical 
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result rejects the random walk hypothesis with an explicit momentum pattern in the 
returns of a medium stock holding period. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) argue that 
previous winners (i.e. high return stocks) tend to continuously realize higher returns in 
the medium term. Jegadeesh and Titman (2001) and Jegadeesh and Titman (2002) test 
the cross-sectional factors in the momentum pattern. Both studies suggest that the 
momentum pattern is not attributed to the cross-sectional factors such as firm size and 
industry characteristics, as the momentum pattern exists in both large and small stocks 
and the market beta for previous winner and loser are virtually equal.  
 
Although the random walk hypothesis has been rejected by recent empirical studies, 
most of these studies still argue that the short and medium term over- and under-reaction 
does not suggest the market inefficiency, rather the adjustments for the mispricing of 
the new information. De Bondt and Thaler (1985), Fama and French, (1988), Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) and Jeadeesh and Titman (2001) find the stock price of previous 
losers tend to show a significantly reversal pattern in the longer horizon, and Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993) find that the abnormal return realized by medium term momentum 
will be significantly reduced in the long term.  
 
Hong and Stein (1999) characterized investors into two “boundedly rational agents”: 
news watchers and momentum traders. The study suggests that the news watchers are 
more likely to underreact in the short run due to the gradual diffusion of new 
information. Such under-reaction can create arbitrage opportunity to the momentum 
traders. On the other hand, if most momentum traders do not incorporate the true value 
of the stock with their trading strategies, their arbitrage strategy will lead to 
overreaction in longer horizons. As a result, when news watchers realize the prices have 
already overshot the long-run equilibrium, a reversal pattern will be observed in the 
long horizon returns. Fama (1998) suggests that the market anomalies are chance and 
temporary results. In respond to the market information, the market anomalies split 
randomly between overreaction and under-reaction. Fama (1998) and Titman (2002) 
argue that the market will adjust the previous under-reaction and overreaction, and 
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thereby the long-term return anomalies will disappear. In addition, Fama (1998) 
indicates that the inappropriate estimation model is the main reason that leads to long-
term anomalies shown in previous studies.    
 
The efficient market hypothesis is the fundamental principle of many M&A studies. It 
assumes that market will efficiently incorporate the gains or losses to M&A in the 
CARs. However, the rejection on the random walk hypothesis (e.g. Lo and Mackinlay, 
1988; Jegadeesh, 1990; Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) suggests that the change in wealth 
associated with M&As may not be instantly reflected in the stock price. The mispricing 
resulted from over-reaction or under-reaction may violate the ‘normal returns’ used as 
the benchmark of the announcement effect. This means that the empirical model needs 
to capture market anomalies that can affect the abnormal returns. 
 
2.4.2 Long-term and Short-term event studies 
  
The empirical studies that use different event windows show results of the post-
acquisition stock returns of the bidding and target firms. Most long-term post-
acquisition performance studies suggest that the bidding firms tend to suffer from either 
insignificant or negative CARs (e.g. Limmack, 1991; Agrawal et al., 1992; Gregory, 
1997). In short term event windows, although most UK and US based M&A studies 
report the insignificant or negative CARs of bidding firms (e.g. Dodd, 1980; Higson 
and Elliot, 1998), some studies show that the bidding firms in Europe (Campa and 
Hernando, 2004) and Canada (Ben-Amar and Andre, 2006) realize positive CARs. 
Notice that some early short run studies (e.g. Asquith et al., 1983; Franks and Harris, 
1989) show the significant positive returns to the acquirers. This may be because the 
sample periods used in these studies (i.e. acquirers earn high abnormal returns in early 
periods such as 1950s and 1960s from the imperfect anti-trust regulations).  
 
Researchers show conflicting views toward choosing the appropriate event window to 
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examine the share returns. Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) suggest that investors tend to 
overreact to new information. The short event window may not be able to capture the 
pre-announcement price mark up (Fama, 1998). In addition, stock returns observed by 
short event windows can be influenced by market anomalies such as the January effect 
(see. Jegadeesh, 1990).  
 
Even though the long-term event study can reduce the bias from investor’s overreaction, 
the conceptual framework of the long-term study has significant problems. Kothari and 
Warner (1997), Lyon et al. (1999) and Sudarsanam and Mahate (2006) suggest that 
short event windows will provide a better estimation of CARs, which may eliminate 
the misspecification problem (the abnormal returns are not sensitive to the specific 
performance benchmarks) in the long run event windows. Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2006) argue that the CARs estimated in long horizon windows are influenced by the 
overlapping events and positively skewed (not normally distributed) abnormal returns. 
In addition, they argue that the asset pricing model commonly used in the long run 
studies can influence the CARs by the bad model problem.  
  
2.4.3 Abnormal estimation models 
 
To test price behaviours during M&As, researchers usually use asset pricing models. 
Single factor Capital asset pricing model (CAPM), Fama-French three-factor CAPM, 
and Carhart four-factor CAPM are the main asset pricing models used in the M&A 
studies (see, e.g. Eun et al., 1996; Moeller et al., 2004; Gregory, 1997; Alexandridis et 
al., 2006; Aybar and Ficici, 2009).  
 
CAPM is introduced by Sharpe (1964), which emphasizes the correlation between the 
expected returns and systematic risks. Fama and French (1992) and Fama and French 
(1993) indicate that the size and book to market ratio contains the explanatory power 
to the variation in the stock returns. Fama and French (1993) extend the asset-pricing 
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model by including the size (SML) and book to market ratio (HML) portfolios in the 
CAPM model. Compared with standard CAPM, the three-factor CAPM shows less 
biased estimation (Fama and French, 1997) and significantly reduces the market return 
anomalies (Fama and French, 1996). Carhart (1997) accounts the momentum factor that 
is observed by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993), and further constructs a four-factor model 
with the additional factor: one-year momentum (PR1YR). This study suggests that the 
one-year momentum significantly explains the return of portfolio. However, Aretz et al. 
(2010) suggest that the Carhart model does not always outperform the Fama-French 
model.   
 
In the M&A event studies, the choice of the pricing model is important since tests of 
market efficiency require that economic agents are rational and that the researcher has 
an equilibrium-based model to test the pattern of returns. In this regard, the Fama-
French and Carhart models are considered to be equilibrium based models, and thereby 
should outperform to the standard CAPM. Empirically, Fama and French (1996) 
suggest that the market return anomalies significantly disappear under the Fama-French 
three-factor model. In addition, the study suggests that Fama-French three-factor model 
can also capture the long-term reversal pattern, where previous losers tend to have 
positive coefficients of SML and HML. Barber and Lyon (1997) suggest that using 
index to measure the long run return will cause misspecification due to the new listing, 
rebalancing and positively skewed abnormal returns. They argue that by controlling the 
size and book to market ratio via applying Fama-French three-factor model will reduce 
the misspecification problem in the measuring the benchmark of abnormal returns.   
 
The bad model problem is the main weakness in the asset pricing measurements. Fama 
and French (1993) suggest that three-factor model overestimates the returns during the 
IPO or SEO sample period. Fama and French (1997) argue that the constant risk loading 
and imprecise estimation of risk premium will result in the bad model problem. 
However, even to replace the constant slope regression by the rolling regression, it only 
results in the small improvement of the forecast errors.     
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2.3.3 Volatility and trading volume 
  
Although neither the Fama-French three-factor model nor Carhart four-factor models 
contains the volatility as an estimator of the expected return, the correlation between 
volatility and the return has been discussed in many financial studies. French et al. 
(1987) find a positive relationship between expected return and the stock price 
volatility. Consistent with French et al. (1987), Banerjee et al. (2007) find that the 
volatility provides strong prediction ability to the return of the stock portfolio even 
control the four risk factors proposed by Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997). 
Jones et al. (1994) and Antweiler and Frank (2004) suggest that volatility is associated 
with the disagreement of market information, which is more likely to increase the 
trading volume of the stock. Shive (2012) suggests that investors with privileged 
information (local investors) reduce the volatility and increase the expected return, and 
thereby reduce the CARs exhibited near the merger announcement.  
 
Amihud (2002), Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) and Bekaert et al. (2007) use the trading 
volume as a proxy of illiquidity of the firms. When comparing the trading volume with 
the change of stock price, it shows the capacity of the shareholders can buy or sell their 
shares without introducing a significant share price change. Under the equilibrium 
perspective, Amihud (2002) predicts that high illiquidity type firms should experience 
higher ARs in order to compensate for the risks from illiquidity.  
 
2.4 Merger wave  
 
Previous studies (e.g. Lambrecht, 2004; Kadyrzhanova and Rhordes-Kropf, 2011) show 
a change in the average abnormal return of the bidding firm in the different stage of a 
merger wave. Empirical studies find that the acquirers benefit from high CARs in the 
beginning of a merger wave and suffer from a high value lost near the end of wave. 
Moeller et al. (2005) show that acquirers initiate the acquisition announcement during 
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2000 and 2001 are suffered from the extremely large stock value destruction that is even 
larger than the total value transactions involved in the M&As. The study suggests that 
the value destruction cannot be explained by either previous performance or the size of 
the acquirers. Although the different announcement returns in various period of a 
merger wave are surely associated with market over-reaction and under-reaction, the 
simple market anomalies cannot explain the systematic appreciation or depreciation of 
the M&A announcement.   
 
In the beginning of a merger wave, firms use acquisition as an expanding method to 
response to the economic shock, which is either resulted from economic expansion that 
changes purchasing power or from release of new technology that breaks existing 
market equilibrium (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008; Gorton et al., 2009). In this 
stage, their announcement effect is more likely to be positive due to the expectation of 
high synergistic effect resulted from the quick response to the new market information. 
Meanwhile, even some bidders make a relatively less synergy acquisition, due to the 
expectation that these firms will become future targets, the acquisition announcement 
of these bidders may still receive a significant positive market response (Martynova 
and Renneboog, 2008; Akdogu, 2009).  
 
In the later period of a merger wave, the number of potential synergistic targets is 
reducing, and thus the M&A initiated at this stage will result in less synergy than at the 
beginning of a merger wave. In addition, the strong bargaining power of target firms 
increases the potential of overbidding (Kadyrzhanova and Rhordes-Kropf, 2011) and a 
shrink of economic growth (Lambrecht, 2004) reduces the potential to yield a positive 
announcement effect. Thus, without controlling the sample period, the result of 
pervious empirical studies can be potentially influenced by merger wave and lose their 
generalization.  
 
Empirical studies also find the motives, the choice of finance method, and other deal 
characteristics are influenced by with the macroeconomic features, including merger 
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wave. Shleifer and Vishny (2003) argue that the wave in 1990s represent the motive 
that acquirers tend to use their current overvalued stocks to exchange for the relatively 
undervalued target stock in order to improve the long-term market return. Baxamusa 
and Georgieva (2015) also find that the change of macro liquidity (which has a close 
relationship with merger wave) influence the intension to use tender offer to secure the 
deal and it also has significant correlation with the future synergy. Tarsalewska (2015) 
shows that the economic life cycle can influence the choice of merger targets.    
 
2.5 Method of payment  
 
Draper and Paudyal (1999) suggest that method of payment is an important variable 
that explains the abnormal returns associated with the M&As. Method of payment 
contains the information related with M&A motives (see, e.g. Harford et al., 2012), 
takeover resistance (see, e.g. Grossman and Hart, 1980), and stock overvaluation (see, 
e.g. Draper and Paudyal, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 2003). However, empirical studies 
show contradictory evidence. Travlos (1987) finds that cash payment is correlated with 
higher CARs of bidders, whereas Harford et al. (2012) finds that bidders experience 
higher CARs when they use equity to finance M&As. The contradictory results are 
supported by various theories.  
  
Amihud et al. (1990) explain the payment method by the agency motive of managers. 
They find that cash financed acquisitions generate insignificant returns for the 
acquirers, whereas the equity financed acquisitions generate significantly negative 
abnormal returns. In this study, they test the percentage of share control by managers, 
and they find that the higher the managerial ownership fraction of the acquiring firm, 
the more likely the firm to use cash financing. Fuller et al. (2002) and Harford et al. 
(2012) also explain the finance method under the agency theory. However, both studies 
show an opposite argument and results with that of Amihud et al. (1990). They find that 
the bidding offers financed by equity generate higher abnormal returns to the acquirers. 
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Harford et al. (2012) argue that the avoidance of using all-equity offers implies the 
possibility that the entrenched managers tend to avoid creating new large shareholders. 
However, Karampatsas et al. (2014) find that the credit rating is positively correlated 
with the probability to use cash to finance the M&A. As high credit rating implies the 
low agency cost (see, e.g. Krishnaswami et al.,1999; Ashbaugh-Skaife et al., 2006), the 
evidence provided by Karampatsas et al. (2014) provides a contradict prediction for 
cash payment compare with Harford et al. (2012).     
 
Draper and Paudyal (1999) and Shleifer and Vishny (2003) and Giuli (2013) argue that 
the choice of using equity offers suggests the possibility of the acquirer’s stock price 
overvaluation. Once the market receives the overvaluation signal from the method of 
payment, acquirers are more likely to experience negative CARs. Cai and Vijh (2007) 
extend this overvaluation hypothesis, and suggest that CEOs who hold large proportion 
of acquirers’ shares tend to sacrifice short-term abnormal returns for the long-term 
growth. Fu et al (2013) also indicate a close relationship between stock overvaluation 
and equity finance. Furthermore, this study suggests that the intention of use overvalued 
equity in M&A may not act in shareholder’s interest, as they observe significant 
overpay and weak synergy after M&As. Thus, contradict with Harford et al. (2012) and 
equity payment can also be associated with agency motive.  Aktas et al. (2016) 
evaluate the relationship between industry IPOs (which partially related with economic 
shock and thereby merger wave) and method of payment. The study finds that the agree 
of paying private target stock instead of cash identifies the anticipation of cluster of 
IPOs in target’s industry. The result of this study is consistent with the evidence of 
Harford et al. (2012) but provides an alternative explanation. However, this evidence 
provides a contradict implication with the evidence from Malmendier et al. (2016). 
Malmendier et al. (2016) show that when M&A deals withdrawn, the targets received 
cash offers tend to experience 15% increase in their stock value compare with pre-
announcement period. In contrast, the value change of targets received equity offers 
remains inconsistent. Thus, if the equity offer predicts an industry IPO, Malmendier et 
al. (2016) should observe opposite effect of cash and equity offers. Consequently, the 
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result of Aktas et al. (2016) may be lack of generality and cannot be used as an evidence 
to predict the motive as well as the result of M&As.  
 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990) argue that cash offers or the high fraction cash used 
in a mixed offer implies high bidding competitions. Schwert (2000) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) also indicate that the cash offers could be a signal of hostile takeover. 
Eckbo (2009) indicate that the average premium of all-cash bids tends to be higher than 
all-stock bids, which suggests that cash financing is associated with high competitions 
among the bidding contest. Draper and Paudyal (1999) suggest that the cash offer 
indicates the eagerness of acquirers to lockup the valuable M&A deals. Travlos (1987) 
suggests that even though cash financing may dilute the value of the combined entity, 
it can significantly reduce the free rider problem by penalizing the free riders.   
 
Erel et al. (2012) find a consistent result that the different local stock market returns 
explain the trend of cross-border takeover. However, since most cross-border M&As 
are financed by cash (Eun et al., 1996) due to the lack of world stock market integration 
in early years (Harris and Revenscraft, 1991), the effect of payment method in cross-
border M&As is rarely tested. The recent increase of cross listing allows researchers to 
observe the informational effect of the equity payment on the CARs of the bidders. Eije 
and Wiegerinck (2010) suggest that the informational effect of overvaluation still 
explains the positive CARs yield by cash offer in the cross-border M&A. Consistent 
with this evidence, Ahern et al. (2012) find that M&A that mainly financed by cash 
yield significant and positive CARs to the bidder. Burns et al. (2007) suggest that cross-
listed firms are more likely to use equity as the method to finance, although the study 
finds insignificant difference between the return of cash and equity financed M&As. 
 
As a conclusion, method of payment relates to many important factors that influence 
the CARs of the acquirers. Theoretically, the method of payment has close relationship 
to motive and target defensive mechanism, and thereby has been commonly used as a 
proxy in previous studies. However, due to a lack of systematic analysis of various 
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theoretical implications and the contradictory evidence from the previous studies, the 
existing evidence in M&A literature provides a relatively confused implication to the 
effect of payment method.   
 
2.6 Conclusion  
 
This chapter reviews the previous theoretical and empirical studies in the field of M&A. 
In regard to the factors that explain the return of M&As, this chapter characterizes the 
previous studies into three categories: M&A motives, target resistance and return 
anomalies. In fact, these categories interconnect with each other. More importantly, 
some underpinning theories of these categories are sometimes contradicting with each 
other. For instance, agency theory suggests that firms with high degree of agency 
problem prefer to finance M&A via cash (Harford et al., 2012), whereas defence 
concept suggests that finance M&A via cash can reduce the free rider problem, and 
thereby reduce the takeover premium. Meanwhile, these contradictory theories have 
different implications to the expected CARs, and thereby result in the difficulty in 
building a powerful framework that can consistently explain the different outcomes of 
the M&A.   
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Chapter Three Methodology 
 
3.0 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents the research methodology used to examine the stock returns 
associated with cross-border M&As. The methodology developed here is based on the 
extant literature in finance research methodologies. As we find that the previous M&A 
studies tend not to have a consistent methodology in either measuring or analysing the 
abnormal returns associated with M&A announcement (see e.g., Croci and Petmezas, 
2010; Kothari and Warner, 2006), this chapter also discusses the stock return model and 
test statistics used in the previous studies to justify the methodology chosen in this study. 
This consideration will form the basis for our empirical analysis in the following 
empirical chapters. In this chapter, we also discuss the data sources, sample selection 
process and explanatory variables. The chapter is organized as follow. Section 3.1 
discusses the model used to generate the abnormal returns. Section 3.2 discusses the 
test statistics used for inferences. Section 3.3 reports on the data and summary statistics. 
Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.  
 
3.1 Estimation of stock returns   
 
Our study focuses on the stock returns associated with the cross-border M&As. If the 
stock market is efficient and economic agents are efficient and rational, the M&A 
announcements should generate insignificant abnormal returns (ARs) as the market 
would have already priced in the outcome of the M&As. However, in practice, the 
market is not semi-strong efficient. This means that we expect the ARs around the 
announcement dates to be non-zero.  
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The concept of AR implies that the return of a security at the time t contains two 
components, the expected (normal) return and unexpected (abnormal) return. Given 
that:  
    
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 (1) 
where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the return of stock i at time t, 𝐾𝑖,𝑡 is the normal return (the expected 
return or predicted return), and 𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal return (or the return difference 
between the observed return and normal return).22  
 
3.1.1 Fama-French and Carhart four-factor model 
 
As we show in the Eq (1), the abnormal return is the difference between normal return 
and the unexpected return. According to Fama and French (1993), the AR is depending 
on two factors: whether the pricing model is in equilibrium and whether agents use all 
available information. Thus, without introducing cross-sectional variation into the 
pricing model, the estimation of AR can involve potential biases. For instance, Croci 
and Petmezas (2010) use average historical returns as expected returns. Without using 
a reliable capital asset pricing model (CAPM), the ARs observed during the 
announcement period can be significantly influenced by systematic risk (market beta). 
Doukas and Travlos (1988), Gupta et al. (1997), Mantecon (2009), and Shahrur (2005) 
use single factor CAPM to estimate expected returns. Their results are not as reliable 
as those from the Fama and French (1993), as investors require compensation for risks 
associated with size and growth rate. Thus, small and high growth firms can experience 
higher return in the event period. When these stock characteristics are not taken into 
account, the standard CAPM tends to overestimate the AR for the small firm and 
underestimated the AR for the large firm (Fama and French, 1992). As a result, the 
basic market model may cause a consistent price anomaly for the expected returns in 
                                                   
22 This framework is introduced by Brown and Warner (1980).  
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the estimation periods, that is named as bad model problem in Fama (1998). Fama 
(1998) also shows that the anomaly tends to disappear after controlling for size and 
BE/ME. By introducing the portfolios controlling by size and BE/ME, Fama and French 
proposed a three factors CAPM as   
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡– 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡– 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1) + 𝜆𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +  𝛾𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 (2) 
 
Ri,t is the percentage return on stock i at the time t; Rf,t-1 is the risk-free rate; Rm,t is the 
return on the market index; SMBt is the return on a portfolio of small stocks minus the 
return on a portfolio of large capital stocks; HMLt is the return on a portfolio of high 
book to market ratio stocks minus a portfolio of low book to market ratio stocks; WMLt 
is the price momentum as in Carhart, 1997); εi,j is the conditional error. Specifically, the 
SMB and HML is constructed based on a 2×3 portfolio sorts on size (SMBt), and B/M 
(HMLt) at the end of June of each precious year t. SMBt is constructed using the return 
of the portfolio of bottom 10% market capitalization firms minus the return of the 
portfolio of top 10% market capitalization. HML is the return of the portfolio of top 30% 
Book to Market ratio firms minus the return of bottom 30% of B/M ratio firms, where 
book value is measured based on the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-1 and market 
capitalization is based on the value at the end of December in calendar year t-1.  
 
Fama and French (1993) argue that their pricing factors work well in explaining the 
cross-section of average stock returns. However, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) argue 
that from a behavioural finance prospective, the compensation for risk explanation 
cannot explain the momentum in the stocks return. In order to capture the effect from 
momentum, Carhart (1997) employs a momentum portfolio as an additional factor to 
generate a four-factor CAPM.   
  
As such, we follow Carhart (1997) to use a four-factor CAPM, hereafter, (F-F-C) to 
estimate the ARs. The four-factor CAPM can be written as:  
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𝑅𝑖,𝑡– 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡– 𝑅𝑓,𝑡−1) + 𝜆𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +  𝛾𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +  𝛿𝑖𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡  + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 (3) 
where:  
momentum WML is also constructed based on a 2×3 portfolio sorts on momentum 
(WMLt) at the end of June of each precious year t. WML is the size weighted return of 
top 30% monthly lagged return firms (so called winner in Carhart, 1997) minus bottom 
30% monthly lagged return firms (so called loser in Carhart 1997).  
 
One of the assumption in the F-F-C CAPM is that the slope of four factors remain 
unchanged in the non-event period.23 If the estimation period spans in the period that 
can significantly influence the investors’ expectation on profitability and investment 
opportunity, the slope captured by F-F-C CAPM can be contaminated. Financial crisis 
can be one of such event. Lemmon and Lins (2003) and Bates (2012) show that 
investment opportunities decrease during crisis periods because of the fall in business 
confidence. As such, we modify the F-F-C CAPM model with a dummy to capture the 
crisis effect to the M&A announcement returns. The modified model is shown as follow:   
 
𝑅𝑖,𝑡– 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡– 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + 𝜆𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡  +  𝛾𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡  +  𝛿𝑖𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑗 (4) 
where dummy is the dummy variable for the crisis effect. It takes on value 1 if the 
estimating period spans in the crisis period, and 0 otherwise.   
 
The asset pricing models assume the expected excess returns are normally distributed 
(see, e.g. Kothari and Warner, 1997; Fama, 1998; Lyon et al., 1999) during the non-
event (estimation) period. However, daily stock returns tend to show volatility 
clustering, and autoregressive conditional heteroscedastic (ARCH) effect. As such, the 
returns are unlikely to be normally distributed. Corhay and Rad (1996) show that the 
conditional variance in the data causes the ordinary least square (OLS) method to 
overestimate the regression parameters following positive shocks relative to the ARCH 
                                                   
23 In the Fama (1998), he defines the three important corporate events. They are mergers, share 
repurchases and seasoned equity offering (SEO).  
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approach and underestimate the parameters following a negative shock.  
 
In order to capture the conditional volatility and improve estimation efficiency, we 
employ the generalized ARCH (GARCH) method. We use the asymmetric GARCH 
method developed by Glosten, et al. (1993), hereafter, GJR-GARCH as the estimation 
method to capture the tendency for negative shocks that have more pronounces impacts 
on returns (i.e. it is documented as the leverage or asymmetric effect). The mean 
equation of the GJR-GARCH is same to Eq. (4), and the variance equation of the GJR-
GARCH can be written as:  
 
h2i,t= μi + φε2i, t-1+δi h2i,t-1 + ηiKi,t-1ε2i,t-1  (5) 
 
where μi is the permanent component; φ is the coefficient for prior news; δi is the 
coefficient for prior conditional volatility; and, ηi is the coefficient for asymmetry effect. 
Ki,t-1 is the dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 if εi,t-1 is negative; zero, otherwise. 
Notice that the Eq. (5) is used to complete the estimation for the GJR-GARCH. The 
coefficients of these estimates are not relevant for capturing the ARs as ARs are 
estimated by out of sample data.  
   
3.1.2 AR estimation window and event window   
 
Determining the optimal size of the event window in the event studies tends to face an 
unavoidable dilemma. How long or short should the event window be? A short event 
window may not be long enough to indicate the point at which the impact of the 
announcement dies out or to determine whether the market has anticipated the 
announcement. Presumably, it is why Gregory (1997) and Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2006) use a long-term estimation window to test the value change associated with 
M&As. However, the short run event study method provides more reliable estimations 
on price shock associated with M&A announcement (Kothari and Warner, 2006). In 
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Chapter 2, we have documented three main advantages to use short run method. Firstly, 
the short run event study method is well specified. In contrast, the method of long run 
method tends to provide unreliable results because of the general tendency for returns 
to compound over time. Secondly, the short run method is more powerful when the 
event day is specified. Kothari and Warner (2006) show that the power to detect the 
abnormal performance decreases with the increase in event window. Thirdly, the short 
run method is not highly sensitive to the normal return estimation model. This is 
contrast to the long run event study method, where the AR is sensitive to the assumption 
about the return generating process.   
 
In our study, the AR is estimated in a short run event window of 11 days (t=-5 to t=5), 
where t=0 is the M&A announcement day. Testing the ARs in five days before and after 
the announcement day can capture the anticipation behaviours and delayed market 
responses. We use an estimation window of 285-days (t=-300 to day t=-15) to estimate 
the coefficients of the CAPM. Based on Eq. (4), the ARs are estimated using:    
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = (𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) − [?̂?𝑖 + ?̂?𝑖(𝑅𝑚,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡) + ?̂?𝑖𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + ?̂?𝑖𝑊𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜔𝑖𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑡  (4) 
where the coefficients βi, λi,γi, and δi are estimated coefficients under the GJR-GARCH-
M method over the estimation window (t=-300 to t=-15) before the announcement date. 
  
We also estimate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). The CARs provide an 
overall inference for the investors’ behaviour in the event window. That is, the CAR 
allows for the accumulation of returns over time. We therefore cumulate the ARs over 
our 11-day window starting from day t=-5 to the day t=5. The CAR for stock i at day t 
is measured as:  
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑡−5,𝑡) = 𝛴𝑡=−5
𝑇 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡      (6) 
where T is the number of cumulating days from t=-5.  
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3.2 Test statistics 
 
Based on the efficient market theory, F-F-C CAPM assumes that the daily anomaly (or 
excess return) in the non-event period should be randomly distributed. However, Brown 
and Warner (1985) show that daily excess returns are not random.24 Thus, the estimated 
AR in the event period may also be influenced by the autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. It can lead to the biased analysis if the standard student t-test is used. 
In addition, this cannot be adjusted by the in-sample error adjustment procedure (e.g. 
Newey-West procedure)25. In order to overcome the effect of excess return correlation, 
Boehmer et al. (1991) propose a standardized AR (SAR) in the t-statistical test (so 
called BMP t-test). The SAR is estimated as follow:  
 
𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 =
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
?̂?(𝐴𝑅𝑖)
 , where  
?̂?(𝐴𝑅𝑖) =  √
1
𝑁−1
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 (𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 − 𝐴𝑅𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)       
 (7) 
 
The ?̂?(𝐴𝑅𝑇) is the standard deviation of the excess returns (regression residuals) in 
the estimation period; N is the number of excess returns in the estimation period (in this 
case, 285); 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 is the regression residual at the day T (in this case, it is from -300 to 
-15); 𝐴𝑅𝑖̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the mean of the regression residuals in the estimation period.  
 
Thus, the BMP t statistics of ARs is estimated as:  
𝐵𝑀𝑃 𝑡. −𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =
1
𝑁
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
?̂?(𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡)
      (8) 
where ?̂?(𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡) =  √
1
𝑁−1
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 (𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅)
2
, 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = 
1
𝑁
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡. Here, SARi,t 
                                                   
24 This study was published before Fama (1993). So, it estimates the AR by only using single factor 
CAPM. However, Fama (1998) suggests that the three-factor model cannot fully explain the cross-
section of stock returns, and therefore the ARs can influenced by non-normality.  
25 Newey-West procedure is designed to overcome the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
error terms in a regression. However, as this study uses the coefficients of the regression to estimate 
ARs, the in-sample error correction procedure cannot help to adjust the ARs.  
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denotes the Boehmer, et al. (1991) standardized AR for stock i on day t, whereas 
?̂?(𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡) denotes the cross-sectional standard deviation of standardized AR on day t.  
 
Notice that, Boehmer et al. (1991) have not estimated standardize CARs (SCARs) in 
their study. In the later event studies, SCAR has been estimated in two ways. Eun et al. 
(1996) estimate the SCARs by using the same method as estimating SAR. They employ 
the standard deviation of the cumulative residuals in the estimation period (which 
replaces 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇  in the second part of Eq. (7) with𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑇 ). However, cumulating the 
residuals in a long estimation window can lead to significantly large standard 
deviations.26 When applying the estimated standard deviation in the BMP-t test, it 
overstates the event period’s standard deviation and leads to a type II error.27 Campbell 
et al. (1997) propose two estimation method for the SCARs. The first method is to use 
the standard deviation of CARs in the event window to standardize the CARs. 
Statistically, this method can standardize the distribution of the CARs and perform an 
unbiased t statistic test. However, the standard deviation in the event window may also 
contain the induced volatility from the event. Thus, the SCARs estimated by this 
method can also be biased by type II error. The second method proposed by Campbell 
et al. (1997) is to cumulate the SARs in the event period (see, Eq. (7) above) to be 
SCARs. This method has one interesting implication. It suggests that the standard 
deviation used to standardise ARs is the same with the one to standardise CARs.28  
 
Although Campbell et al. (1997) suggest that the difference between two methods 
should be insignificant. However, if we assume that the M&A announcements can result 
                                                   
26 It would not be surprising that the estimation period is across several corporate events that lead ARs 
clustering. Thus, under the estimation method of Eun et al. (1996), the standard deviation of the CARs 
would be significantly large.  
27 The study assumes that the standard deviation in the estimation period should be the same as the 
event period disregards the length of the cumulative period.  
28 It can be easily to shown that 
𝛴𝑡=−5
𝑇 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡
?̂?(𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡)
 = 𝛴𝑡=−5
𝑇 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡, where here 𝛴𝑡=−5
𝑇 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 at day t, 
and  𝛴𝑡=−5
𝑇 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖 at day t.  
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in volatility clustering in ARs and CARs, the outcome difference between the two 
methods should be positively correlated with the scale of AR clustering in the event 
period. Thus, in our event study, we believe that the second method is more appropriate 
as the first method is more likely to introduce type I error. Thus, we use the second 
method in this study. The BMP-t statistic can be stated as follows:     
 
𝐵𝑀𝑃 − 𝑡. −𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =
1
𝑁
𝛴ⅈ=1
𝑛 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡
?̂?(𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡)
  where:  
𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑡−5,𝑡) = 𝛴𝑡=−5
𝑇 𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡          and,                                       (9) 
?̂?(𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡) = √
1
𝑁−1
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 (𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )
2
 ; 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
1
𝑁
𝛴𝑖=1
𝑛 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
Here, 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,(𝑡−5,𝑡) denotes the SCAR i at day t. ?̂?(𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡) is the cross sectional standard 
deviation of SCARs at day t.  
  
In the BMP-t statistic, one important assumption is that the cross sectional excess return 
correlation in the event period is insignificant (see, e.g. Brown and Warner, 1985; 
Boehmer, et al, 1991; Campbell et al., 1997). In other words, the event days of the 
sample stocks do not overlap with each other. In practice, the overlap of event day tends 
to be unavoidable. Thus, Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) suggest that the BMP-t statistic 
is biased by the cross-sectional correlation of ARs and tends to over- reject the null 
hypothesis.29 Thus, Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) further adjusted the BMP-t test to 
account for the cross-sectional variance. The adjusted BMP-t test (adj. BMP-t) is given 
as:   
𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝐵𝑀𝑃 − 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =
1
𝑁
𝛴ⅈ=1
𝑛 𝑆𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡
?̂?(𝑆𝐴𝑅𝑡)
 √(1 − ?̅?) ∕ (1 + (𝑛 − 1)?̅?)      (10) 
and 
𝐴𝑑𝑗. 𝐵𝑀𝑃 − 𝑡 − 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡 =
1
𝑁
𝛴ⅈ=1
𝑛 𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅ⅈ,𝑡
?̂?(𝑆𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡)
 √(1 − ?̅?) ∕ (1 + (𝑛 − 1)?̅?)      (11) 
                                                   
29 Kolari and Pynnonen (2010) suggest that the return cros-sectional correlation is a positive infinite 
matrix, and thereby the average cross-sectional correlation should be positive or at least non-
significantly negative. In our test, we find that the cross-sectional correlation can be negative. 
However, due to the weak cross-sectional correlation, neither the positive or negative average 
correlation influence the t statistic significantly.  
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where ?̅?  is the average of the sample cross-correlations of the estimation-period 
residuals. 30  Assuming that ?̅?  remains the same for the CARs, the Adj.BMP can 
estimate the CARs by simply replacing the SAR from Eq (10) with SCAR.   
3.3. Sample Description 
3.3.1 Data source and sample selection 
We extract our M&A samples from the Thomson ONE Database. We focus on the 
changes in control, and therefore limit the sample to the M&A where acquirers 
announce more than 10% of target share acquiring. Both acquirers and targets must be 
listed on their local stock market exchanges. Each stock must have traded 300 days 
prior to the acquisition announcement and 5 days after the announcement. The M&As 
were announced between 1st of January 1990 and 30th of June 2015. We also exclude 
the M&A events in our sample when an M&A is initiated by multiple acquirers. Notice 
that the sample of our Japanese firms only cover the period between 1st of January 1991 
and 31st of 2013. This is a constraint imposed on the period over which the pricing 
factors have not been constructed by Fama and French.   
 
Our sample period spans two major financial crises: the East Asian financial crisis in 
1997, and the recent global financial crisis of 2007/08.31 Following Lemmon and Lins 
(2003), we define the East Asian financial crisis period as the period 1st July 1997 to 1st 
August 1998. Brunnermeier (2009) identifies the period of global financial crisis period 
as February 1st, 2007 to October 1st, 2008. Crisis periods are not always precisely 
defined. Brunnermeier (2009) identify the end of global financial crisis as October 1st, 
2008, since this was the point of coordinated international bailout. However, the 
                                                   
30Following Kolari and Pynnonen (2010), we employ Pearson correlation to estimate the cross-
sectional correlation. Compare with Spearman rank correlation, the Pearson correlation contains 
economic information for the adjustment. However, one of the weaknesses of employ the Pearson 
correlation is that we cannot ensure the consistent variance of the estimation residuals.  
31 Further information about our data and statistical summary are shown in the section 3.3.  
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descending trend of the US financial market continuous after 2008 and bottomed in 
March 2009. Bates (2012) also finds that the Volatility Index32 of the US financial 
market in 2010 was still 20% higher than in the pre-crisis period. Thus, it might be 
difficult to draw a clear line for the end of the 2007/2008 global financial crisis. On the 
other hand, our study is only focusing on the AR of acquirers and targets in the cross-
border M&A instead of the returns of market indexes. After March 2009, investors may 
have regained their confidence in financial market. Thus, the impact from financial 
crisis to the coefficients of the F-F-C CAPM portfolio returns may be less significant. 
Thus, we use March 31st, 2009 as the end of the global financial crisis. We also assume 
that the Japanese firms are only influenced by the East Asian financial crisis and the 
US firms are only influenced by the global recent financial crisis. 
 
The market value data, share and index returns of the US firms are obtained from the 
Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). For the Japanese firms, similar data are 
obtained from Thomson Datastream. The US market portfolio return used in the F-F-C 
four factor model is obtained from the data library of Kenneth R. French. The daily 
return of the US three-month treasury bill rate is used as the daily risk-free rate in the 
US market.33 The Japanese F-F-C four factors are obtained from Prof. Nathan Joseph. 
This dataset is constructed in a similar manner to the method shown in data library of 
Kenneth R. French. We use the Japanese six-month treasury bill rate as the risk-free 
rate for Japanese stocks.  
 
Table 3.3.1 reports the details of our sample M&A events. We have a sample of 979 
cross-border M&As initiated by the US acquirers to acquire Japanese targets (US-JP, 
here after), and 2094 cross-border M&As initiated by the Japanese acquirers to acquire 
the US targets (JP-US, here after). In the US-JP, 437 acquirers listed in the US stock 
                                                   
32 It is also called fear index (See, Schwert, 1989).  
33 The risk-free rate in the data library of Kenneth R. French is fixed one the calendar month. Since 
treasury bill rates are variable, we adjust the market excess return by the daily annualized three-month 
treasury bill return.   
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exchange, and 229 Japanese targets are listed in the Japanese stock exchange. However, 
16 the US acquirers and 73 Japanese targets have no trading data in the range between 
300 days prior to the acquisition announcement and 5 days after the announcement. As 
a result, we have 425 acquirers and 156 targets in our final US-JP sample. In the JP-US, 
we have 1502 listed Japanese acquirers and 329 listed the US targets. However, we 
have the trading data missing for 776 Japanese acquirers and 7 the US targets. As a 
result, 726 Japanese acquirers and 322 the US targets are used in our final sample. 
 
Table 3.3.1 Sample selection 
 Total US-JP M&As Total JP-US M&As 
Initial sample: 979 2094 
Acquirers   
listed firms  437 1502 
Data missing  -13 -776 
Final sample  424 726 
Acquired less than 50% 136 360 
Acquired more than 50% 288 366 
Targets   
listed firms  229 329 
Data missing  -73 -7 
Final sample  156 322 
Acquired less than 50% 144 195 
Acquired more than 50% 12 127 
 
Even though we define the M&A as 10% target share acquiring due to the limited M&A 
events between the US and Japan, we notice that 50% target share acquisition has 
commonly used as a benchmark in previous studies. Thus, in table 3.3.1, we split the 
sample into target takeover (acquiring more than 50% of target shares) and increase in 
ownership (acquiring less than 50% of target shares). We will also test the investor 
behaviour associated with target takeover and increase ownership in later sections.   
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3.3.2 M&A Sample distribution 
  
Table 3.3.2 M&A distribution  
 
Year No. of 
M&A 
Transaction 
Value 
No. of 
M&A 
Transaction 
Value 
No. of 
M&A 
Transaction 
Value 
No. of 
M&A 
Transaction 
Value 
 US-JP used US-JP total JP-US used JP-US total 
1990 4 1.900 10 11.033 0 0.000 226 116.096 
1991 7 105.997 21 201.975 0 0.000 130 40.904 
1992 8 15.868 20 15.499 21 108.575 63 62.320 
1993 7 28.562 17 28.562 16 44.167 35 32.722 
1994 8 20.162 20 46.473 25 11.324 47 25.373 
1995 12 68.087 20 58.932 22 237.361 40 188.114 
1996 12 192.413 22 136.652 32 140.312 57 88.806 
1997 14 52.285 25 53.213 31 96.688 54 66.908 
1998 30 255.952 51 294.020 22 53.276 43 126.091 
1999 32 779.805 68 477.224 50 74.340 73 68.374 
2000 41 124.663 80 111.592 38 685.369 70 396.897 
2001 25 437.960 53 102.019 34 107.249 50 78.643 
2002 25 75.356 42 58.242 20 241.748 30 199.219 
2003 22 947.716 54 461.579 14 23.959 26 32.082 
2004 20 73.583 46 156.791 16 122.890 30 94.846 
2005 19 330.818 34 134.825 28 67.175 44 80.266 
2006 17 146.183 28 118.754 35 173.421 48 327.063 
2007 24 947.162 67 342.611 36 135.680 54 174.647 
2008 17 114.304 38 110.961 44 247.280 68 821.914 
2009 12 0.000 41 141.417 37 126.239 49 106.847 
2010 14 100.595 43 366.724 50 381.675 75 248.490 
2011 12 54.969 27 109.097 34 440.507 60 365.558 
2012 14 539.597 36 327.745 67 1055.241 92 898.692 
2013 9 2384.701 25 1274.719 54 224.440 77 269.904 
2014 9 272.929 29 198.390 0 0.000 65 928.078 
2015 10 352.929 15 242.849 0 0.000 44 963.997 
This table presents the M&A announcement distribution over the period January 1, 1990 to June 30, 2015. The 
Transaction value denotes the average transaction value of the M&As initiated the year. The transaction value of is 
in the unit of one million US dollar. 
 
Table 3.3.2 presents the sample distribution of the used and total US-JP and JP-US 
M&As announced between 1st of January 1990 and 30th June 2015. Due to the data 
missing, the number of announcement and average deal value is 0 in 1990, 1991, 2014 
and 2015 for the JP-US M&As. 
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Figure 3.3.2 presents the bar and line chart of the US-JP and JP-US M&A distribution. 
The bar chart shows the number of announcements in each year from 1990 to 2015. 
The line chart presents the average value of the M&A in each year from 1990 to 2015.  
 
Figure 1 US-JP M&A Distribution 
 
 
Figure 2 JP-US M&A Distribution 
 
 
Figure 1 shows that the number of US-JP M&A increase annually from 1990 and reach 
its highest level in 2000. Then it drops significantly in the following years. The trend is 
consistent to that documented by Moeller et al. (2004). We also find that the average 
value of the M&A follows an upward trend. However, we find high fluctuations in the 
 71 
 
average M&A value. It may be influenced by the small number of large M&As. In our 
sample, the number of M&As follows the trend of total M&A events. In addition, we 
find that the average deal value in our used sample is higher than that in the total sample. 
It may suggest that deal initiated by listed the US acquirers tend to be larger than the 
ones initiated by unlisted the US acquirers.     
 
Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that the trend for the JP-US M&As announcement 
frequency is almost opposite to the US-JP M&As. The number of M&As drops annually 
starting from 1990 to 1998. After the East Asian financial crisis, the number of M&A 
has significant increase in 1999 and 2000. There is also an increase in the trend from 
2003 to 2012. The trend suggests that the global financial crisis does not result in 
significant impact on the JP-US M&As. Consistent with the US-JP M&As, we also find 
that the average transaction value in our used sample tend to be higher than the average 
sample.   
 
3.3.3 Descriptive statistics of F-F-C four factors over the full period 
 
Table 3.3.3 reports the descriptive statistics for the four explanatory variables (i.e. 
excess market returns, SMB, HML and WML) used in the four-factor CAPM (see, Eq 
(3)). The mean of market’s excess returns, SMB, HML and WML portfolio returns are 
positive in the US and negative (except HML) in Japan. The pricing factors for the US 
and Japan seem to capture different economic conditions. All variables contain 
significant skewness and kurtosis. The Jarque-Bera statistic also confirms the non-
normality distribution. Notice that most of the variables (e.g. excess market return, 
SMB and WML in the panel A and SMB, HML and WML in the panel B) have negative 
skewness. The negative skewness shows a strong tendency for the returns to be below 
the mean return. The negative skewness can lead to a negative asymmetric effect, a 
statistic condition that can be captured by GJR-GARCH. The significant Q-statistic for 
the square of variables also confirm the presence of ARCH effects. It is well known 
 72 
 
that the use of the GJR-GARCH method leads to better estimation efficiency relative 
to the standard OLS. 
 
Table 3.3.3 Descriptive statistics of F-F-C four factors over the full period 
Variables N Mean Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Auto(1) Auto(2) Auto(3) 
Panel A: The US market F-F-C factors  
Rm,t – Rf,t 6425 0.035a  1.135  -0.120a  11.236a  17821.927a  5.626a  16.263a  16.514a  
SMBt 6425 0.006  0.589  -0.243a  7.294a  4902.447 a 10.084a  10.241a  12.528a  
HMLt 6425 0.012  0.598  0.111a  10.183a  13557.847a  49.345a  49.362a  49.374a  
WMLt 6425 0.029a 0.861  -0.954a  15.207a  40076.924a  208.370a  215.500a  217.620a  
Panel B: Japanese market F-F-C factors 
Rm,t – Rf,t 5660 -0.004a  0.012  0.228a  7.563a  875.499a  38.822a  39.220a  40.360a  
SMBt 5660 -0.001a 0.008  -0.694a  6.640a  631.722a  36.009a  36.945a  38.390a  
HMLt 5660 0.001a  0.003  -0.305a  5.155a  208.675a  71.591a  103.887a  114.604a  
WMLt 5660 -1.896E-04a 0.005  -0.274a  4.721a  135.762a  113.973a  138.578a  140.757a  
This table presents the descriptive statistics of explanatory variables over the period January 1, 1990 to June 30, 
2015. Std. dev. denotes the standard deviation. Auto (n) denotes the Q-statistic for autocorrelation based on the 
square of the variables at various lags. a, b and c denote the statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively. 
3.3.4 Mean and skewness of GJR-GARCH mean estimation coefficients  
 
Table 3.3.4 reports the Mean and skewness of the coefficients of the F-F-C four factors 
and crisis dummy estimated by by the equation (2) under GJR-GARCH. The coefficient 
of SMBt is significant in the Panel A, and the F-F-C four factors are all significant in 
the panel B. The SMBt is significant in the Panel C. The results show that the F-F-C 
pricing factors have significant explanatory power to our sample firms’ daily stock 
returns. We find the Dummy variable has the significant and negative coefficient in the 
Panel B and Panel D. It suggests that the East Asian financial crisis has significant 
impact on the Japanese firm’s stock returns. Surprisingly, we find that the coefficient 
of the Dummy is insignificant in the panel A and panel C. Overall, because we only 
have a small number of firms initiate M&As across crisis and non-crisis period, we 
cannot identify the extend of explanatory power increases by adding the crisis dummy. 
However, theoretically, it is justifiable to include the dummy in the estimation model.  
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Table 3.3.4 Mean and skewness of GJR-GARCH mean estimation coefficients  
 
Variables N mean Std. dev Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Auto(1) Auto(2) Auto(3) 
Panel A: The US acquirers 
Rm,t – Rf,t 424 1.107a 0.481 1.020a 9.223a 757.631a 0.249 0.333 2.091 
SMBt 424 0.271a 0.738 1.216a 5.883a 251.350a 23.067a 33.797a 36.492a 
HMLt 424 0.001 0.860 -0.741a 7.928a 467.745a 10.912a 12.821a 12.967a 
WMLt 424 -0.040 0.529 0.492a 7.349a 351.309a 0.1519 0.2037 0.8245 
Dummyt 21 -0.070 0.980 -1.421a 5.896a 14.403a 0.002 0.003 0.004 
Panel B: Japanese acquirers 
Rm,t – Rf,t 726 0.015a 0.118 0.722a 6.470a 427.028a 14.367a 14.440a 16.964a 
SMBt 726 -0.906a 0.593 -0.050 2.643 4.151 78.568a 107.352a 131.154a 
HMLt 726 -1.030a 0.685 -0.930a 5.691a 323.655a 21.834a 24.869a 29.343a 
MOMt 726 -0.072b 1.131 0.235a 4.012a 37.664a 54.557a 62.773a 63.059a 
Dummyt 82 -0.002a 0.004 0.515b 3.837c 6.021b 2.485 2.749 2.806 
Panel C: The US targets 
Rm,t – Rf,t 322 0.993a 0.732 1.386a 14.520a 1883.595a 0.998 1.883 2.501 
SMBt 322 0.590a 0.868 1.348a 6.367a 249.665a 0.405 2.754 2.840 
HMLt 322 -0.035 0.979 -1.051a 10.411a 796.163a 2.259 5.568c 5.612 
MOMt 322 -0.121 0.667a -0.716a 10.032a 691.063a 0.073 1.474 1.505 
Dummyt 16 0.036 0.321 0.379 2.421 0.606 0.012 0.044 0.122 
Panel D: Japanese targets 
Rm,t – Rf,t 156 0.055a 0.179 1.475a 7.475a 186.746a 0.003 0.109 3.286 
SMBt 156 0.019 0.239 -1.212a 7.095a 147.226a 1.578 2.427 2.436 
HMLt 156 -0.027 0.479 -4.326a 42.576a 10667.482a 1.461 4.084 4.098 
MOMt 156 -0.072 0.528 -3.939a 31.956a 5853.192a 0.008 0.813 0.828 
Dummyt 9 -0.003a 0.003 -1.434a 4.575a 4.014 0.218 0.232 0.232 
This table presents the descriptive statistics of regression coefficient of the explanatory variables over the period 
January 1, 1990 to June 30, 2015. The coefficients are estimated under the Eq (5) with GJR-GARCH model. Std. 
dev. denotes the standard deviation. Auto (n) denotes the Q-statistic for autocorrelation based on the square of the 
variables at various lags. a, b and c denote the statistical significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. 
  
3.4. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has presented the methodology we use in our empirical chapters. Through 
the discussion of the various estimation models used in the previous studies, we justify 
why we use F-F-C four-factor CAPM as well as why we use the GJR-GARCH to 
improve on estimation efficiency above that of the standard OLS. We also discuss the 
inconsistent t statistics employed in the previous studies, and justify the reason we use 
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adj.BMP to estimate the statistical significance of the estimated ARs. In the section 3.3, 
we present the data set and our sample selection. We also show that the F-F-C four 
factors and our crisis period dummy significantly explain the estimation period stock 
return. In addition, the statistical property of the F-F-C four factors also justifies our 
choice of the GJR-GARCH for the AR estimation.   
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Chapter Four   
Estimation of abnormal returns of the US and Japanese acquirers  
 
This chapter reports the changes in shareholder’s wealth of acquirers in cross-border 
M&A announcements. We test the announcement effect on the ARs and CARs of the 
US acquirers that take over Japanese targets (US-JP, hereafter) and Japanese acquirers 
that take over the US targets (JP-US, hereafter). As we have discussed in Chapter 2, the 
previous studies tend to have biased test design and statistical analysis. 34  The 
inconsistent results and the corresponding interpretations in the cross-border M&A 
literature provide limited insight in understanding investor behaviour. In addition, the 
factors that influence the investor’s behaviour in the cross-border M&As are rarely 
tested across different countries with a consistent methodology. Thus, when we review 
the studies that employ M&A events from different countries, the results tend not to be 
comparable as indicated before.  
 
In order to address the above issues, this chapter is designed to serve the following 
purposes. Previous cross-border M&As studies (see, e.g. Francis et al., 2008) have 
reported that the acquirers experience significant and positive CARs. However, the use 
of non-equilibrium asset pricing model and the test statistics that does not account the 
time-series correlation of ARs can lead to potential upward bias and provide less 
reliable results.35 For this reason, section 4.1 in this chapter examines whether the 
cross-border acquirers show significant AR during the announcement period under the 
more equilibrium-based F-F-C CAPM. Furthermore, based on the previous studies, we 
expect the acquirers’ ARs to be influenced by acquirer’s portfolios and deal 
characterises. In order to test our hypotheses, in Sections 4.2 to 4.7, we examine the 
                                                   
34 As we have discussed in Chapter 2, some previous studies tend to selective use of theories and use 
non-equilibrium models to estimate expected returns.  
35 Francis et al. (2008) use single factor CAPM. Compared with F-F-C four factor CAPM, it can cause 
upward bias. For further explanation, see Chapter 3 section 3.3.1.  
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factors (method of payment, merger relationship and other acquirer and deal 
characteristics) that influence investor behaviour associated with the cross-border 
M&A announcements across acquirers from the US and Japan. Based on the evidence 
provided by Baxamusa and Georgieva (2015), we expect that investor behaviour 
associated with M&A announcements will vary across sub- periods. In order to test this 
hypothesis, section 4.8 examines the stability of ARs and CARs in different sub-periods.  
 
4.1 Acquires ARs and CARs under Fama-French and Carhart model   
 
In this section, we present the empirical results for ARs and CARs estimated using F-
F-C four-factor CAPM. Following Kolari and Pynnonen (2010), we employ adjusted 
BMP t-statistic (adj.-BMP) to account for the serial correlation and cross-sectional 
correlation of ARs and CARs (see Chapter 3).  
 
The prior evidence shows that the cross-border acquirers tend to experience significant 
and positive ARs (see, e.g. Eije and Wiegerinck, 2010; Francis et al., 2008) during the 
announcement period, whereas the ARs of domestic acquirers tend to be insignificant 
(see, e.g. Fee and Thomas, 2004; Alexandridis et al., 2014). The higher announcement 
return can be due to investors’ anticipation of higher value creation when acquirers 
access another market with different culture, economic and legislative background.  
 
Table 4.1 shows the ARs and CARs, and the statistical test results for ±  5 days 
encompassing pre- and post-announcement dates. Panel A reports the ARs and CARs 
of the US acquirers and Panel B reports the ARs and CARs of Japanese acquirers.  
 
Panel A of Table 4.1 shows that US acquirers experience insignificant ARs and CARs 
during the announcement period. This result is inconsistent with Eije and Wiegerinck, 
(2010) and Francis et al. (2008). Incidentally, our result is in line with some domestic 
M&A studies (see, e.g. Fee and Thomas, 2004; Alexandridis et al., 2014) that report 
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insignificant ARs experienced by acquirers. There are several reasons that can cause 
the discrepancies between our result and the results shown in previous cross-border 
M&A studies. Firstly, we only focus on US-JP acquisitions, whereas the Eije and 
Wiegerinck, (2010) and Francis et al. (2008) use the worldwide cross-border M&As as 
sample in their studies. Thus, the deal and the acquirers in our studies may have specific 
characteristics. Secondly, and more importantly, we use the F-F-C four-factor CAPM 
which is likely to reduce the magnitude of the ARs. We will further study these 
characteristics in later sections.  
  
Table 4.1 Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japan acquirers  
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP 
Panel A: The US Acquirers Panel B: Japanese Acquirers 
-5 0.2520 1.36 0.2520 1.36 0.0643 1.17 0.7453 1.09 
-4 -0.0169 -1.09 0.2351 0.69 -0.0623 -1.10 0.6830 0.09 
-3 0.1098 0.52 0.3450 0.79 0.1665 1.56 0.8496 0.87 
-2 0.1209 1.17 0.4659 1.13 -0.0001 0.05 0.8494 0.73 
-1 0.1551 -0.80 0.6210 0.80 -0.0268 -0.41 0.8226 0.45 
0 0.1382 0.13 0.7592 0.77 0.1256 0.80 0.9482 0.68 
1 0.1213 1.04 0.8805 1.15 0.1172 1.94c 1.0655 1.31 
2 0.0900 0.33 0.9705 1.04 0.1302 1.91c 1.1956 1.79c 
3 0.1720 1.02 1.1425 1.19 -0.0081 -0.16 1.1875 1.61 
4 -0.1163 -1.14 1.0263 0.80 0.0778 0.49 1.2653 1.65c 
5 0.1796 1.20 1.2059 1.09 -0.0793 -1.26 1.1861 1.25 
The AR and CAR are measured in percentage terms. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance 
at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Notice that in Panel A, the mean of AR at day t=-1 has opposite sign to the adj.-BMP t 
statistic test. It is meanly resulted by the adj.-BMP t statistic test replacing normal AR 
with standard AR (SAR) (see, Chapter 3). As a result, the mean used in the statistical 
test can have opposite sign to the mean of ARs and CARs.     
 
Panel B also shows that AR and CAR are insignificant at announcement dates. We find 
that Japanese acquirers experience positive and significant AR on the day t=1 and day 
t=2, and significant and positive CAR on day t=2 and day t=4. Even though the result 
may imply that Japanese acquirers also do not experience significant ARs, the 
significant ARs can arise with a lag as the news needs to cross markets and the market 
 78 
 
takes time to react to the announcement information. Thus, the significant and positive 
ARs experienced by Japanese acquirers can be resulted by their M&A announcements.   
 
Eije and Wiegerinck, (2010) suggest that the product and financial market imperfection 
lead to higher ARs for the acquirers in the cross-border M&As. However, market 
imperfection may not explain our results as we find only Japanese acquirers 
experiencing significant ARs. Apart from the market imperfection, there are several 
reasons that may explain the different investor behaviour across the US and Japan. For 
instance, Gaisford and Ivus (2014) suggest that the small country may gain more from 
cross-country risk diversification. Another explanation is that the US stock market is 
more efficient than the Japanese stock market and investors may have already priced in 
the M&A announcements before the announcement date. The different ARs may also 
be explained by the deal or firm characteristics (e.g. acquirers’ industry, method of 
payment and targets’ public status). For instance, Eun et al. (1996) suggest that Japanese 
acquirers are more R&D intensive. Thus, they can create higher value by efficiently 
internalizing targets’ R&D resources. We will further test the factors that influence the 
ARs of acquirers in the following sections.  
 
It is interesting to notice that the significance level of the ARs and CARs shown in the 
previous studies are much higher than ours.36 We suggest that there are three basic level 
elements in our study which reduce the significance level of our test results. Firstly, we 
employ F-F-C four-factor CAPM whereas previous studies typically estimate the basic 
one-factor CAPM or even use the average stock price to estimate ARs. Compared with 
the F-F-C four-factor CAPM, the standard CAPM tends to overstate the magnitude of 
the ARs (see, Fama and French, 1996). 37  Secondly, we use the GJR-GARCH 
                                                   
36 For instance, Eije and Wiegerinck (2010) show that the US cross-border acquirers experience 
positive CAR at a significance level p=0.000 in both -5 to +5 and -3 to +3 cumulative windows.   
37 Fama and French (1996) suggest that three factor model can capture the average stock returns 
anomalies better than standard CAPM. Thus, the significance level of ARs under F-F-C four-factor 
CAPM should be lower than standard CAPM.  
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estimation method instead of the standard OLS method, which reduces the volatility 
clustering in the residuals and increases estimation efficiency relative to the OLS. 
Thirdly, and most importantly, our study employs more sophisticated test statistic: the 
adj.BMP t-statistic to overcome the common issues of serial correlation and the cross-
sectional correlation in event studies. This more sophisticated estimation method is 
likely to place a downward effect on the significance level of ARs and CARs. As we 
still find that Japanese acquirers experience significant CARs during the announcement 
period, our result appear to provide reliable evidence about the change in shareholder 
wealth in cross-border M&A.   
 
4.2 Merger relationship  
 
The previous studies (see, e.g. Lewis and Webb, 2007; Sharma and Ho, 2002; 
Lambrecht, 2004) find the ARs can depend on the nature of merger relationship 
(horizontal or vertical). These studies suggest that the merger relationship can be a 
proxy for evaluating i) the synergistic effect in the acquisition (see, e.g. Acemoglu et 
al., 2009; Dos Santos et al., 2008); ii) the amount of agency costs in the acquirers (see, 
e.g. Laeven and Levine, 2007); and iii) the reduction of information asymmetry risks 
in the target market (see, e.g. Garfinkel and Hankins, 2011; Beladi et al., 2013). 
Following previous studies, we examine the investor behaviour associated with merger 
relationship in the cross-border M&As.  
 
Based on our cross-border M&A sample, we classified the merger relationship into four 
groups: horizontal acquisition, vertical acquisition, conglomerate acquisition, and 
increase of corporate control (ICC). Following the previous studies, we employ the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code and input/output (I/O) code (see, e.g. Fan 
and Lang, 2000; Acemoglu et al., 2009) to classify the horizontal, vertical and 
conglomerate acquisition. We classify M&As as horizontal acquisitions when the 
acquirer and target share the same primary SIC code. Following Fan and Goyal (2006) 
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and Ahern and Harford (2009), we classify M&As as vertical if I/O codes of the 
acquirer and target have more than 1% relativeness. We classify M&As as 
conglomerate if I/O code relativeness is less than 1%.38 ICC is the acquisition made by 
acquirers who have already hold a significant amount of the target shares. Compared 
with other types of organisational structure, ICC mergers suffer less from risks 
associated with information asymmetry and also creates less value from the market for 
corporate control. Without differentiating ICC from the other organisational structures, 
our result may be weakened by the effect of ICC. In our study, we categorize the M&As 
as ICC when the acquirer has already hold more than 10% of target shares. 
 
Table 4.2.1 presents the ARs of the US and Japanese acquirers in different merger 
relationships. Our sample consists of 95 horizontal, 160 vertical, 146 ICC and 123 
conglomerate M&A initiated by the US acquirers. Correspondingly, there are 173 
horizontal, 143 vertical, 81 ICC and 329 conglomerate M&As initiated by Japanese 
acquirers. Panel A to D show the ARs of horizontal, vertical, ICC and conglomerate 
acquirers, respectively. As ARs in our sample are not normally distributed (see Chapter 
3), we also employ the non-parametric Kruskal Wallis statistic to test whether ARs in 
different panels are significantly different from each other.  
 
In Panel A, we find that both the US and Japanese acquirers experience insignificant 
ARs and CARs on the announcement day. The only significant AR we find in this panel 
                                                   
38 We notice that the I/O code contains several weaknesses. Firstly, as it is composed based on the US 
industry input and output, it may not be able to capture the Japanese industry complementary 
relationship. Although Claessens et al. (2000) use I/O as the proxy for industry relativeness in their 
Asian country studies, they suggest that despite the high similarity of the Japanese and US industry 
pattern, the I/O code may still be a less precise method in defining the industry relationship. Secondly, 
we find that the I/O code is based on early SIC code, which fails to capture the information of many 
new industries. Thirdly, using the SIC or I/O code may only capture the primary industry of acquirers 
and targets. The M&A may be motivated by the development of an acquirer’s secondary industry 
business. Even though the I/O code and SIC code may contain weaknesses, we still argue that using the 
I/O code and SIC code provide a more precise and comparable result compared to manually classified 
industry relationship. Indeed, only very early studies (see, e.g. Amihud and Lev, 1981; Johnson and 
Houston, 2000) use such subjective method.   
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is the significant and positive AR experienced by US acquirers on day t=-2. This 
significant AR may be the effects of market noise. Our result is consistent with Fee and 
Thomas (2004) who suggest that a larger proportion of value created from the 
synergistic effect is converted into the target shareholders’ wealth due to their high 
bargaining power. In Chapter 5, we show that the bargaining between acquirers and 
targets can reduce the acquirers’ wealth gain in the M&A, but it should not be able to 
determine the difference in ARs across different panels (see Chapter 5, section 5.2). 
Thus, the insignificant ARs in the horizontal panel may be resulted by other factors 
such as high post-acquisition restructuring cost and information asymmetry that trade 
off the value created by the horizontal integration. 
 
In panel B, we show that the US acquirers experience positive and significant AR on 
day t=1. Japanese acquirers experience negative and significant ARs on day t=1, t=3, 
t=4 and t=5. Although the market response is insignificant on the announcement day 
for both US and Japanese acquirers, the significant AR on day t=1 is likely to be a 
delayed market response. Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Beladi et al. (2013) indicate that 
vertical M&As are motivated by the reduction in contract costs and improve in cash 
flow certainty. Considering that Japanese accounting information disclosure and 
shareholders’ protection laws are less mature than the US ones, cross-border vertical 
M&As may generate higher benefit for the US acquirers than Japanese acquirers.39  
 
 
 
                                                   
39 Aggarwal et al. (2008) show that the information transparency and shareholder’s protection in the 
US firms is higher than the Japanese firm.   
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Table 4.2.1 Abnormal returns of the US and Japanese acquirers taking horizontal, vertical, increasing corporate control and conglomerate acquisition  
 
 The ARs are measured in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Kruskal Wallis
-5 0.1941 0.20 0.3195 0.44 0.2430 -0.02 0.2355 1.26 0.35
-4 0.2893 -0.15 -0.2465 -0.11 -0.2228 -0.21 0.2486 -0.73 2.74
-3 0.8961 1.53 -0.3562 -0.77 0.4745 1.66
c -0.2334 0.08 9.68
b
-2 0.6732 1.94
c 0.4806 1.70 -0.4455 -0.98 -0.2300 0.10 7.76
c
-1 -0.1131 -0.79 0.6883 1.61 -0.0948 0.04 -0.0505 -1.18 2.00
0 0.1993 0.52 -0.2546 -0.74 0.3475 0.08 0.4223 0.71 3.61
1 -0.1217 -0.58 0.1855 1.77
c 0.0275 0.78 0.1702 0.61 0.49
2 0.0713 -0.48 0.0427 0.39 0.0665 -0.86 0.1461 0.92 0.88
3 0.2097 0.53 0.0270 0.32 0.2494 1.89
c 0.2375 0.80 0.04
4 -0.2211 -0.24 0.1957 0.94 0.1350 0.26 -0.6470 -1.68
c 3.62
5 0.2957 1.04 -0.0944 -0.23 -0.0121 -0.63 0.6802 1.58 6.32
c
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Kruskal Wallis
-5 0.9040 0.12 -1.2890 -0.78 0.3544 1.09 1.6923 1.11 3.21
-4 0.7602 -0.31 -1.3990 -0.70 0.3028 0.95 1.4456 0.92 3.30
-3 0.5894 -0.80 -1.5172 -0.89 0.4417 1.03 1.6971 0.99 4.91
-2 0.3427 -1.21 -1.7066 -0.84 0.4035 1.03 2.0025 1.06 6.25
c
-1 0.0660 -1.57 -2.0591 -1.04 0.4821 1.05 2.3898 1.20 6.06
0 -0.0519 -1.45 -2.4601 -1.33 0.6129 1.14 2.6407 1.36 8.07
b
1 0.0595 -1.09 -2.8037 -1.85
c 0.8824 1.18 2.8142 1.63 11.42
a
2 0.4279 -0.72 -2.7893 -1.56 0.5368 1.13 3.0256 1.72
c
9.58b
b
3 0.6031 -0.56 -3.2125 -1.82
c 0.3504 0.91 3.0781 1.74
c
10.67
b
4 0.3003 -0.63 -3.2023 -2.04
b 0.4347 0.91 3.1324 1.68
c
10.89
b
5 0.6641 -0.56 -3.1252 -1.76
c 0.3016 0.68 3.1281 1.51 8.77
b
The US Acquirers
Japanese Acquirers
Panel A: Horizontal Panel B: Vertical Panel C: ICC Panel D: Conglomerate
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This explanation is also in line with Mantecon (2009), who finds that the acquisition 
between two joint venture entities experience higher CARs when the target is in the 
country with lower economic freedom.40  In addition, if investors expect Japanese 
acquirers have already experienced lower contract cost and cash flow risk in the US, 
the acquirers may lose flexibility to employ better suppliers or distributors and increase 
internal transaction cost after the vertical integration. This may explain why Japanese 
vertical acquirers experience negative ARs. 
 
In the panel of ICC, we find that neither the US nor Japanese acquirers experience 
significant AR on the announcement day. Our result suggests that the market does not 
expect ICC to create strong synergistic effect. Comparing with the horizontal and 
vertical M&As, ICC may not be able to create scale and scope effect, nor the cost from 
information asymmetry. It is also possible that acquirers who initiate ICC type of M&A 
do not acquire sufficient amount of target shares. To test whether insignificant ICC 
announcement effect is a result of low percentage target share acquiring, we perform a 
test to compare the acquirer’s ARs and CARs when takeover more or less than 50% 
percent of target shares. The results are presented in table 4.2.2. 
 
The table 4.2.2 shows that the US acquirers in both less and more than 50% of target 
share takeover groups experience insignificant ARs and CARs. This result is confirmed 
by non-parametric Mann–Whitney U test. On the other hand, Japanese acquirers who 
acquired more than 50% target shares experience significant and positive AR at day t=1, 
and significant and positive CARs over day t=2 to day t=5. This result may suggest that 
the amount of share control impose a more significant effect on Japanese acquirers’ 
ARs.  
 
 
 
                                                   
40 Although this study is focusing on the cross-border M&As between joint venture entities. We argue 
that the increasing the corporate control serves the similar function as takeover joint venture partner.  
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Table 4.2.2 ARs and CARs the US and Japan acquirers taking over more or less 50% of target shares  
The AR and CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. The M –W U denotes the Mann–Whitney U 
test. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
We further investigate the distribution of the four types of M&As in the more or less 
than 50% groups. The table 4.2.3 shows the distribution of four types of M&A in more 
or less than 50% target takeover.  
 
As we expected, the ICC has the smallest number of announcements of than 50% 
takeover. However, for Japanese acquirers, we find that the percentage of ICC in total 
sample is not significantly lower in the more than 50% of the bidding group. Thus, we 
can conclude that in ICC, the size of target share acquiring does not have a significant 
effect on the ARs, given our established minimum cut-off point. 
The US Acquirers bid less than 50% The US Acquirers bid more than 50%  ARs CARs 
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP CARs  adj.-BMP M-W U M –W U 
-5 0.0306  0.46 0.0306 0.46 0.3565  1.97b 0.3565  1.97b 0.57 0.57 
-4 -0.0006  -0.53 0.0300 0.14 -0.0245  -1.21 0.3320  0.77 1.38 0.34 
-3 0.4036  1.40 0.4336 0.93 -0.0289  -0.62 0.3031  0.22 0.66 0.42 
-2 -0.1789  0.62 0.2347 0.85 0.2625  1.16 0.5656  0.76 1.04 0.35 
-1 -0.2646  -1.14 0.0099 0.31 0.3533  0.33 0.9189  0.78 0.07 0.15 
0 0.0895  -0.41 0.0796  0.03 0.1612  0.64 1.0801  0.94 0.07 0.05 
1 0.4062  1.39 0.4857  0.77 -0.0131  -0.04 1.0669  0.88 0.21 0.02 
2 0.1127  0.74 0.5984  0.86 0.0793  -0.48 1.1462  0.63 0.25 0.09 
3 0.2692  1.81c 0.8676  1.14 0.1262  -0.28 1.2724  0.52 0.18 0.11 
4 0.7909  1.92c 1.6584  1.55 -0.5446  -2.37a  0.7278  -0.36 3.78a 1.13 
5 -0.0549  0.40 1.6035  1.31 0.2904  1.42 1.0182  0.08 0.93 0.63 
Japanese Acquirers bid less than 50% Japanese Acquirers bid more than 50%  ARs CARs 
-5 -0.0142  0.35 -0.0142  0.35  0.1414  1.38 0.1414  1.38  0.54  0.54 
-4 -0.0346  -0.70 -0.0488  -0.22  -0.0895  -0.88 0.0519  0.38  0.23  0.18 
-3 0.3257  2.08b 0.2770  0.95  0.0099  -0.06 0.0618  0.27  1.52  0.71 
-2 0.0294  0.56 0.3064  1.06  -0.0292  -0.57 0.0326  -0.07  0.54  1.15 
-1 -0.2882  -1.39 0.0182  0.28  0.2302  0.98 0.2628  0.40  1.84c 0.07 
0 0.0571  -0.21 0.0753  0.15  0.1930  1.56 0.4558  0.96  0.90  0.15 
1 0.0390  0.79 0.1143  0.42  0.1942  1.95c 0.6500  1.63  0.30  0.53 
2 0.1397  1.14 0.2540  0.72  0.1208  1.59 0.7708  2.05b 0.27  0.12 
3 0.0263  0.48 0.2803  0.81  -0.0420  -0.80 0.7289  1.69b 1.07  0.22 
4 0.0718  0.18 0.3521  0.82  0.0838  0.54 0.8127  1.72b 0.40  0.02 
5 -0.2900  -2.28b 0.0621  0.20  0.1280  0.50 0.9406  1.78b 1.97b  0.48 
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 Table 4.2.3 number of observations for each type of M&A in more or less than 50% of target bidding 
The US acquirers 
 Horizontal Vertical ICC  Conglomerate 
Bid less than 50% 31 58 99 48 
Bid more than 50% 64 102 47 75 
Japanese acquirers 
 Horizontal Vertical ICC  Conglomerate 
Bid less than 50% 104 62 40 160 
Bid more than 50% 69 81 41 169 
 
We also find that the US acquirers who initiate conglomerate M&As do not experience 
significant returns during the announcement period. The only significant AR on day  
t=-4 is more likely to be driven by the unrelated market noise. The announcement effect 
for the US acquirers is consistent with the previous studies (see, e.g. Villalonga, 2004; 
Dos Santos et al., 2008) that show that the conglomerate integration neither increases 
nor decreases the shareholders’ wealth.  
 
Unlike the US acquirers, Japanese acquirers experience positive and significant ARs on 
day t=2, t=3 and t=4. Although we do not observe significant AR on the announcement 
day, the continuation of the positive ARs can be interpreted as a positive market 
response to the acquisition announcement. There are two reasons that can explain the 
different investor behaviours associated with conglomerate M&As across the US and 
Japan. Firstly, Japanese investors tend to be more optimistic than the US investors in 
response to the M&A announcements (Kang et al., 2000). Japanese firms have 
historically maintained a close relationship with Japanese commercial banks (the main 
bank system). Pinkowitz and Williamson (2001) and Kang et al. (2000) report that the 
main bank provides significant liquidity support as well as monitoring to Japanese 
acquirers. Secondly, the acquirers from the two countries may have different 
characteristics. When we examine the US and Japanese conglomerate acquirers, we 
find that a large number of Japanese conglomerate acquirers are general trading 
companies. These firms tend to already have highly diversified business sectors before 
 86 
 
the M&As. Thus, Japanese conglomerate acquirers can be more experienced in 
integrating businesses from different industries, which in turn, may result in lower costs 
in the post-M&A restructuring. It is worth noting that when we examine the M&A 
experience of the US and Japanese acquirers, we find that most US and Japanese 
conglomerate acquirers have initiated more than two acquisitions in the past. Thus, the 
M&A experience may not be the reason why markets act differently to the 
announcements. 
  
To test for differences in the ARs across the forms of merger relationships, we apply 
the Kruskal–Wallis statistic to the ARs across the various groups. The result shows that 
the ARs of the US acquirers for the different merger relationships are not significantly 
different. This result is inconsistent with adj-BMP test, which shows that the acquirers 
experience positive and significant ARs in the vertical panel but experience 
insignificant ARs in the other panels. It might because the Kruskal–Wallis statistic is 
non-parametric, so the result is unaffected by the particular distribution of the ARs. For 
Japanese acquirers, Kruskal–Wallis test shows that ARs in at least one panel are 
significantly different from the ARs in the other panels from day t=0 to day t=5. This 
result is consistent with the result of adj-BMP test.  
 
Table 4.2.3 presents the CARs of the US and Japanese acquirers in different merger 
relationships. Panel A to Panel D show the CARs of the horizontal, vertical, ICC and 
conglomerate acquirers.  
 
Different to the ARs shown in table 4.2.1, we cannot find any significant CARs around 
the announcement date in table 4.2.3. The insignificant CAR may imply that investors 
do not show consistent response to any specific type of M&A announcements. The 
Kruskal-Wallis test also shows that the CARs experienced by the US and Japanese 
acquirers are not significantly different across the panels.  
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Table 4.2.3 Cumulative abnormal returns for the US acquirers taking horizontal, vertical, increasing corporate control and investment acquisition  
 
The CARs are measured in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Days CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Kruskal Wallis
-5 0.1941 0.20 0.3195 0.44 0.2430 -0.02 0.2355 1.26 0.35
-4 0.4834 0.02 0.0730 0.24 0.0202 -0.17 0.2486 -0.73 0.68
-3 1.3796 0.82 -0.2831 -0.20 0.4947 1.03 -0.2334 0.08 8.36
b
-2 2.0527 1.62 0.1975 0.52 0.0491 0.30 -0.2300 0.10 8.60
b
-1 1.9397 1.01 0.8858 1.08 -0.0457 0.31 -0.0505 -1.18 7.15
c
0 2.1390 1.00 0.6312 0.50 0.3018 0.27 0.4223 0.71 4.37
1 2.0173 0.80 0.8167 1.12 0.3293 0.70 0.1702 0.61 2.75
2 2.0886 0.46 0.8594 1.11 0.3958 0.34 0.1461 0.92 3.25
3 2.2982 0.54 0.8863 1.08 0.6452 0.90 0.2375 0.80 2.78
4 2.0772 0.49 1.0820 1.22 0.7802 0.92 -0.6470 -1.68
c 2.73
5 2.3729 0.74 0.9876 1.16 0.7681 0.50 0.6802 1.58 2.47
Days CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Kruskal Wallis
-5 0.9040 0.12 -1.2890 -0.75 0.3544 1.09 1.6923 1.11 7.29
c
-4 1.6642 -0.10 -2.6880 -0.72 0.6572 1.02 3.1379 1.02 7.08
c
-3 2.2536 -0.36 -4.2052 -0.78 1.0989 1.03 4.8351 1.01 6.66
-2 2.5963 -0.61 -5.9117 -0.80 1.5024 1.04 6.8375 1.03 5.84
-1 2.6623 -0.86 -7.9708 -0.85 1.9845 1.06 9.2273 1.08 5.19
0 2.6105 -1.01 -10.4309 -0.94 2.5974 1.08 11.8681 1.14 4.45
1 2.6700 -1.04 -13.2346 -1.08 3.1797 1.11 14.6822 1.23 3.65
2 3.0979 -1.00 -16.0239 -1.15 3.7165 1.12 17.7078 1.31 3.42
3 3.7011 -0.94 -19.2364 -1.23 4.0669 1.10 20.7859 1.37 3.30
4 4.0013 -0.90 -22.4387 -1.33 4.5016 1.09 23.9183 1.42 3.15
5 4.6654 -0.86 -25.5639 -1.38 4.8032 1.05 27.0464 1.43 3.02
Panel D: Conglomerate
Japanese Acquirers
The US Acquirers
Panel A: Horizontal Panel B: Vertical Panel C: ICC
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Overall, we find that the types of acquisition can explain the announcement returns in 
the cross-border M&As. We also find that the US and Japanese market act 
inconsistently to the M&A announcement. We suggest that the risks from information 
asymmetry and shareholder’s protection in the target country influence the market 
interoperation to the M&A announcement. 
 
We need to highlight several important issues with our test procedure. Firstly, we find 
that the ARs and CARs in most subgroups are not significant on day t=0. Thus, the type 
of acquisitions may not be a strong determinant of the ARs. Secondly, we find that 
acquirers in the horizontal and ICC M&As experience insignificant ARs. In theory, we 
suggest that the insignificant ARs in the two panels should be driven by different 
reasons. However, we cannot find other better proxy to test the difference. Indeed, this 
problem exists in most M&A studies. When we compare the insignificant ARs found 
by previous studies (e.g. Malmendier and Tate, 2008; Sherman and Pettway, 1987), it 
is difficult to justify the main factor that results in the insignificant ARs. Thirdly, our 
classification of the merger relationships may not capture all the synergic effects we 
wish to test. For instance, when an acquirer takes over a firm in the target country, it 
may also take over the supplier and distributor networks. Thus, the boundary between 
the horizontal and vertical can sometimes be ambiguous.  
 
4.3 Acquiring listed or unlisted target  
 
Fuller et al. (2002) and Harford et al. (2012) indicate that acquirers are more likely to 
experience negative market responses when they inappropriately avoid the unlisted 
targets in M&A. The negative ARs may reflect the high bargaining power of listed 
targets. Grossman and Hart (1980) and Schwert (2000) also show acquirers experience 
negative CARs when they take over listed targets. However, different to Fuller et al. 
(2002) and Harford et al. (2012), Grossman and Hart (1980) and Schwert (2000) explain 
the negative CARs by free rider problem. They suggest that when the target is listed, 
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free riders can dilute the acquirers’ shareholders’ wealth.  
 
In this study, we categorise the public status of the target firms into listed and unlisted. 
Following Officer (2007), we categorize the subsidiaries as unlisted firms. Officer 
(2007) indicates that acquiring subsidiaries shares common characteristics with 
acquiring the unlisted targets. Acquirers can be risked by high information asymmetry 
and benefit from low target bargaining power considering the target’s weak capability 
to access external funds. Surprisingly, we find that the majority of target firms are 
unlisted in both US-JP and JP-US cross-border M&As.  
 
Table 4.3.1 shows the ARs and CARs of the US and Japanese acquirers who take over 
the listed and unlisted targets. The sample consists of 367 unlisted biddings and 57 
listed biddings initiated by the US acquirers. In addition, there are 662 unlisted biddings 
and 64 listed biddings initiated by Japanese acquirers. In Panel A, we report the 
acquirers’ AR when they bid listed targets (listed bidding). In Panel B, we report the 
acquirers’ ARs when they bid unlisted targets (unlisted bidding). In Panel C and Panel 
D, we report the acquirer’s CARs in listed and unlisted bidding, respectively.  
 
Panel A shows that the US acquirers who take over listed targets do not experience 
either significant ARs or CARs during the announcement period. Consistent with Fuller 
et al. (2002) and Harford et al. (2012), we find that the acquirers in the unlisted bidding 
experience positive and significant CARs from day t=-3 to day t=5. The return 
continuations suggest that investors appreciate the US acquirers to takeover unlisted 
Japanese targets. Officer (2007) reports that unlisted firms or subsidiaries experience 
takeover premium discount about 15% to 30% compared with public firms. The less 
wealth shift from acquirers to targets may explains the more positive ARs and CARs 
experienced by the US acquirers. The high cost of accessing external funding for 
unlisted targets may also explain the significant and positive CARs of acquirers in the 
unlisted bidding (see, e.g. Francis et al., 2008). In this case, acquirers can create higher 
value from financial synergy and have higher bargaining power over their targets.   
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Table 4.3.1 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japanese acquirers who bid listed and unlisted targets 
 
The ARs and CARs are measured in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U
-5 -0.0970 -0.98 0.3062 1.42 1.25 -0.0970 -0.63 0.3062 1.42 1.25
-4 -0.0634 -0.14 -0.0096 0.79 0.32 -0.1604 -1.23 0.2966 1.52 0.79
-3 0.2675 0.83 0.0853 1.14 0.20 0.1071 -0.79 0.3819 1.89
c 0.89
-2 0.0083 0.59 0.1384 1.13 0.54 0.1154 -0.38 0.5203 2.16
b 0.71
-1 0.6352 0.80 0.0805 0.16 1.04 0.7506 -0.29 0.6008 1.95
c 0.80
0 -0.0459 -0.37 0.1668 1.49 0.61 0.7047 -0.53 0.7676 2.39
a 0.87
1 -0.2438 -0.58 0.1781 1.61 1.11 0.4610 -0.62 0.9457 2.66
a 1.14
2 0.1664 1.36 0.0781 0.31 0.93 0.6274 -0.13 1.0238 2.60
a 0.97
3 0.4841 0.48 0.1236 1.46 0.33 1.1115 -0.15 1.1474 2.80
a 0.99
4 -0.0275 -0.09 -0.1301 0.03 0.34 1.0840 -0.33 1.0173 2.64
a 0.83
5 -0.3894 -0.47 0.2680 0.98 0.90 0.6946 -0.13 1.2853 2.78
a 1.05
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U
-5 2.4297 2.36
a 0.5825 0.30 0.44 2.4297 2.36
a 0.5825 1.25 1.65
c
-4 2.8268 2.57
a 0.4758 -0.05 0.52 5.2566 2.49
a 1.0583 1.11 1.77
c
-3 3.1515 2.51
a 0.6270 0.45 0.63 8.4081 2.53
a 1.6853 1.12 1.74
c
-2 2.5497 2.50
a 0.6851 0.60 0.48 10.9578 2.55
a 2.3704 1.12 1.67
c
-1 2.2672 2.34
a 0.6829 0.56 0.10 13.2250 2.53
a 3.0533 1.08 1.54
0 2.0063 2.21
b 0.8459 1.08 -0.07 15.2312 2.50
a 3.8992 1.14 1.42
1 2.4566 2.29
b 0.9310 1.30 0.05 17.6878 2.50
a 4.8302 1.24 1.36
2 2.8294 1.93
b 1.0377 1.40 -0.04 20.5172 2.44
a 5.8679 1.33 1.28
3 3.3272 2.31
b 0.9807 1.18 0.10 23.8444 2.45
a 6.8485 1.38 1.24
4 3.2159 1.99
b 1.0768 1.47 0.00 27.0602 2.42
a 7.9253 1.43 1.19
5 2.9430 1.78
c 1.0162 1.36 -0.20 30.0032 2.37
a 8.9416 1.46 1.14
The US Acquirers
Japanese Acquirers
Panel A: Listed bidding Panel B: unlisted bidding Panel C: Listed bidding Panel D: Unlisted bidding
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Despite these results, the Mann–Whitney U test shows that that ARs are insignificantly 
different across that types of bids. We suggest that the difference in sample size may 
reduce the power of Mann–Whitney U test. Thus, our adj-BMP test results can be more 
reliable to identify the effect of listed and unlisted bidding.   
 
Interestingly, the market response for listed and unlisted biddings initiated by Japanese 
acquirers shows opposite signs. Japanese acquirers experience significant and positive 
ARs and CARs when they bid for the US listed targets. On the other hand, when they 
bid the unlisted targets, Japanese acquirers only experience insignificant ARs and 
CARs. This is potentially due to the better accounting disclosure system in the US and 
thereby the Japanese acquirers who bid listed targets are compensated by less 
information asymmetry. However, we cannot justify whether the reduction of the 
information asymmetry can trade-off for the high bargaining power of listed targets.  
 
Other possibility is that the size of the US unlisted target is relatively smaller than the 
Japanese unlisted targets. Thus, when Japanese acquirers takeover the unlisted US 
targets, they cannot be benefit from increasing market power or diversification. To test 
the size effect on the target public status, we present the average size of the deal in table 
4.3.2. Following Fuller et al. (2002), we measure the size by deal value to acquirer’s 
total assets.   
 
Table 4.3.2. Relative deal size of the US and Japanese public and private bidding 
The US acquirers 
 Public bidding Private bidding t-statistics 
Deal value / Total asset 0.0352 0.0447 0.48 
Japanese acquirers 
 Public bidding Private bidding t-statistics 
Deal value / Total asset 0.0391 0.0465 0.47 
The deal value and total asset value are converted into USD based on the average exchange rate during 365 days 
before the announcement.   
 
Table 3.3.2 shows that the relative deal size is not significantly different between public 
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and private bidding for both the US and Japanese acquirers. Thus, the size effect should 
not explain the different ARs experienced by acquirers from the two countries when 
bidding the unlisted targets.  
 
In addition, in the listed bidding panel, we find that the ARs and CARs of Japanese 
acquirers are significant and positive over the entire announcement period. This result 
implies that investors anticipate the M&A announcement from other information 
sources beforehand. We have tested several possibilities to explain the pre-
announcement significant returns. We have checked the industry of the Japanese 
acquirers and the merger relationship with the listed targets. However, we cannot find 
any significant evidence that the investor behaviour is influenced by the two factors 
above. In addition, bidding for the foreign listed target can also be driven by the purpose 
of cross-listing (see, e.g. Doidge et al., 2009). By taking over the listed targets, acquirers 
can reduce the listing cost in the target’s country. However, we have not found a trend 
that Japanese acquirers list their shares on the US market after the acquisition. Moreover, 
by checking the bidding experience of the Japanese acquirers, we find that the acquirers 
in the listed bidding tend to have more experience of acquisition activities. However, 
we also have not found evidence that more experienced acquirers experience higher 
average ARs or CARs.  
 
Overall, we suggest that the target public status can determine the AR of acquirers. 
However, we find it difficult to explain the opposite market reactions to the 
announcements experienced by the US and Japanese acquirers. Furthermore, even if 
we only focus on the results of the US acquirers, we still find that the positive CARs 
can be explained by more than one theories.  
 
4.4. Method of payment 
  
Previous studies indicate that the method of payment can influence investor behaviour 
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during the M&A announcement period. Draper and Paudyal (1999) and Shleifer and 
Vishny (2003) indicate that the using stock payment may be a sign of the perceived 
overvaluing an acquirer’s stock price. Thus, an acquirer’s stock value may decrease 
when it finances M&A by stock. However, even though stock payment can exchange 
the overvalued acquirer’s stock for the undervalued target assets, Fu et al. (2013) argue 
that stock financing may not be able to benefit acquirer’s shareholders. Instead, the 
overvalued acquirers tend to have higher agency cost. Thus, investors may show 
negative response to the pure stock payment as it can be the signal of the stock 
overvaluation and high agency cost in the acquirer. In addition, Schwert (2000) and 
Shleifer and Vishny (2003) suggest that pure cash payment may reduce the resistance 
of the target and in turn reduce the cost of completing an acquisition. 
 
The method of payment in this study is defined as the proposed payment method 
reported in the M&A announcements. Compared to the final payment method, the 
proposed payment method should have more significant impact on the announcement 
returns. Consistent with Boubakri et al. (2008), we find that cross-border M&As are 
mainly financed by cash. In our sample of 181 the US acquirers and 397 Japanese 
acquirers who disclosed their proposed payment method, only 28 US acquirers and 26 
Japanese acquirers use common stock or mixed method as the final finance method.41 
In addition, due to our small sample size, we can only classify all the non-cash payment 
in one subgroup instead of classifying them into more granular level as in some other 
studies.  
 
Table 4.4 reports the ARs and CARs of the US and Japanese acquirers according to 
their forms of payment. The sample consists of 152 cash payment and 27 non-cash 
payment US-JP M&As, and consists 369 cash payment and 25 non-cash payment JP-
US M&As. Panel A and Panel B report the ARs of the acquirers financing M&As by 
                                                   
41 The mixed payment method is mainly referring to the cash and stock payment. There are also a 
small number of M&As financed by cash and convertible bond, cash and debt, ordinary shares and 
assets.     
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cash and non-cash. Panel C and Panel D report the CARs of the acquirers who finance 
the M&As by cash and non-cash, respectively.  
 
The table shows that both the US and Japanese acquirers do not experience significant 
ARs and CARs during the announcement period. Our result is inconsistent with Shleifer 
and Vishny (2003), Eije and Wiegerinck (2010), and Schwert (2000) who find the 
method of payment significantly explains the CARs. However, these studies are based 
on domestic M&As whereas in the cross-border M&As it is a common practice to use 
cash payment.  
 
Overall, we suggest that the method of payment cannot explain the ARs and CARs 
during the announcement period. As most cross-border M&As are financed by cash, 
the method of payment in cross-border M&A may not contain valuable information for 
investors to anticipate the real bargaining power or the result of the M&A. The method 
in this section however, may contain two weaknesses. Firstly, Harford et al. (2012) 
indicate that the cash payment is a signal of empire building when the target is listed. 
However, due to the sample size, we cannot do the cross test for the method of payment 
and target public status. Secondly, we cannot separate the mixed and pure stock 
payment, and this can reduce the power of our test (see, Martynova and Renneboog, 
2009). 
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Table 4.4 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japanese acquirers who use with different finance method  
 
The US AR and CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U
-5 0.0850 -0.63 0.9423 1.59 0.90 0.0850 -0.48 0.9423 1.61 0.90
-4 0.0706 0.47 -0.2897 0.43 0.26 0.1556 0.06 0.6525 1.44 0.74
-3 0.1830 0.78 -0.0579 0.60 0.28 0.3386 0.18 0.5946 0.80 0.81
-2 0.0288 0.08 -1.1900 -0.30 0.20 0.3674 0.47 -0.5954 0.02 0.31
-1 0.1199 0.50 0.4932 0.45 0.03 0.4873 0.24 -0.1022 0.31 0.31
0 -0.0357 1.50 -0.6214 -1.21 1.49 0.4516 0.95 -0.7236 -0.59 1.04
1 -0.2485 -0.76 -0.0846 0.41 0.68 0.2030 0.72 -0.8083 -0.63 0.86
2 0.0218 0.40 -0.6546 -0.13 0.01 0.2249 0.91 -1.4628 -0.75 1.13
3 -0.0674 0.32 1.6799 1.55 1.69
c 0.1575 0.97 0.2171 0.02 0.29
4 -0.4316 -1.15 0.2119 1.26 1.86 -0.2741 0.18 0.4289 0.42 0.38
5 0.0672 -0.20 -0.2499 0.44 0.68 -0.2070 0.03 0.1790 0.43 0.19
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U
-5 0.8428 0.72 1.3646 0.49 0.28 0.8428 0.72 1.3646 0.49 0.28
-4 0.6610 0.25 1.8043 0.45 0.20 1.5038 0.49 3.1689 0.48 0.26
-3 0.9662 0.81 2.1004 0.33 0.03 2.4699 0.60 5.2693 0.42 0.18
-2 0.8788 0.62 2.0383 0.22 0.03 3.3487 0.61 7.3076 0.36 0.14
-1 0.9727 0.83 2.4415 0.18 0.04 4.3214 0.67 9.7490 0.32 0.14
0 1.0983 1.23 2.6181 0.26 0.14 5.4197 0.78 12.3671 0.31 0.13
1 1.3870 1.35 2.6356 0.22 0.20 6.8067 0.88 15.0027 0.30 0.18
2 1.5332 1.29 3.0949 0.45 0.40 8.3399 0.95 18.0976 0.32 0.22
3 1.5357 1.27 2.9513 0.53 0.42 9.8756 1.00 21.0489 0.35 0.25
4 1.6155 1.32 2.6591 0.26 0.18 11.4911 1.04 23.7080 0.35 0.25
5 1.5393 1.24 3.2878 0.61 0.45 13.0304 1.07 26.9958 0.38 0.28
Japanese Acquirers
Panel A: Cash payment Panel C: Cash payment Panel D: Non-cash PaymentPanel B: Non-cash Payment
The US Acquirers
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4.5 The ARs and CARs of acquirers in different industries 
 
As the cross-border M&A is a process of business resource reallocation, the 
characteristics of different industries (e.g. output variation, contract cost, information 
asymmetry) may explain the motivation as well as friction in the M&As. If the investors 
efficiently price these characteristics, the industry of the acquirers can be a determinant 
of the announcement returns.  
 
Following Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Kiymaz (2004), we classify the acquirers’ 
industry by using 4-digit standard industrial classification (SIC) code. We find that 
several acquisitions are initiated by the investment subsidiaries of a non-finance 
company (e.g. Microsoft Global Finance). For these cases, we use the secondary SIC 
code of the acquirers to match the industry identity of the subsidiaries.  
 
Based on the Fama-French 10 industry classification42, we classify our 435 samples of 
the US acquirers and 735 samples of the Japan acquirers into 7 industry areas, which 
are consumer products43, finance44, health care, manufacturing, high technology, retail 
and service.45   
 
                                                   
42 We found that if we follow the Fama French 10 industry portfolio classification method, we will 
have a large number of acquirers being categorised into “other” and “high tech” group. In the 10 
portfolio classification method, Fama and French integrated service in the high tech portfolio and 
integrated finance, insurance and many other industries in the other portfolio. Thus, we believe that the 
10 industry portfolio is not an efficient method for our study. Thus, we further classify the finance from 
the “other” industry and classified high technology industrial and service firms from the “hiTec” 
industry. We also combined Consumer Durables and Consumer Nondurable products manufacturer 
since the sample size of each group is too small.   
43 “Consumer products” contains both Consumer Durables and Consumer Nondurable.  
44 “Finance” contains insurance and banking.  
45 Notice that, we exclude some event in this test due to the small size of sample number. We exclude 
the whole sales, telecom, mining and energy industry. In addition, we exclude the US retail industry 
acquirers since only less than 10 public American retailers initiated cross-border M&As to Japan target 
between 1990 and 2015.     
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Table 4.5.1 presents the average ARs of the US and Japanese acquirers from consumer 
products, manufacturing, finance, health care, and high technology, service and retail 
industry sectors. Our sample consists 33 the US acquirers from consumer products 
industry, 98 from finance industry, 35 from healthcare industry, 59 from high-
technology industry, 88 from manufacturing industry; and consists 75 from service 
industry. The corresponding samples for Japanese acquirers are 123 firms in consumer 
industry, 23 in finance industry, 46 in healthcare industry, 69 in high-technology 
industry, 194 in manufacturing industry, 70 in service industry, and 121 in retailer 
industry.         
 
We find that the Japanese high technology acquirers experience significant and positive 
AR on day t=1. The significant AR can be a delayed market reaction to the M&A 
announcement. This result is in line with Eun et al. (1996) and Seth et al. (2002), who 
show that the acquirers from R&D intensive industries experience higher CARs. 
However, we find that the US acquirers from high technology group do not experience 
significant AR during the announcement period. It is also worth noting that the high 
technology industry acquirers in both the US and Japan do not show significant trend 
to choose targets from specific industries.  
 
There are two reasons may explain why only Japanese high technology acquirers 
experience significant ARs. Firstly, Japanese high technology acquirers have the 
highest R&D intensity among Japanese acquirers. Following Eun et al. (1996), we use 
R&D to Sales ratio as the proxy of R&D intensity. As it shown in table 4.5.2, we find 
that Japanese acquirers in high technology industry have the highest R&D to Sales ratio. 
In contrast, the US acquirers in high technology have the second lowest R&D/Sales.  
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Table 4.5.1 Abnormal returns for the US acquirers in consumer products, finance, health care, high technology and service industry sector 
The AR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 The US Acquirers 
 Consumer products Finance Health Care High-Tec       Manufacturing Service Kruskal Wallis 
Days ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP  
-5 0.6195 0.51 -0.0268 -0.55 -0.0743 -0.20 0.5450 0.59 0.4862 0.28 0.1839 1.72c 4.22 
-4 -0.4228 -0.53 -0.0264 0.99 -0.7618 -1.62 -0.4433 -0.21 0.0741 0.23 0.4577 0.77 3.83 
-3 0.0242 0.53 -0.6075 -1.22 0.0381 -0.19 -0.0474 0.00 0.6857 2.98a 0.7125 1.99b 11.43b 
-2 -0.1469 -0.36 0.0192 0.03 -0.0331 -0.38 -0.3391 0.40 0.3593 1.08 0.4727 2.15b 9.30 
-1 0.2656 0.33 0.0667 0.50 0.6650 0.18 0.8814 1.27 0.2157 0.58 -0.2983 -1.20 2.93 
0 0.6719 1.32 0.1807 0.80 0.4645 0.18 -0.6705 -1.00 0.3584 1.16 0.0597 0.11 3.13 
1 0.6030 0.66 0.6587 1.69c -0.1608 -0.16 -0.0470 0.45 -0.1456 0.56 -0.0558 -0.27 3.01 
2 -0.6975 -2.00b -0.0101 0.48 0.2697 1.06 0.0957 0.70 0.5595 1.90c 0.0427 0.15 5.75 
3 0.0643 0.17 0.2189 0.92 0.0040 0.18 0.4609 1.20 -0.0118 -0.05 0.5465 1.57 2.91 
4 -0.6825 -1.29 0.0020 0.41 0.9098 2.52a -0.7503 -1.22 -0.3321 -0.92 -0.3741 -0.59 9.21 
5 0.1489 0.84 0.1210 0.07 0.2411 0.16 -0.0448 0.26 0.7148 1.70 0.0035 -0.52 2.08 
                       The Japanese Acquirers  
 Consumer products Finance Health Care High-Tec Manufacturing Service Retailer Kruskal Wallis 
Days ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP  
-5 0.2205  1.03 0.4087  1.07 0.2228  -0.22 -0.0782  0.01 -0.0140  0.45 0.6824  2.14b -0.3692  -0.78 5.55 
-4 -0.1622  -0.73 -0.4873  -0.62 0.1506  0.75 -0.3625  -1.29 -0.1212  -0.15 -0.4137  -1.64c 0.0465  0.05 4.86 
-3 0.3543  1.52 -0.8951  -1.37 -0.0575  -0.76 -0.0740  0.29 0.1596  1.44 0.0091  0.37 0.3992  2.15b 5.23 
-2 -0.0969  0.00 0.2934  -0.02 -0.0369  -0.05 -0.0592  0.01 -0.2879  -0.98 0.5826  1.44 0.3527  2.16b 5.89 
-1 -0.4058  -0.62 -0.3293  0.12 -0.3402  -0.92 0.4077  0.69 0.2278  0.86 0.0873  0.38 -0.1544  -0.35 3.28 
0 -0.0018  0.87 -0.5643  -0.47 -0.4721  -1.06 0.4366  1.24 0.0811  -0.07 0.5039  0.91 0.2731  1.45 6.82 
1 -0.0776  0.20 0.3653  0.44 0.1851  0.30 0.4389  1.76c 0.3480  1.48 -0.0119  0.15 -0.0063  0.46 2.05 
2 0.2078  1.37 0.6164  1.11 -0.0846  -1.29 -0.7387  -1.44 0.3194  0.91 -0.2015  -0.79 0.1753  0.82 7.96 
3 -0.1083  -0.92 0.4630  0.53 -0.3647  -0.72 -0.4945  -1.46 -0.0282  0.50 0.5647  0.95 -0.0060  0.82 7.43 
4 -0.2470  -0.39 0.2174  0.81 -0.4345  -0.98 1.0319  2.06b 0.0033  0.49 0.3837  1.38 -0.1062  -0.87 9.78 
5 -0.3939  -1.19 0.1379  0.30 -0.9313  -2.58a 0.2539  0.69 -0.0247  0.36 0.0233  -0.08 0.2548  1.10 11.33c 
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Secondly, as table 4.5.2 shows that the US and Japanese high technology acquirers have 
the lowest and second lowest asset values, respectively, the high technology acquirers 
may not be able to create much value from the scale effect compared to other acquirers. 
In contrast, high technology acquirers can create value from the complimentary effect 
of intangible assets. In this case, the information asymmetry may impose a more 
significant effect on the high technology acquirers. In considering the weaker 
information transparency and accounting disclosure system in Japan, the higher risks 
from information asymmetry may lead the US high technology acquirers to experience 
insignificant ARs.  
 
We do not find evidence that the acquirers from healthcare, manufacturing, service and 
retailer industry experience significant ARs from the M&A announcement. Although 
several significant ARs appear during the announcement period (e.g. the US 
manufacturing acquirers experience significant ARs on day t=-3 and day t=2; the 
Japanese acquirers from service industry experience significant ARs at day t=-5 and 
day t=-4), the long gap between the announcement day and the significant AR day 
weakens their correlation to the announcement.  
  
Table 4.5.2 Average Total asset and R&D/Sales of acquirers in different industries  
The US Acquirers 
 Consumer Finance Health care Hi-Tec Manufacturing Service Retailer 
Average total assets (ml) 32.12 517.8 13.72 7.530 48.47 9.633 n.a. 
R&D/Sales 5.7577 0.1747 2.1278 0.2330 1.1735 0.4958 n.a. 
Japanese Acquirers 
Average total assets (bl) 4.197 8.772 0.8772 1.071 2.231 1.204 4.746 
R&D/Sales 0.0372 0.0029 0.0998 0.0465 0.0255 0.0372 0.002 
The value of total assets shown in table 4.5.2 are in local currency. ml and bl denotes for a unit of million and billion 
respectively.  
  
Notice that, acquirers in health industry shares serval common characteristics with the 
acquirers in high technology industry. In table 4.5.2, we show that acquirers in the two 
industries have low total asset values. In addition, acquirers in high technology and 
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health industries are R&D intensive. However, Dranove and Lindrooth (2003) and Ho 
and Hamilton (2000) indicate that the combined entities do not experience significant 
change in the cost efficiency or product quality. Their study may explain the reason 
why acquirers in the healthcare industry do not experience significant ARs. 
 
The Table 4.5.1 shows that US finance acquirers experience significant and positive 
ARs on day t=1. On the other hand, we find that Japanese acquirers from the finance 
industry do not experience significant ARs. Our result can be explained by the 
regulatory arbitrage documented by Karolyi and Taboada (2015). The relatively less 
matured market and regulations in Japan may provide the US acquirers more 
investment opportunities. We also find that the US finance acquirers tend to acquire 
targets from different industries whereas Japanese finance acquirers are more likely to 
acquire targets in the financial industry. The choice of targets may also confirm the 
existence regulatory arbitrage. Market for corporate control may be another explanation 
for the inconsistent investor behaviours. Finance institutions are more likely to 
encourage their targets to adopt more advanced accounting disclosure system to 
increase the information transparency (Campa and Hernando,2006). As a result, target 
firms will reduce their cost of funds in the future (Doidge et al., 2007). Aggarwal et al. 
(2011) also suggest that once the target firms are acquired by the finance institutions 
from foreign countries, they are more likely to be forced to improve their corporate 
governance and information disclosure. The corporate governance index reported in 
Doidge et al. (2007) and Aggarwal et al. (2011) shows that the shareholders in the US 
are more likely to benefit from the market for corporate control due to their high 
corporate governance rating and more advanced disclosure system.46  
 
Table 4.5.3 presents the CARs for the US and Japanese acquirers from consumer 
                                                   
46 Most corporate governance index was constructed after 2000, which only covers 2/3 of our analysis 
period. However, if we consider the trend of the Japanese financial reporting system development and 
the Japanese financial market development, it is reasonable to assume that the corporate governance 
rating of the US is higher than Japan from 1990. 
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products, manufacturing, finance, health care, and high technology, service and retail 
industry sectors.  
 
We find that M&A announcements do not result in significant CARs for both the US 
and Japanese acquirers. The only expectation is that Japanese acquirers in the retail 
industry experience significant and positive CARs from day t=0 to day t=3. When we 
review the Japanese acquirers in the retail industry, we find that the sample is highly 
overlap with the acquirers who initiate conglomerate M&As. Thus, the significant and 
positive CARs may not be a result of the synergy effect but low risks involved in the 
M&As.   
 
The insignificant CARs in most panels might be resulted by inconsistent reactions 
during the announcement period. In table 4.5.1, we show that the significant ARs tend 
to be surrounded by return reverse. The Kruskal Wallis test also confirms that acquirers 
from different industries do not experience significantly different CARs.47  
 
                                                   
47 The only significant Kruskal Wallis test result is the US acquirers on day t=-2. However, it is still 
too far away from the announcement day to show the significant correlation between the result and the 
announcement.  
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Table 4.5.3 Cumulative abnormal returns for the US acquirers in consumer products, finance, health care, high technology and service industry sector 
The CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 The US Acquirers 
       Consumer products Finance Health Care High-Tec       Manufacturing             Service Kruskal Wallis 
Days CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP  
-5 0.6195  0.58  -0.0268  -0.61  -0.0743  0.32  0.5450  0.48  0.4862  0.05  0.1839  1.05  4.41 
-4 0.1967  -0.16  -0.0532  0.87  -0.8361  -0.12  0.1017  -0.04  0.5603  0.07  0.6416  0.59  1.38 
-3 0.2209  0.37  -0.6607  -0.39  -0.7980  -0.14  0.0543  -0.50  1.2461  1.34  1.3541  1.27  5.31 
-2 0.0740  0.30  -0.6415  -0.11  -0.8311  -0.41  -0.2848  -0.52  1.6054  1.35  1.8268  2.04b  9.34b 
-1 0.3396  0.46  -0.5748  0.14  -0.1662  -0.22  0.5965  0.33  1.8211  0.96  1.5285  1.25  2.66 
0 1.0115  1.03  -0.3941  0.50  0.2983  0.12  -0.0740  -0.08  2.1794  1.56  1.5882  1.24  2.67 
1 1.6145  1.27  0.2646  1.16  0.1375  -0.29  -0.1211  -0.12  2.0339  1.63  1.5324  0.93  2.57 
2 0.9170  0.57  0.2546  1.34  0.4072  0.08  -0.0254  -0.10  2.5933  2.34a  1.5751  0.76  2.69 
3 0.9813  0.74  0.4735  1.64  0.4111  0.08  0.4354  0.32  2.5815  2.02b  2.1216  1.39  2.70 
4 0.2989  0.32  0.4755  1.31  1.3209  1.11  -0.3149  0.12  2.2494  1.20  1.7475  0.68  1.18 
5 0.4478  0.72  0.5965  1.22  1.5620  0.92  -0.3596  0.20  2.9642  1.85c  1.7509  0.75  1.01 
                          The Japanese Acquirers  
 Consumer products Finance Health Care High-Tec Manufacturing Service Retailer Kruskal Wallis 
Days CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP  
-5 0.2205  1.01  0.4087  1.07  0.2228  -0.22  -0.0782  0.01  -0.0140  0.45  0.6824  2.14a  -0.3692  -0.78  3.80 
-4 0.0583  0.26  -0.0785  0.22  0.3733  0.32  -0.4407  -0.80  -0.1353  0.21  0.2687  0.22  -0.3227  -0.53  0.74 
-3 0.4126  1.05  -0.9737  -0.36  0.3158  -0.24  -0.5148  -0.43  0.0243  0.96  0.2778  0.34  0.0765  0.77  1.51 
-2 0.3157  0.87  -0.6803  -0.37  0.2790  -0.22  -0.5739  -0.35  -0.2636  0.29  0.8604  0.95  0.4292  1.72  2.97 
-1 -0.0901  0.51  -1.0095  -0.26  -0.0612  -0.58  -0.1662  0.00  -0.0358  0.61  0.9477  0.94  0.2747  1.32  1.02 
0 -0.0919  0.76  -1.5738  -0.40  -0.5333  -0.96  0.2704  0.48  0.0454  0.50  1.4516  1.19  0.5479  1.80c  3.87 
1 -0.1695  0.76  -1.2084  -0.21  -0.3483  -0.81  0.7094  1.13  0.3934  1.07  1.4397  1.07  0.5415  1.80c  2.62 
2 0.0382  1.08  -0.5921  0.19  -0.4329  -1.14  -0.0293  0.59  0.7128  1.28  1.2382  0.79  0.7168  1.92c 1.92 
3 -0.0701  0.76  -0.1291  0.36  -0.7976  -1.35  -0.5238  0.15  0.6846  1.31  1.8029  0.99  0.7108  1.98b  1.85 
4 -0.3171  0.59  0.0884  0.63  -1.2321  -1.51  0.5081  0.62  0.6879  1.38  2.1866  1.27  0.6046  1.61  2.26 
5 -0.7110  0.26  0.2263  0.68  -2.1635  -2.10b  0.7620  0.75  0.6633  1.43  2.2099  1.19  0.8594  1.81c  5.29 
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4.6 R&D intensity  
 
In section 4.5, we suggest that the R&D intensity can explain the different investor 
behaviour of the high technology acquirers. In this section, we test whether the 
acquirers’ industry is a proxy for the level R&D intensity. For testing purposes, we 
classify the acquirers in our sample into high and low R&D intensity groups. We use 
the R&D to Sales ratio to define the R&D intensity, and classify acquirers in the top 
and bottom 33 percentile of R&D/Sales as high and low R&D intensive acquirers, 
respectively.  
 
Table 4.6 presents our test results. Our sample consists 70 the US acquirers with low 
R&D spending and 70 with high R&D spending; and 170 Japanese acquirers with low 
R&D spending and 170 with high R&D spending. Panel A and Panel B show the ARs 
of high and low R&D intensive acquirers, respectively. Panel C and Panel D show the 
CARs of high and low R&D intensive acquirers, respectively.    
 
We find that acquirers do not experience significant ARs and CARs on the 
announcement dates. We find several significant ARs (e.g. the US high R&D intensive 
acquirers experience significant ARs on day t=-4 and day t=2), but all the significant 
ARs are far away from the announcement day. Thus, we conclude that R&D intensity 
cannot explain the ARs and CARs of the acquirers. Our result also suggests that 
acquirer’s industry is not a proxy of R&D intensity.   
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Table 4.6. Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns of high and low R&D intensive acquirers  
 
The ARs and CARs are measured in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. M-W U denotes the Mann–Whitney U test. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP M-W U CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP M-W U
-5 -0.0199 0.10 0.4073 1.28 0.09 -0.0199 0.10 0.4073 1.28 0.09
-4 0.5899 1.83
c -0.2793 -1.16 1.30 0.5700 1.05 0.1280 1.06 1.25
-3 0.1759 0.65 -0.3165 0.35 0.73 0.7458 1.05 -0.1885 0.83 1.31
-2 0.0805 0.50 0.6789 1.48 0.77 0.8264 1.19 0.4903 1.20 1.19
-1 0.4086 0.03 0.0390 -0.97 1.30 1.2349 1.20 0.5293 1.18 1.42
0 0.2177 0.67 -0.0964 -0.49 0.56 1.4527 1.46 0.4329 1.14 1.43
1 -0.0621 -0.19 -0.2546 0.45 0.08 1.3906 1.27 0.1783 0.97 1.30
2 -0.4568 -2.06
b 0.0404 1.03 -1.39 0.9338 0.79 0.2187 1.08 0.99
3 0.1131 0.05 -0.2989 0.07 0.25 1.0468 0.72 -0.0802 0.92 1.04
4 0.0734 -0.76 -0.8769 -1.42 0.65 1.1202 0.52 -0.9571 0.45 1.37
5 0.2399 0.21 0.7500 1.73
c -0.34 1.3601 0.51 -0.2071 0.91 1.10
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP M-W U CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP M-W U
-5 0.0994 0.69 0.2006 1.32 -0.06 0.0994 0.69 0.2006 1.32 -0.06
-4 -0.1798 -0.96 -0.1215 -0.30 -0.32 -0.0804 -0.10 0.0791 0.68 -0.41
-3 0.1080 0.04 0.0114 0.07 -0.02 0.0277 -0.06 0.0905 0.58 -0.19
-2 -0.2334 -1.37 0.1220 0.76 -0.71 -0.2057 -0.70 0.2125 0.84 -0.71
-1 -0.2361 -1.34 -0.3496 -0.97 0.05 -0.4418 -1.18 -0.1371 0.06 -1.00
0 -0.0973 -0.77 -0.0699 -0.26 -0.46 -0.5391 -1.35 -0.2070 -0.05 -0.89
1 0.0416 0.71 0.1016 1.24 -0.60 -0.4975 -1.04 -0.1054 0.42 -0.57
2 0.0839 0.41 0.5536 3.12
a -2.08 -0.4136 -0.82 0.4482 1.33 -1.00
3 0.0796 0.10 0.3496 1.36 -0.79 -0.3340 -0.76 0.7978 1.68
c -1.07
4 -0.0584 -0.49 -0.0138 0.38 -0.11 -0.3924 -0.86 0.7840 1.69
c -1.33
5 -0.1917 -1.46 -0.0335 -0.47 -0.50 -0.5841 -1.24 0.7505 1.52 -1.51
Panel A: High R&D Intensity Panel B: Low R&D Intensity Panel C: High R&D Intensity Panel D: Low R&D Intensity
The US Acquirers
Japanese Acquirers
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4.7 Announcement effect on market illiquidity acquirers  
 
Following the asset pricing theories, many previous studies indicate that the market 
liquidity status will influence the expected returns of a firm (see, e.g. Amihud, 2002; 
Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Bekaert et al., 2007). Investors of highly illiquid firms 
may experience risks when liquidating their stock holdings. Thus, investors may show 
less willingness to invest in illiquid firms. As a compensation for the additional risks 
that are taken on by investors, a premium is generally offered to account for the liquidity 
risk. The previous studies found that in the price shock period, illiquidity explains why 
certain firms experience higher excess returns than the others. Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) find that the illiquidity effect is still significant even they adjust the Fama French 
factors.  
 
Following Amihud (2002), we measure the market illiquidity by using the average ratio 
of daily absolute return to the trading volume in dollars. We take an average of the 
illiquidity ratios for each acquirer from day -300 to day -15. Based on our sample size, 
we classify our samples into high illiquidity (HI) acquirers, medium illiquidity (MI) 
acquirers and low illiquidity (LI) acquirer for the top 30 percent illiquidity (HI), middle 
40% illiquidity (MI) and bottom 30 percent illiquidity acquirers (LI).  
 
Table 4.7 presents the ARs and CARs of HI acquirers, MI acquirers and LI acquirers. 
Our sample consists of 127 the US low illiquidity, 170 medium illiquidity, and 127 high 
illiquidity acquirers; and consists of 218 Japanese low illiquidity, 290 medium 
illiquidity, and 218 high illiquidity acquirers.   
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Table 4.7 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japanese low illiquidity, medium illiquidity and high illiquidity acquirers 
 
The AR and CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Kruskal Wallis CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Kruskal Wallis
-5 0.2396 1.23 -0.0512 -0.49 0.5895 1.12 0.10 0.7049 0.45 0.0187 0.55 1.7501 -0.40 0.10
-4 -0.1466 1.03 0.0332 0.05 0.0757 0.31 0.07 0.5583 0.56 0.0519 0.56 1.8258 -0.40 0.07
-3 -0.4091 -1.15 0.1256 0.46 0.5612 3.37
a 0.92 0.1492 0.13 0.1775 0.42 2.3870 0.01 0.92
-2 -0.1788 -0.43 0.0677 0.83 0.4668 2.51
a 1.59 -0.0296 0.01 0.2452 0.45 2.8539 0.32 1.59
-1 -0.0157 0.03 0.1685 0.54 0.2655 0.32 1.88 -0.0453 -0.03 0.4137 0.57 3.1194 0.30 1.88
0 0.2216 0.82 0.0669 1.34 0.1274 0.18 1.31 0.1762 0.23 0.4806 1.13 3.2467 0.27 1.31
1 0.4188 1.86
c -0.1023 -0.09 0.0539 0.60 0.62 0.5950 0.70 0.3783 1.04 3.3006 0.18 0.62
2 -0.2372 -0.34 0.3334 1.68
c 0.1648 0.20 0.86 0.3578 0.55 0.7117 1.66
c 3.4654 0.15 0.86
3 0.2463 1.74
c 0.1891 0.57 0.0602 0.72 1.09 0.6041 0.81 0.9008 1.56 3.5256 0.19 1.09
4 -0.1700 0.09 -0.2085 -0.71 0.0595 0.75 1.14 0.4341 0.66 0.6923 0.92 3.5851 0.25 1.14
5 0.0180 -0.37 0.3947 0.84 0.1113 1.11 1.46 0.4520 0.54 1.0869 1.29 3.6964 0.37 1.46
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Kruskal Wallis CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Kruskal Wallis
-5 -0.0058 0.52 0.6643 0.44 1.5775 0.57 0.91 -0.0058 0.66 0.6643 0.48 0.0158 0.55 2.04
-4 -0.1115 0.36 0.7661 0.60 1.3945 0.01 1.06 -0.1174 0.52 1.4304 0.58 0.0297 0.28 1.83
-3 -0.0083 0.71 0.9981 0.62 1.5589 0.50 1.13 -0.1256 0.30 2.4286 0.61 0.0453 0.36 1.70
-2 0.0188 0.90 1.0757 0.80 1.4538 0.35 1.05 -0.1068 0.62 3.5042 0.69 0.0598 0.36 1.49
-1 -0.3446 0.52 1.0698 0.64 1.7426 0.74 1.80 -0.4514 0.49 4.5740 0.70 0.0773 0.44 1.50
0 -0.3176 0.47 1.2934 1.06 1.8688 0.99 2.24 -0.7689 0.15 5.8674 0.78 0.0960 0.54 1.53
1 -0.1237 0.65 1.4209 1.13 1.8992 1.15 1.53 -0.8927 0.12 7.2883 0.86 0.1150 0.64 1.48
2 -0.0520 0.61 1.4573 0.80 2.1816 1.64 1.50 -0.9446 0.24 8.7456 0.87 0.1368 0.78 1.46
3 -0.1583 0.60 1.4624 0.84 2.2585 1.45 1.76 -1.1030 0.32 10.2080 0.89 0.1594 0.86 1.39
4 -0.2657 0.54 1.7290 1.11 2.3327 1.44 2.17 -1.3687 0.32 11.9370 0.93 0.1827 0.93 1.40
5 -0.4893 0.32 1.8230 1.09 2.2246 1.38 2.88 -1.8580 0.15 13.7600 0.97 0.2049 0.98 1.44
The US Acquirers
Japanese Acquirers
Low Illiquidity Medium Illiquidity High Illiquidity Low Illiquidity Medium Illiquidity high Illiquidity
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Overall, we the effect of market illiquidity is not conclusive. We find that all the US LI, 
MI and HI acquirers experience significant and positive ARs during the announcement 
period. However, none of these significant ARs are close to the announcement date. 
The significant and positive AR on day t=1 experienced by LI may be related to the 
M&A announcement; however, this result is inconsistent with our hypothesis that 
investors of high illiquidity acquirers should be compensated for higher returns. 
 
We find that the US MI acquirers experience significant AR on day t=2 whilst HI 
acquirers experience significant AR on day t=-2, which are both far away from the 
announcement day.   
 
On the other hand, the Japanese acquirers from different illiquid sub-groups do not 
experience significant ARs and CARs on or near the announcement day.  
  
The Kruskal Wallis test also shows that the three subgroups of the US and Japanese 
acquirers are not significantly different from each other. Our result implies that the 
liquidity status of an acquirer in the cross-border M&A may not be an important 
determinant of the significant ARs and CARs. Due to the information asymmetry in 
cross-border M&As, investors tend to be more cautious, and thereby invest less in 
respond to the announcement. Thus, the illiquid may not be as important as other 
synergistic factors.   
  
Thus, we conclude that the market liquidity status of acquirers is not an effective 
determinant for the ARs. Although we suggest that high illiquidity firms might 
compensate the shareholders with return premiums, this is not always the case in a large 
corporate event like M&A where shareholders’ wealth are more likely to be influenced 
by other major factors such as the synergetic effect and bargaining power of the targets.   
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4.8 Announcement effect in the different time period  
 
Our sample covers the M&A events over a longer than twenty years’ period. Investors 
may change their interpretations of the M&A announcements in different times. There 
are several factors that may lead to such changes. Firstly, the improvement in 
accounting disclosure quality in our sample countries (see, e.g. Alimehmeti and Paletta, 
2014; Bebchuk et al., 2008) and the increase in monitoring situations involved (see., 
e.g. Alimehmeti and Paletta, 2014; Bebchuk et al., 2008; Chen et al, 2007) may 
significantly improve the information transparency in recent years. Thus, if investors 
are risk averse due to the strong information asymmetry in a cross-border manner, we 
should observe inconsistent market responses in different periods. In addition, as more 
and more M&As take place, the gains from M&As decreases as market inefficiency 
decreases. As a result, we expect to observe less significant ARs in the later years. Thus, 
in this section, we examine whether the ARs and CARs are stable over different period 
of time.  
 
In order to compose this test, we split our sample into three time periods. Our sample 
period is from 1990 to 2015. We test whether the ARs and CARs are consistent between 
the first nine calendar years (from 1990 to 1998) and the last nine calendar years (from 
2007 to 2015). Martynova and Renneboog (2008) indicate that the investor’s 
interpretation of M&A announcements can be significantly inconsistent in the different 
stages of merger waves. Thus, in order to overcome the effect from merger wave, our 
periods choice also avoids the M&A clustering in our event sample (see, chapter 3, 
figure 1 and figure 2). 
 
Table 4.8.1 shows the ARs and CARs experienced by the US and Japanese acquirers in 
different time periods. Our sample consists of 102 US-JP M&As before 1998 and 121 
US-JP M&A after 2007. For the JP-US M&As, the samples consist of 169 before 1998 
and 322 after 2007.  
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Table 4.8.1 Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japan acquirers  
The AR and CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. The M –W U denotes the Mann–Whitney U 
test. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In general, the market does not price the US acquirers’ announcements differently 
across the two periods. The US acquirers only experience significant and positive CARs 
on day t=2 and t=3 in between 2007 and 2015. These significant CARs are more likely 
to be driven by market noise given the long gap from the announcement day. The 
insignificant Mann–Whitney U test results also confirm our interpretation. Based on 
this result, we conclude that the ARs and CARs of US acquirers are not significantly 
influenced by the change of investors’ interpretations. This may be due to the US 
investors being more sophisticated and their decision making being less reliant on the 
accounting disclosures. The voluntary accounting information disclosure taken by the 
The US Acquirers in 1990 to 1998 The US Acquirers in 2007 to 2015  ARs CARs 
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP CARs  adj.-BMP M-W U M –W U 
-5 0.3148 0.68 0.3148 0.92 0.0124 0.00 0.0124 0.26 0.75 0.75 
-4 -0.1577 -0.11 0.1570 0.33 0.1749 0.90 0.1873 0.68 0.77 0.18 
-3 0.1065 0.95 0.2636 0.53 -0.1101 -0.12 0.0771 0.32 1.21 0.74 
-2 0.3254 0.46 0.5890 0.83 0.0021 1.35 0.0792 0.88 0.57 0.62 
-1 0.2646 0.59 0.8536 0.86 -0.3764 -0.84 -0.2972 -0.07 0.60 0.78 
0 0.4829 1.50 1.3364 1.49 0.3005 1.01 0.0033 0.73 0.11 0.35 
1 0.1428 0.88 1.4792 1.46 0.4235 1.41 0.4268 1.16 1.09 0.34 
2 0.0394 -0.27 1.5186 1.38 0.323 1.51 0.7498 1.76c  1.18 0.00 
3 -0.1962 -0.28 1.3224 1.39 0.0658 1.24 0.8156 2.06b  0.45 0.08 
4 0.1129 0.62 1.4353 1.23 -0.4858 -1.43 0.3298 1.15 1.69c 0.12 
5 0.2205 1.10 1.6558 1.47 0.4403 0.58 0.7701 1.31 0.65 0.10 
Japanese Acquirers in 1990 to 1998 Japanese Acquirers in 2007 to 2015  ARs CARs 
-5 0.0216 1.60 0.0216 -0.33 0.0322  0.14 0.0322  -0.20 2.15 2.15 
-4 0.0232 1.39 0.0448 -0.50 -0.0756  0.03 -0.0434  -0.14 2.13 2.13 
-3 0.0270 1.72c 0.0718 -0.22 -0.0522  0.11 -0.0956  -0.28 2.24 2.16 
-2 0.0272 1.84c 0.099 -0.03 -0.0473  0.17 -0.1429  -0.21 2.35b 2.20 
-1 0.0313 2.36a 0.1303 0.28 -0.2511  -0.10 -0.3940  -0.43 2.78a 2.35 
0 0.0358 3.08a 0.1662 0.66 -0.2995  0.01 -0.6935  -0.76 3.10a 2.52 
1 0.0360 2.91a 0.2021 0.96 -0.0789  0.48 -0.7724  -0.76 2.64b 2.54 
2 0.0369 2.85a 0.2391 1.17 0.1418  0.64 -0.6306  -0.60 2.57c 2.51 
3 0.0372 2.75a 0.2763 1.35 0.1558  0.65 -0.4748  -0.44 2.54c 2.49 
4 0.0381 2.49a 0.3144 1.42 0.2149  0.90 -0.2600  -0.25 2.32c 2.46 
5 0.0382 2.38a 0.3526 1.43 0.0632  0.64 -0.1968  -0.22 2.38c 2.44 
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US firms may also explain why consistent investor behaviours are consistent over two 
periods (see, e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 2000).    
 
In contrast, Japanese acquirers experience significant and positive ARs in between 1990 
and 1998. This may suggest that Japanese investors are more optimistic as we discussed 
above (in section 4.2) as they may significantly price in for the information asymmetry 
whilst giving more positive response to the synergistic effect from market imperfection. 
Therefore, we can conclude that the ARs and CARs of the Japanese acquirers in 
different time periods are unstable. It is worth noting that this result may reduce the 
power of our tests in the early sections. The significant ARs and CARs may be 
influenced not only by the portfolio of the Japanese acquirers but also by the time 
periods of the sample event. 
4.9 Conclusion and evaluation  
 
In general, we suggest that acquirers’ shareholders do not benefit from the cross-border 
M&As. Although this result is inconsistent with the previous studies, we suggest that 
the inconsistency mainly comes from the different AR estimation method used our 
study. To further explore the factors that influence the ARs and CARs of acquirers, we 
also test the factors including industry classification, organisational structure, method 
of payment, and public status of targets. We find that the factors related to M&A 
synergy such as the merger relationship and industry R&D intensity have the strongest 
explanatory power to the ARs and CARs of acquirers. Thus, we suggest that the 
synergistic effect dominates the market behaviour in the cross-border M&As.  
 
We also find that the US stock market and Japanese stock market have inconsistent 
responses to the cross-border M&A announcements from acquirers sharing similar 
characteristics. We suggest that shareholders’ protection and accounting information 
disclosure differentiate investors’ interpretations to the risks and profits in the cross-
border M&A.  
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Chapter Five 
Examine Abnormal returns of the US and Japanese targets 
 
5.0 Introduction  
In both cross-border and domestic M&As, target firms are likely to experience positive 
and significant ARs during the announcement period (see, e.g. Bradely et al., 1983; 
Gupta et al.,1997; Ahern, 2012). Previous studies explain the positive market reaction 
from two perspectives: i) the positive AR is due to the wealth transfer from acquirers 
to targets (see, e.g. Eckbo, 2009); and ii) M&A announcement can lead to the increase 
in target’s Tobin’s Q (see, e.g. Dong et al., 2006; Malmendier et al., 2016). The former 
perspective is based on the agency theory. It implies that the entrenched managers of 
acquirers are willing to sacrifice their shareholders’ wealth by accepting excessive 
premium to complete the value destroying M&A. This theory also predicts that the 
corresponding acquirers of the high AR targets should experience negative AR due to 
the wealth transfer (see, Jensen, 1986, Schwert, 2000). The latter perspective is based 
on the theories of synergy and market for corporate control. By increasing the value of 
target assets, both acquirers and targets should experience significant and positive ARs 
(see, e.g. Aggarwal et al., 2011; Bradely et al., 1983). Thus, the two hypotheses lead to 
contradictory predictions for the covariance of target and acquirer ARs.  
 
Despite the theoretical explanations, the effect of wealth transfer is rarely tested. As we 
discussed in the Chapter 2, the deal characteristics and acquirer and target’s portfolio 
should determine investors’ perceptions of the synergy and bargaining power of 
acquirers and targets. As a result, we expect that the deal characteristics and acquirer 
and target’s portfolio explain the AR of targets in announcement period. In addition, as 
the synergistic effect influenced by the macro liquidity in different time period, we also 
hypothesize that the target experience inconsistent ARs in different time periods. In 
order to test our hypotheses, this chapter examines the target’s AR based on the deal 
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and portfolios.  
 
This chapter is structured as follows. Section 5.1 examines ARs and CARs of the target 
firms. In Sections 5.2 to 5.7, we examine the ARs based on the factors associated with 
target’s portfolio and deal characteristics (including industry characteristics, merger 
relationship, acquirers’ public status). Section 5.8 examines the stability of target’s ARs 
across different time periods. Section 5.9 concludes.  
 
5.1 Targets ARs and CARs under Fama-French and Carhart model  
  
In this section, we present the ARs, CARs of the targets. Similar to acquirers, we use 
an 11-day event window (from t =-5 to day t=5, in which the day t=0 is the 
announcement day) is employed. In this chapter, our targets of interest are the US 
targets acquired by Japanese firms and the Japanese targets acquired by the US firms.  
 
Previous empirical studies (see, e.g. Eun et al., 1996; Malmendier et al., 2016) show 
that the cross-border M&A targets experience significant and positive ARs and CARs 
during the announcement period. Despite the premiums that targets may receive when 
the deal is completed, other studies proposed two potential reasons that may explain the 
targets’ ARs during the announcement period. Firstly, M&As lead to a revaluation of 
the target market value. Dong et al. (2006) emphasize that investors’ misevaluation of 
target share price is an important reason for the M&A taking place. Thus, the M&A 
announcements can impose a positive informational effect on the target price even if 
the deal fails. Second and more importantly, even if the deal is dropped, the target firm 
are more likely to become potential target for other acquirers and receive better 
acquisition offers in the next few years (see, e.g. Akhigbe and Martin, 2000; 
Malmendier et al., 2016). 48  
                                                   
48 This paper suggests that the targets with cash offer are more likely to receive better offers in the future. Since most cross-
border acquisitions are financed by cash, the finding of Malmendier et al. (2016) may be applicable in our study.   
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Table 5.1 shows the ARs and CARs using the ± 5 days encompassing pre- and post-
announcement day.49 Our sample consists 156 Japanese listed targets and 322 the US 
listed targets.  
 
In table 5.1, we find that both the US and Japanese targets experience significant and 
positive ARs and CARs on the announcement day. Compared with table 4.1, we find 
that target firms in cross-border M&As experience more positive and significant ARs 
and CARs. We have also observed a return continuation pattern experienced by the US 
targets, where the ARs are continuously significant and positive between day t=0 and 
day t=1. This result implies that the Japanese stock market might be more efficient and 
be able to instantly price the value of M&As for targets. However, this implication is 
inconsistent with Visaltanachoti and Yang (2010) and Otsubo, (2014) who suggest that 
the US stock market is more efficient in pricing M&As deals than the Japanese stock 
market. Farquhar (1982) indicates that the presence of serial correlation in returns can 
be used to measure the market efficiency. Following Farquhar (1982), we find that 
correlations in ARs on day t=0 and day t=1 are insignificant for both the US and 
Japanese targets.50 Thus, the return continuation might be attributed to gradual new 
information release from the acquirers and targets, and lead to continuous pricing 
adjustments. 
 
Overall, our result is consistent with the previous studies (see, e.g. Jensen and Ruback, 
1983; Jarrell et al., 1988; Andrade et al., 2001), which shows that the targets experience 
substantially positive returns during the announcement period. Note that in Chapter 4, 
we stated that the application of F-F-C CAPM model and adj.BMP can reduce the 
significance level of ARs and CARs. Thus, even with this CAPM, we still find that 
                                                   
49 Notice that, the time zone difference between the US and Japan can result in the Japanese investors to react one calendar day 
later than the US investors, if the announcement information is published by the US acquirers. On the other hand, the 
announcements from the Japanese acquirers are less likely to result the US investors to react one calendar day earlier since the 
announcement is less likely to be made before 5 am (see, e.g. Becker et al., 1990).  
50 We use spearman rank test to test the serial correlation. We find that the AR correlation of the US and Japanese targets 
between day t=0 and t=1 is -0.035 (p=0.52), and 0.078 (p=0.331), respectively.  
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target firms generally experience positive and significant ARs and CARs in the cross-
border M&As. 
  
Table 5.1 Abnormal and cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japan targets  
The US Targets Japanese Targets 
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP 
-5 0.8261 3.12a 0.8261 2.28b 0.3813 0.59 0.3813 0.68 
-4 0.1795 1.42 1.0055 2.49b 0.2173 0.34 0.5986 0.72 
-3 -0.0181 1.93c 0.9874 3.17a 0.2435 0.61 0.8421 0.94 
-2 0.4602 2.61a 1.4477 3.67a -0.0913 0.47 0.7508 0.97 
-1 1.2614 4.98a 2.7091 4.78a 2.5156 4.90a 3.2664 3.58a 
0 5.9013 9.04a 8.6103 9.36a 4.1876 4.74a 7.4540 5.94a 
1 1.8265 3.72a 10.4368 10.86a -0.1209 0.34 7.3331 5.67a 
2 0.5192 0.56 10.9560 10.97a -1.6167 -0.48 5.7164 5.14a 
3 -0.0555 0.44 10.9005 10.37a 
 
0.4886 -0.21 6.2050 4.85a 
4 0.0818 0.77 10.9823 10.38a 0.2863 -0.42 6.4913 4.66a 
5 0.0026 -0.03 10.9848 9.44a 0.8754 2.19 7.3667 5.19a 
The ARs and CARs are measured in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 
1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
  
  
5.2 Wealth transfer and conversance between acquirers and targets ARs  
 
Previous studies explain the positive market reaction from two perspectives: i) the 
positive AR is due to the wealth transfer from acquirers to targets (see, e.g. Eckbo, 
2009); and ii) M&A announcement can lead to the increase in target’s Tobin’s Q (see, 
e.g. Dong et al., 2006; Malmendier et al., 2016). However, the two theories indicate 
contradictory relationships between the targets’ and acquirers’ ARs. Based on the 
agency and hubris theory, we should expect a wealth transfer from acquirers to targets 
and observe a negative covariance between the target and acquirer ARs (see, e.g. Aktas 
et al., 2009; Kadyrzhanova and Rhodes-Kropf, 2011). It is because the agency 
problematic acquirers tend to pay substantial premium in the M&As. Based on synergy 
or market for corporate control, we should expect investors to revalue the market value 
of targets (North, 2001), which leads to a positive covariance between the acquirers’ 
ARs and targets’ ARs. We argue that it is important to test the dominant factor that 
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contribute to the significant target ARs. This test can help us explain whether the 
negative or insignificant ARs experienced by acquirers are attributed to the agency and 
hubris motive, or the low expected synergistic effect from the combination.51    
   
To perform this test, we use the acquirers’ CAR(-1,1) (i.e. we sum ARs from day t=-1 to 
day t=1) computed from the average acquirer returns. We examine whether the target 
firms experience different ARs when acquirers experience high and low CAR(-1,1). We 
sort the target ARs and CARs by their corresponding acquirer’s CAR(-1,1). We define the 
acquirers who experience the top 33 percentile returns as high return acquirers and the 
bottom 33 percentile returns as low return acquirers. 52  We then group the 
corresponding targets based on acquirer returns. Our sample consists of 43 the US 
targets with high CAR acquirers, and 43 the US targets with low CAR acquirers; and 
consists of 20 Japanese targets with high CAR acquirers and 20 Japanese targets with 
low CAR acquirers.  
 
Table 5.2 shows that the acquirer returns do not explain the US target ARs and CARs 
during the announcement period. Targets with both high and low return acquirers 
experience significant and positive ARs (at 1% significance level) on the announcement 
day. The targets with high return acquirers experience significant and positive ARs on 
day t=-1. However, the continual significant ARs from day t=-1 to day t=0 do not lead 
to significantly different CARs on the announcement day. The Mann–Whitney U test 
also confirms that the ARs and CARs of the targets in the both panel are not 
significantly different.  
 
 
                                                   
51 Target ARs always tend to be positive, we should therefore observe a positive relationship between 
the acquirer and target ARs when the acquirers experience high ARs.  
52 In an unreported test, we find that the CAR(-1,1) of high return acquirers is significantly higher than 
the low return acquirers. Under Mann-Whitney U test, the standard test statistic of the high and low  
CAR(-1,1) difference is 7.86 for the US acquirers, and 5.41 for Japanese acquirers.     
 116 
 
 
  
Table 5.2 The ARs and CARs of the targets with high and low acquirer returns 
The ARs and CARs measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. The M –W U denotes the Mann–Whitney 
U test. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
We also find that Japanese targets experience significant and positive ARs and CARs 
on the announcement day regardless of whether they are acquired by the high or low 
return acquirers. The Mann–Whitney U test shows that Japanese targets with high 
acquirer returns experience significantly higher AR on day t=-1. This result implies that 
investors are more likely to anticipate high synergy M&A deals. However, the Mann–
Whitney U test also suggests that the CARs of the two test groups are insignificantly 
different from each other during the announcement period. Thus, we can conclude that 
although we observe significant AR difference on day t=-1, this does not lead to 
The US targets with low acquirer returns The US targets with high acquirer returns ARs CARs 
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP M-W U M –W U 
-5 0.4934 1.17 0.4934 1.03 1.5505 0.96 1.5505 0.05 -0.81 -0.81 
-4 0.4936 0.39 0.9870 1.01 -0.5954 -1.05 0.9550 -0.41 0.58 0.09 
-3 1.0707 0.98 2.0577 1.65c -1.8935 -0.65 -0.9385 -0.76 0.32 0.64 
-2 -0.5876 -1.42 1.4701 0.67 0.5673 0.49 -0.3711 -0.97 -0.89 -0.52 
-1 0.6327 0.38 2.1028 0.65 2.3823 2.23b 2.0111 -0.17 -1.42 -0.98 
0 7.8377 2.88a 9.9405 2.33b 5.9979 3.82a 8.0090 1.75c -0.38 -0.09 
1 1.8354 0.67 11.7759 1.99b 2.8655 1.11 10.8745 1.68c 0.29 0.21 
2 0.4120 0.43 12.1879 2.17b 0.4364 1.43 11.3109 2.23b -0.61 -0.06 
3 -0.0148 -0.75 12.1731 1.89c 0.4048 1.42 11.7157 2.46b -1.80c -0.17 
4 0.3522 0.76 12.5253 2.24b 0.0880 -0.28 11.8037 2.33b 0.80 -0.02 
5 -0.6032 -0.87 11.9221 1.72c 0.3748 0.12 12.1785 1.70c -0.85 -0.06 
Japanese targets with low acquirer returns Japanese targets with high acquirer returns ARs CARs 
-5 1.9356 1.92c 1.9356 1.40 0.2356 0.58 0.2356 -0.04 0.81 0.81 
-4 -0.4724 -0.67 1.4632 0.79 0.8207 0.81 1.0564 0.68 -1.89c 0.00 
-3 1.3220 2.54b 2.7852 2.43b -0.3435 -1.10 0.7128 -0.46 2.08b 1.46 
-2 -0.6195 -0.85 2.1657 1.55 -0.7085 -0.28 0.0043 -0.94 -0.46 1.11 
-1 -0.0065 0.08 2.1592 0.91 6.5157 2.96a 6.5200 0.92 -2.16b -1.27 
0 3.9347 1.84c 6.0939 1.80c 4.2306 2.02b 10.7506 1.80c -0.22 -0.62 
1 0.1971 0.31 6.2910 1.58 0.4401 0.26 11.1907 1.62 0.46 -0.62 
2 -0.8067 -1.16 5.4843 1.14 1.2475 0.42 12.4382 1.06 -0.30 -0.92 
3 -0.4020 -1.42 5.0823 0.86 2.8644 1.86 15.3025 1.87c -1.46 -1.22 
4 -0.1949 -0.01 4.8874 0.76 -0.1453 -0.57 15.1572 1.51 0.41 -0.78 
5 0.8623 0.95 5.7497 1.27 -0.7136 -0.99 14.4436 0.78 1.81c -0.54 
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significantly different CARs during the entire announcement period.   
 
Our test result provides several interesting implications. Firstly, when acquirers can 
create high value from the M&As (either by synergistic effect or market for corporate 
control), the revaluation of the target market value is a more important determinant for 
the ARs experienced by both acquirers and targets.53 That explains why both acquirers 
and targets can experience significant and positive ARs. Secondly, when acquirers 
cannot create value from M&As (which also implies that the M&A is motivated by 
agency motive), the wealth transfer determines the ARs of both acquirers and targets, 
which explains why targets can still experience significant and positive ARs when 
acquirers experience significantly negative market responses.  
 
Our test result also suggests that the target’s AR is independent of the acquirer’s CARs. 
Thus, our test result does not support either of the two arguments. We suggest that the 
explanatory powers of the agency and synergy theories are largely dependent on the 
acquirer and deal characteristics. In order to further explore the determinants, we repeat 
the portfolio and deal characteristic test carried out in Chapter 4 in the following 
sections. By comparing the patterns of the acquirer and target ARs, we intend to explore 
the factors that change the explanatory power of the two theories.  
 
5.3 Merger relationship  
 
In Chapter 4, we find that the merger relationship explains the acquirer ARs. We argue 
that investors may expect different degrees of synergetic effects and risks to be 
experienced by acquirers in different types of merger relationships. Therefore, if we 
observe different target ARs and CARs in different types of relationships, it can help us 
                                                   
53 Notice that, the wealth shift between the acquirers and targets may not be immediately reflected in the price. As 
more deal details to be published, this should continue to influence the ARs of acquirers and targets. Thus, our test 
result may only reflect the short term investor’s interpretation instead of the true wealth transition between the 
acquirers and targets. In addition, our interpretation has one limitation. 
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to identify the return relationships between acquirers and targets.  
 
Following Chapter 4, we classify our merger relationship into four types: horizontal, 
vertical, increase of corporate control (ICC) and conglomerate. Table 5.3 shows the 
returns of the US and Japanese targets in different types of mergers.  
 
In table 5.3.1, we find that the US targets experience significant and positive ARs and 
CARs on the announcement day in all four types of mergers. Our sample consists of 
184 the US listed targets in horizontal M&As, 66 in vertical, 22 in ICC and 50 in 
conglomerate M&As. For Japanese listed targets, we have 45 firms in horizontal M&As, 
9 in vertical, 17 in ICC and 86 in conglomerate M&As. Panel A denotes the horizontal 
M&A, Panel B denotes the vertical M&A, Panel C denotes the ICC and Panel D denotes 
the conglomerate.  
 
Consistent with our results in table 5.1, we find the US targets experience significant 
and positive ARs on the announcement day across the panels. However, we find that 
the significance level of the AR on the announcement day is the lowest for the vertical 
panel (the vertical targets experience positive average AR at 5% significance level 
comparing with 1% for the other panels). There can be two possible reasons. Ahern 
(2012) indicates that the market dependence (in this case, the vertical relationship) can 
create strong bargaining power for the acquirers which means less bargaining power 
for targets. Also, that is more uncertainty regarding the successful outcome of mergers 
for vertical compared to horizontal mergers as acquirers will be less familiar with such 
operations. Thus, less premium may be received by the targets. The second reason is 
that vertical M&A can only reduce the external transaction costs between the acquirers 
and targets. Thus, the synergetic effect may not be as strong as other types of M&As.  
 
Consistent with the US targets, the Japanese targets in all the panels also experience 
significant and positive AR on the announcement day. In addition, we also find that the 
vertical integration lead the Japanese targets experience less significant AR at the 
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announcement day. It is interesting if we compare the results with the ones in table 4.2.1 
(see, Chapter 4, section 4.2), we find that Japanese vertical acquirers (who take over 
the US targets) are the only type of acquirers who experience significant and negative 
ARs during the announcement period (on day t=1), and the US vertical acquirers are 
only type of acquirers experience significant and positive AR surrounding the 
announcement day (on day t=1). The results in table 5.2.1 and 4.2.1 may suggest that 
the risk reduction effect associated with vertical M&As only influence the outcome of 
acquirers. For targets, the announcement return is more likely to be influenced by 
synergistic effect and thereby the vertical targets experience weak positive returns.  
The Kruskal-Wallis test result shows that the ARs on the announcement day are not 
significantly different across each type of integration. This is in line with our results for 
acquirers.    
 
In the previous section, we find that the sign of anticipation behaviour (i.e. significant 
ARs before the announcement day). In this test, we find that ICC targets of both the US 
and Japan acquirers do not experience the pre-announcement ARs. It may imply that 
ICC is more difficult to anticipate as for both external investors and insiders. However, 
the AR in the ICC panel on the announcement day is not significantly different from 
the ARs in the other panels. The result in the ICC panel provides an inconsistent 
evidence to the notion from with Cai et al. (2011) and Cornett et al. (2011). They 
suggest that the pre-announcement market anticipation will significantly reduce the AR 
in the announcement period.  
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Table 5.3.1 Abnormal returns for the US targets and Japanese taking horizontal, vertical, increasing corporate control and investment acquisition  
  
The CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP
Kruskal-
Wallis
-5 1.0717 2.91a 0.4920 0.93 -0.0050 0.52 1.0752 1.25 1.61
-4 0.2245 0.96 0.2776 0.77 -1.7759 -2.96a 0.8711 2.03b 6.90c
-3 -0.5854 -0.10 0.9357 1.83
c
0.8712 1.55 0.5671 1.87
c
4.17
-2 0.5653 2.16
b
-0.1821 0.10 0.3464 -0.20 0.8956 2.48
b
4.00
-1 1.1142 3.35
a
1.6288 1.91
c
0.9305 1.20 1.5917 3.57
a
2.79
0 6.2335 7.63
a
2.8352 2.05
b
9.6692 2.90
a
7.6773 3.85
a
4.17
1 2.4351 4.05a 2.0030 1.18 1.5803 1.26 -0.5153 -0.86 3.93
2 0.5649 0.33 0.8812 1.28 0.2795 -0.46 -0.1016 -0.46 6.19
3 -0.4254 -0.39 0.6563 1.39 0.0589 0.64 0.0032 -0.76 1,85
4 0.1123 0.95 0.5122 0.70 0.1056 0.22 -0.6836 -1.17 0.86
5 -0.0077 -0.61 -0.6108 -1.53 -0.6251 0.49 0.8582 1.63 4.68
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP
Kruskal-
Wallis
-5 1.2842 2.03
b
-0.5795 -0.38 1.1636 1.40 -0.1813 -0.84 5.75
-4 0.8893 1.24 0.7339 2.03
b -0.1753 -0.08 0.0221 -0.30 6.01
-3 0.7759 1.20 1.7695 0.94 -0.3589 -1.28 0.0258 -0.16 5.35
-2 -0.0773 0.80 2.7665 0.59 -0.6058 -0.90 -0.1977 0.23 2.70
-1 3.9494 3.88a 15.6424 0.35 1.0765 0.95 2.0068 3.43
a 3.78
0 3.8334 3.05a 2.0484 1.75
c 4.6504 2.94a 3.0882 2.73a 2.12
1 -1.8531 -1.17 -4.8641 0.13 2.7469 1.26 0.0249 -0.30 3.86
2 -5.0332 -0.99 -3.6555 -1.50 -0.5945 -0.16 0.3206 0.19 4.09
3 3.4277 1.91c -1.6992 -1.50 -0.3341 -1.22 -0.4625 -0.98 5.90
4 1.1782 -0.20 3.4367 1.29 0.9898 1.14 -0.1035 -0.39 3.87
5 0.5653 0.10 0.8630 0.98 -0.7085 -0.35 1.0644 2.75
a 1.41
The US targets
Japanese targets 
Panel A: Horizontal Panel B: Vertical Panel C: ICC Panel D: Conglomerate
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Table 5.3.2 shows the CARs of the US and Japanese targets in different types of merger 
relationship.  
 
Consistent with the ARs shown in table 5.2.1, we find that the CARs of the targets are 
significant and positive for horizontal, vertical and Conglomerate acquisitions. The US 
and Japanese targets of ICC only start to experience significant and positive CARs from 
day t=1. However, as we continue to see significant CARs following the announcement, 
this may indicate that target shareholders associated with ICC also experience 
significant wealth increase.  
 
The Kruskal-Wallis test show that the US targets do not experience significantly 
different CARs on the announcement day whereas Japanese targets experience 
significantly different CARs upon M&A announcement. This may be due to the delay 
in the market response to the announcements when M&As take in the form of ICC. 
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Table 5.3.2 Cumulative abnormal returns for the US targets and Japanese taking horizontal, vertical, increasing corporate control and investment acquisition  
 
The US and Japanese CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
Days CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Kruskal-Wallis
-5 1.0717 2.20b 0.4920 0.54 -0.0050 0.57 1.0752 0.74 1.61
-4 1.2962 2.02b 0.7696 1.28 -1.7809 -1.36 1.9463 2.04b 4.49
-3 0.7108 1.88c 1.7053 2.29b -0.9097 -0.14 2.5135 2.57a 2.84
-2 1.2761 2.31b 1.5233 1.76c -0.5633 -0.78 3.4091 3.63a 3.10
-1 2.3903 2.93
a
3.1520 1.83
c
0.3672 0.25 5.0008 4.65
a
4.98
0 8.6238 6.73
a
5.9872 3.32
a
10.0364 1.56 12.6781 6.46
a
5.15
1 11.0589 8.28
a
7.9902 3.45
a
11.6167 3.01
a
12.1628 5.85
a
2.94
2 11.6238 8.24a 8.8714 3.81a 11.8961 2.88a 12.0612 5.51a 1.16
3 11.1984 8.07a 9.5277 3.55a 11.9550 2.59a 12.0644 4.51a 0.52
4 11.3107 8.04a 10.0399 3.99a 12.0606 2.60a 11.3808 4.23a 0.15
5 11.3030 7.14a 9.4291 2.94a 11.4356 2.50a 12.2390 5.21a 0.28
Days CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Kruskal-Wallis
-5 1.2842 1.28 -0.5795 -0.38 1.1636 1.94
c -0.1813 -0.81 5.75
-4 2.1734 1.85
c
0.1544 1.47 0.9883 1.25 -0.1592 -0.78 8.66
b
-3 2.9493 1.90
c
1.9239 1.58 0.6294 0.37 -0.1335 -1.03 7.89
b
-2 2.8720 1.78
c
4.6905 1.06 0.0236 -0.81 -0.3312 -0.71 7.35
c
-1 6.8214 2.92a 20.3329 1.25 1.1001 -0.52 1.6756 1.02 10.78
b
0 10.6547 4.64a 22.3813 1.87
c 5.7505 1.37 4.7638 2.16b 7.03c
1 8.8016 3.58a 17.5172 1.63 8.4975 1.75 4.7887 1.94
c 3.06
2 3.7685 2.47a 13.8617 1.11 7.9029 2.22
b 5.1093 1.79c 2.00
3 7.1961 3.45a 12.1625 0.75 7.5688 1.35 4.6468 1.50 2.17
4 8.3743 2.99a 15.5991 0.93 8.5586 1.66 4.5433 1.47 1.71
5 8.9396 3.08a 16.4621 1.24 7.8501 1.27 5.6077 2.70
a 1.07
Japanese targets
The US targets
Panel A: Horizontal Panel B: Vertical Panel C: ICC Panel D: Conglomerate
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5.4 Listed and unlisted acquirers 
 
In Chapter 4, we find that the US acquirers who take over unlisted firms tend to 
experience more significant and positive CARs during the announcement period.54 
Despite the extensive research on targets’ public status and the acquirers’ announcement 
returns, the effect of acquirers’ public status on target announcement returns are rarely 
tested. 
 
In order to test the effect of bidders’ public status on the target returns, we split the 
acquirers into two groups: listed and unlisted. Notice that, in our sample, we find some 
acquisitions are made by group of investors.55 Following Bargeron et al. (2008), we 
exclude these cases from our test sample. Within our sample of 322 Japanese acquirers 
who target the US companies, we find that 248 are unlisted firms and only 43 are listed. 
On the other side, our sample of US initiated M&A deals are more balanced, with 75 
listed acquirers and 70 unlisted acquirers.56  
 
In the previous M&A studies, researchers indicate that market anticipation of the 
potential integration synergy can be influenced by the public status of the target. The 
integration of unlisted acquirers and listed targets in a merger may have the benefits 
such as: i) reducing the financial constraints of the unlisted acquirers since they may 
experience higher cost of funds than listed firms, which in turn, may create financial 
synergy; ii) Benefiting the shareholders of unlisted acquirers as better shareholder 
protection practices being transferred from the listed targets.  
  
                                                   
54 In Chapter 4, we have also listed several reasons that the Japanese acquirers who take over the public firm 
experience more positive and significant ARs and CARs. Despite the inconsistent market reaction, we suggest that 
the public status do influence the market anticipation to the future synergy.  
55 Group of investors refers to the scenario where multi-companies jointly acquire a target.  
56 We did not include the investor group in our sample. Thus, the number of unlisted and public acquirers is 
smaller than the total sample size.   
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Table 5.4.1 shows the ARs and CARs of the US and Japanese targets who are taken 
over by listed and unlisted acquirers. The US targets who are acquired by both listed 
and unlisted companies experience significant and positive ARs and CARs on the 
announcement day. Consistent with the Bargeron et al. (2008), significance intervals of 
ARs and CARs show that the target bids by the listed acquirers experience higher ARs 
and CARs than those bid by the unlisted acquirers.  
 
Japanese targets also experience significant and positive ARs during the announcement 
period. Notice that, although the targets of unlisted bidders do not experience 
significant ARs on the announcement day, the significant AR on day t=-1 implies that 
the market gives positive response to the expected announcement. Consistent with the 
US targets, we find that the Japanese targets taken over by listed acquirers also 
experience more positive ARs. This is further evidenced by the continuing significant 
CARs of the Japanese targets of listed bidders. The Mann–Whitney U test confirms our 
finding that the CARs of the two test groups are significantly different from day t=0 to 
day t=5.  
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Table 5.4.1 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japanese targets who are bid by listed or unlisted acquirers 
 
The US and Japanese CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U
-5 0.8053 2.72
a 0.9124 1.99
b 0.57 0.8053 2.20
b 0.9124 1.65
c 0.57
-4 0.0828 0.56 0.9753 1.32 0.27 0.8882 1.92
c 1.8877 1.59 0.90
-3 -0.0546 1.59 0.1960 1.30 0.33 0.8336 2.62
a 2.0837 1.84
c 0.90
-2 0.3469 1.54 0.9927 1.73
c 0.39 1.1805 2.33
a 3.0765 2.53
b 1.03
-1 1.2092 4.20
a 1.4851 1.89
c 0.60 2.3897 3.28
a 4.5616 3.38
a 1.50
0 6.3037 8.15
a 5.5920 3.15
a 0.29 8.6934 7.60
a 10.1536 4.98
a 1.26
1 2.2525 3.91
a 1.1944 0.39 0.63 10.9459 8.86
a 11.3479 6.17
a 0.53
2 0.7632 1.15 -1.1274 -1.95 1.72
c 11.7091 9.18
a 10.2205 4.36
a 0.28
3 -0.1355 0.50 0.0418 -0.07 0.34 11.5736 8.74
a 10.2623 4.34
a 0.41
4 0.0425 0.66 0.8525 1.30 0.39 11.6160 8.85
a 11.1148 4.70
a 0.10
5 -0.3204 -1.26 0.4517 0.72 1.61 11.2956 7.52
a 11.5665 4.53
a 0.19
Days ARs adj. -BMP ARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U CARs adj. -BMP CARs adj. -BMP Mann–Whitney U
-5 1.0314 2.17
b -0.0249 -0.49 2.22
b 1.0314 1.14 -0.0249 -0.30 2.22
b
-4 0.4741 1.42 0.1732 -0.52 1.38 1.5055 1.92
c 0.1483 -0.83 2.36
b
-3 0.6639 1.34 0.0569 0.16 1.08 2.1694 2.27
b 0.2053 -1.13 2.42
b
-2 -0.4158 -1.03 0.3916 1.71
c 1.60 1.7535 0.99 0.5969 0.03 0.98
-1 3.0073 3.92
a 1.7744 2.49
a 0.82 4.7608 2.31
b 2.3713 1.08 1.54
0 5.7508 4.26
a 1.9588 1.39 1.25 10.5116 4.69
a 4.3301 1.36 2.41
b
1 0.5013 0.46 -0.8645 -0.44 0.33 11.0129 4.55
a 3.4656 1.22 2.39
b
2 -0.7703 -0.17 -2.6588 -0.37 1.13 10.2426 4.19
a 0.8068 0.75 2.25
b
3 0.2393 0.31 0.9206 -0.49 0.31 10.4819 4.27
a 1.7274 0.73 2.22
b
4 -0.1906 -0.47 0.7167 -0.37 0.27 10.2913 3.62
a 2.4441 0.78 1.86
c
5 0.6213 0.94 1.0941 2.12
b 0.92 10.9126 4.00
a 3.5382 1.59 1.75
c
Targets of listed bidders Targets of unlisted bidders Targets of listed bidders Targets of unlisted bidders
The US targets
Japanese targets
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5.5 The announcement returns and the industry of the targets 
 
The industry characteristics may affect the potential synergy and the bargaining power 
in the M&A (see, e.g. Ahern, 2012). Thus, industry characteristics can be a factor in 
valuing acquirers and targets’ stock prices during the announcement period. In Chapter 
4, we test acquirers’ ARs and CARs by industry. Our results suggest that acquirers’ 
industries do not explain their ARs and CARs. On the other hand, Eun et al. (1996) 
indicate that acquirers or the combined entities may benefit from the reversal 
internalization. The R&D resources and efficient management style of the targets can 
create synergy after the acquisition. Therefore, this section will test the ARs and CARs 
of the targets by industry.  
 
As in Chapter 4, we follow the Fama-French industry classification. We classify our 
sample of M&A targets into seven industry groups: Consumer product, Finance, 
Healthcare, Service, High technology, Manufacturing and Retailer. Notice that, due to 
the relatively small sample size, we do not examine the Japanese targets in the finance 
and healthcare and the US targets in the retailer industry.  
 
Table 5.5.1 presents the ARs of the US and Japanese targets in different industries. Our 
sample consists of 15 the US targets from consumer product industry, 21 from finance 
industry, 44 from healthcare industry, 80 from high technology, 83 from manufacturing, 
48 from service industry, 14 from retailer industry; and 37 Japanese targets from 
consumer product industry, 10 from healthcare industry, 16 from high technology 
industry, 33 from manufacturing industry, 21 from service industry, and 27 from retailer 
industry. In addition, as our sample of consists of 3 Japanese targets in finance industry, 
we do not include it in our test.  
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Table 5.5.1 Abnormal returns for the US and Japanese acquirers in consumer products, finance, health care, high technology and service industry sector 
The US and Japanese AR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 The US targets  
 Consumer products Finance Health Care High-Tec Manufacturing Service Retailer Kruskal Wallis 
Days ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP  
-5 0.5033 1.10 -0.0387 0.46 0.9649 0.96 0.0892 -0.79 0.9368 1.70c 2.7023 3.68a 1.0450  1.57 11.61c 
-4 0.0463 -0.46 -1.1411 0.38 0.4903 0.28 0.0555 0.24 1.1037 3.28a -0.1862 0.05 -1.6514  -2.24b 12.69b 
-3 -0.2303 -0.41 1.0833 1.81 0.4991 0.22 0.1797 2.22 -0.7676 0.26 0.2195 1.11 0.0697  0.21 3.04 
-2 0.6328 1.20 -0.0963 0.26 -0.0013 0.34 0.0395 0.64 0.6326 1.69c 1.2306 1.59 0.4706  0.85 1.96 
-1 -0.0318 0.63 1.3496 0.95 2.1227 3.33a 1.5491 2.21b 0.6551 1.76c 1.8282 2.08b 0.0209  -0.18 5.01 
0 6.4648 1.81c 9.2661 3.12a 9.5654 3.93a 6.3664 4.32a 5.2853 5.18a 3.8573 2.56b 5.5424  1.69c 1.76 
1 -0.7421 -0.18 3.0905 1.35 1.5501 2.11b 0.4197 1.33 2.7135 2.30b 4.0431 1.18 0.1004  0.49 6.74 
2 -1.1835 -1.97b -0.8516 -0.55 0.1776 0.23 1.6024 -0.67 0.5428 1.98b 0.0748 -0.49 1.9120  2.14b 8.29 
3 0.0852 -0.30 0.3671 -0.01 -0.6499 -1.30 -0.2580 1.07 -0.0324 0.39 -0.2911 -0.93 -0.2438  -0.49 3.47 
4 -1.2680 -1.50 -0.2490 0.37 0.2022 0.50 -0.7497 -1.06 0.4055 1.12 0.8560 1.85c -2.2946  -2.58a 14.25b 
5 -0.6120 -0.21 0.1144 -0.56 0.3450 0.69 0.0265 0.19 -0.0223 0.69 -0.3035 -1.62 -0.0311  -0.10 4.81 
 Japanese targets  
 Consumer products Health Care High-Tec       Manufacturing             Service             Retailer Kruskal Wallis 
Days ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP  
-5 0.3937 0.35 0.7004 0.85 -0.0864 -0.14 0.4558 -0.09 0.9200 0.13 0.2757 1.59 1.99 
-4 0.0083 0.03 -0.7495 -0.30 -0.0712 -0.17 1.1813 1.77c 1.0694 0.24 -0.3445 -0.71 4.49 
-3 0.2812 0.35 -1.0258 -1.15 0.9130 0.93 0.3607 0.60 1.0194 0.93 0.1181 0.02 3.40 
-2 0.1144 0.71 2.0315 1.27 0.1100 0.06 -1.0453 -1.04 -0.9551 -0.70 0.1110 0.43 3.94 
-1 1.9617 1.87c 0.8071 0.98 2.5195 1.02 5.0938 3.90a 1.0160 1.10 1.5522 1.37 6.53 
0 3.6853 2.85a 14.6156 0.46 4.4438 2.67a 2.8938 1.43 1.5306 0.13 5.3616 2.39a 2.74 
1 -1.5494 -1.01 5.2017 1.21 -1.9248 -2.13b -0.3994 -0.67 -0.5236 1.50 1.6505 1.07 10.87c 
2 -0.8059 -1.18 -4.4079 0.45 1.4467 1.61 -1.0216 -0.91 -6.6745 0.75 -0.5259 -1.03 6.81 
3 -0.2339 -0.55 -2.6057 -0.27 0.7417 0.90 -0.5430 -1.03 5.8734 1.22 -0.2765 -0.82 2.67 
4 0.6548 0.59 -1.0214 -0.99 -0.8804 -1.18 -0.6294 -0.51 4.7015 1.03 -0.2447 -0.15 6.55 
5 0.0055 0.69 3.6216 1.76 0.6568 1.80 1.2323 2.55a 2.5396 0.53 0.5815 1.00 2.71 
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The results of table 5.5.1 show that the US targets experience significant and positive 
ARs on the announcement day across the panels. However, the significance levels of 
the ARs are inconsistent within different panels. We find that the US targets in the 
consumer product industry and in the retailer industry experience less significant AR 
(with a t value of 1.81 and 1.69, respectively) and the manufacturing targets experience 
the most significant AR (with a t value of 5.18) on the announcement day. In addition, 
we also find that the targets in healthcare, high technology, manufacturing and service 
industry experience significant AR from day t= -1. 
 
Inconsistent with the US targets in the service industry, Japanese targets in the service 
and healthcare industry do not experience significant ARs during the announcement 
period. Japanese targets in other industries experience significant AR on or surround 
the announcement day.  
 
The Kruskal Wallis test does not show significant AR difference on the announcement 
day for both the US and Japanese targets. However, we find that the Kurskal Wallis test 
shows significant result for the Japanese targets on day t=1, which is more likely to be 
contributed by the delayed market reaction observed in the finance and retailer panel.  
 
Table 5.5.2 presents the CARs of the targets in the different industries. We find that the 
target CARs generate a more consistent set of results. Of all the test groups, the 
consumer product industry of the US targets and the high technology and service 
industry of the Japanese targets do not experience significant CARs during the 
announcement period. In addition, for other targets who show significant CARs on the 
announcement day, we also observe a continuing trend of experiencing significant 
CARs over the next few days. The results of target CARs further imply that investors 
tend to respond inconsistently to targets within different industries. Notice that, the 
Kruskal Wallis test does not show significant result, which is potentially due to the 
difference in our sample size weakening the effectiveness of the test.   
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Table 5.5.2 Cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japanese acquirers in consumer products, finance, health care, high technology and service industry sector 
 
The US and Japanese CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 The US targets  
 Consumer products Finance Health Care High-Tec Manufacturing Service Retailer Kruskal Wallis 
Days CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP  
-5 0.5033 0.77 -0.0387 0.60 0.9649 1.14 0.0892 -1.57 0.9368 1.61 2.7023 2.48b 1.0450 1.57 11.61c 
-4 0.5496 0.10 -1.1798 0.63 1.4552 0.76 0.1447 -1.06 2.0406 3.96a 2.5161 2.01b -0.6065 -1.01 14.86b 
-3 0.3193 0.21 -0.0965 1.23 1.9543 0.70 0.3244 -0.10 1.2730 4.03a 2.7357 2.47b -0.5368 -0.77 10.74c 
-2 0.9521 0.45 -0.1928 1.16 1.9530 0.72 0.3639 0.02 1.9056 3.94a 3.9662 2.99a -0.0662 -0.33 12.03c 
-1 0.9203 0.44 1.1568 1.04 4.0756 1.95c 1.9131 0.57 2.5607 3.75a 5.7944 4.04a -0.0453 -0.29 8.24 
0 7.3852 1.63 10.4229 2.71a 13.6411 3.71a 8.2795 2.98a 7.8460 6.70a 9.6517 5.05a 5.4971 1.18 4.80 
1 6.6431 0.99 13.5135 4.15a 15.1911 4.39a 8.6992 3.62a 10.5595 7.81a 13.6947 5.26a 5.5974 1.28 6.93 
2 5.4596 0.56 12.6619 3.80a 15.3688 4.23a 10.3016 3.21a 11.1023 8.98a 13.7695 5.36a 7.5094 2.04b 7.82 
3 5.5448 0.51 13.0290 3.47a 14.7189 3.72a 10.0436 3.64a 11.0699 8.11a 13.4784 3.91a 7.2656 1.94c 5.47 
4 4.2768 0.00 12.7800 3.04a 14.9211 3.77a 9.2938 3.16a 11.4754 9.09a 14.3345 5.20a 4.9710 1.16 9.24 
5 3.6647 -0.22 12.8944 2.60b 15.2662 3.74a 9.3204 2.69a 11.4531 8.05a 14.0309 4.62a 4.9400 1.13 8.62 
 Japanese targets  
 Consumer products Health Care High-Tec       
Manufacturing 
            Service             
Retailer 
Kruskal Wallis 
Days CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP  
-5 0.3937 0.35 0.7004 0.85 -0.0864 -0.14 0.4558 -0.09 0.9200 0.13 0.2757 1.59 1.99 
-4 0.0083 0.03 -0.0490 0.44 -0.0712 -0.17 1.1813 1.77c 1.0694 0.24 -0.3445 -0.71 3.75 
-3 0.2812 0.35 -1.0748 0.05 0.9130 0.93 0.3607 0.60 1.0194 0.93 0.1181 0.02 1.36 
-2 0.1144 0.71 0.9566 0.81 0.1100 0.06 -1.0453 -1.04 -0.9551 -0.70 0.1110 0.43 0.60 
-1 1.9617 1.87c 1.7637 0.96 2.5195 1.02 5.0938 3.90a 1.0160 1.10 1.5522 1.37 2.94 
0 3.6853 2.85a 16.3793 1.65 4.4438 2.67a 2.8938 1.43 1.5306 0.13 5.3616 2.39a 2.36 
1 -1.5494 -1.01 21.5810 1.96b -1.9248 -2.13b -0.3994 -0.67 -0.5236 1.50 1.6505 1.07 2.01 
2 -0.8059 -1.18 17.1731 2.17b 1.4467 1.61 -1.0216 -0.91 -6.6745 0.75 -0.5259 -1.03 2.31 
3 -0.2339 -0.55 14.5673 2.01b 0.7417 0.90 -0.5430 -1.03 5.8734 1.22 -0.2765 -0.82 2.01 
4 0.6548 0.59 13.5460 1.93c -0.8804 -1.18 -0.6294 -0.51 4.7015 1.03 -0.2447 -0.15 0.76 
5 0.0055 0.69 17.1675 2.42a 0.6568 1.80 1.2323 2.55a 2.5396 0.53 0.5815 1.00 1.55 
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5.6 Target R&D intensity 
 
In Chapter 4, we find that the R&D intensity explains the ARs of acquirers in different 
industries. The result is consistent with the notion of reverse internalization (see, Eun 
et al., 1996). Seth et al. (2002), on the other hand, indicate that the R&D intensity of 
targets also explains the reverse internalization pattern. Thus, in this section, we 
examine the effect of R&D intensity on target ARs and CARs.  
 
Consistent with Chapter 4, we use the R&D to Sales ratio as a proxy of R&D intensity. 
We use the 12-month R&D spending and revenue before the announcement to measure 
the R&D spending and sales, respectively. In order to perform this test, we also assume 
that the R&D intensity of targets is independent of their bargaining power.  
 
Table 5.6.3 reports the average R&D to Sales of targets in each industry. Notice that, 
firms that do not report their R&D spending are excluded from this test. For this reason, 
as there is no data available for targets in the finance industry, the US retailer industry, 
Japanese healthcare industry, we do not report these industry sectors in table 5.6.3. We 
also find that some US targets in the service industry tend to report significantly higher 
R&D spending and lower sales in the 12-month period before the M&A announcement. 
As a result, the average service industry R&D spending ratio is more than 1. This can 
be due to the industry specific characteristics (e.g. long turnover period and/or large 
overheads). 
 
Table 5.6.3 Average target R&D/Sales in each industry  
The US targets 
 Consumer product Healthcare High-Tec Manufacturing Service 
R&D / Sales 0.1226 0.6979 0.1337 0.1601 1.725 
Japanese targets 
 Consumer product High-Tec Manufacturing Service Retailer 
R&D / Sales 0.0166 0.0435 0.0193 0.0015 0.0183 
 
We find that the US targets from consumer product industry show the lowest 
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R&D/Sales ratio. The low R&D intensity in the consumer industry may explain the 
insignificant CARs in table 5.5.2. 
 
The R&D spending shows a mixed result in explaining the Japanese target ARs and 
CARs. We find that targets in the service industry report the lowest R&D spending, 
which may explain the reason why those targets experience insignificant ARs and 
CARs (see, table 5.5.1 and 5.5.2). However, even the R&D spending of the high-
technology targets is the highest among all industries in our test, Japanese high-
technology targets also experience insignificant CARs.  
 
To further illustrate the relationship between R&D spending and target ARs and CARs, 
we perform a Mann–Whitney U test to compare the ARs and CARs of targets from the 
highest R&D spending industry with those from the lowest R&D spending industry. 
Notice that, as we mention above, the R&D spending ratio in the US service industry 
may be overestimated due to its specific industry characteristics. Thus, we use the US 
industry with the second highest ratio (healthcare) to compare with the consumer 
product industry (low R&D spending). For the Japanese targets, we compare the 
manufacturing industry (high R&D spending) with the service industry (low R&D 
spending). Table 5.6.4 shows the result of the test.  
 
In table 5.6.4, we show that the targets in the high R&D spending and low R&D 
spending industry do not experience significantly different ARs on the announcement 
day. However, we find that the difference among ARs is significant from day t=1 to day 
t=2 for both countries’ targets. The result may imply that investors do not efficiently 
capture all target’s information on the announcement day. Thus, the targets in the high 
R&D spending industry experience return continuation. Surprisingly, the return 
continuation shown in the AR does not result in the significant CAR difference over the 
announcement period. The insignificant Mann–Whitney U test of the CARs may be 
resulted by the strong volatility during the announcement period. Overall, we suggest 
that the R&D spending ratio do explain the different target returns in different industries. 
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Table 5.6.4: The ARs and CARs for high and low R&D spending industry 
The US and Japanese AR and CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. The M –W U denotes the 
Mann–Whitney U test. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
We also intend to test whether the R&D spending can explain ARs and CARs at the 
firm level, or it only explains the average ARs and CARs at the industry level. The test 
may help us understand whether the positive market response is resulted by the target’s 
specific industry with high average R&D spending, or by the individual firm’s high 
R&D spending. In this case, the test may justify whether the R&D spending is part of 
the industry characteristics, or the industry classification is the proxy of R&D spending. 
To perform this test, we define the highest 33% R&D spending targets as high R&D 
spending targets and the lowest 33% of R&D spending targets as the low R&D spending 
targets.  
The US healthcare targets The US consumer product targets ARs CARs 
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP M-W U M –W U 
-5 0.9649 0.96 0.9649 1.14 0.5033 1.10 0.5033 0.77 0.37 0.37 
-4 0.4903 0.28 1.4552 0.76 0.0463 -0.46 0.5496 0.10 0.99 0.26 
-3 0.4991 0.22 1.9543 0.70 -0.2303 -0.41 0.3193 0.21 0.28 0.54 
-2 -0.0013 0.34 1.9530 0.72 0.6328 1.20 0.9521 0.45 0.26 0.17 
-1 2.1227 3.33a 4.0756 1.95c -0.0318 0.63 0.9203 0.44 1.27 0.98 
0 9.5654 3.93a 13.6411 3.71a 6.4648 1.81c 7.3852 1.63 0.23 0.70 
1 1.5501 2.11b 15.1911 4.39a -0.7421 -0.18 6.6431 0.99 2.25b 1.29 
2 0.1776 0.23 15.3688 4.23a -1.1835 -1.97b 5.4596 0.56 1.67c 1.57 
3 -0.6499 -1.30 14.7189 3.72a 0.0852 -0.30 5.5448 0.51 0.56 1.38 
4 0.2022 0.50 14.9211 3.77a -1.2680 -1.50 4.2768 0.00 1.25 1.85c 
5 0.3450 0.69 15.2662 3.74a -0.6120 -0.21 3.6647 -0.22 0.64 1.92c 
Japanese manufacturing targets Japanese Service Targets ARs CARs 
-5 0.4558 -0.09 0.4558 -0.59 0.9200 0.13 0.9200 -0.12 0.59 0.59 
-4 1.1813 1.77c 1.6370 0.69 1.0694 0.24 1.9894 0.18 0.59 0.20 
-3 0.3607 0.60 1.9977 0.74 1.0194 0.93 3.0088 0.16 0.22 0.08 
-2 -1.0453 -1.04 0.9524 0.10 -0.9551 -0.70 2.0537 -0.65 1.20 0.47 
-1 5.0938 3.90a 6.0462 2.12b 1.0160 1.10 3.0697 -0.05 1.50 1.45 
0 2.8938 1.43 8.9400 2.59b 1.5306 0.13 4.6003 -0.48 0.22 1.18 
1 -0.3994 -0.67 8.5406 2.77a -0.5236 1.50 4.0768 0.49 2.19b 0.83 
2 -1.0216 -0.91 7.5191 2.49b -6.6745 0.75 -2.5977 0.58 2.00b 0.47 
3 -0.5430 -1.03 6.9761 1.98b 5.8734 1.22 3.2757 1.36 0.83 0.17 
4 -0.6294 -0.51 6.3467 1.70c 4.7015 1.03 7.9773 1.33 1.87c 0.17 
5 1.2323 2.55a 7.5790 3.12a 2.5396 0.53 10.5169 1.27 0.47 0.44 
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Table 5.6.5 presents the ARs and CARs of the high and low R&D spending targets. Our 
sample consists of 25 the US targets with high R&D spending and 25 with low R&D 
spending; and consists of 16 Japanese targets with high R&D spending and 16 with low 
R&D spending.  
 
We find that the R&D spending ratios impose a mixed effect on the target ARs and 
CARs. On day t=-2, the US high R&D spending targets experience significantly higher 
ARs. However, on the day t=-1, the US low R&D spending targets experience 
significantly higher ARs. The ARs are insignificant on the announcement day in both 
panels. We also find the US high R&D spending target experience significantly lower 
AR on day t=4. The insignificant Mann–Whitney U result of CARs also confirms the 
weak correlation between the R&D spending and the positive market reaction. 
Consistent with the US targets, the Japanese targets in the high R&D spending and low 
R&D spending panel do not experience significantly different ARs and CARs on the 
announcement day. In addition, on day t=3, the high R&D spending target experiences 
significantly lower ARs. Since the significant result is far away from the announcement 
day, this is more likely to be resulted by the market noise.  
 
The result of this test implies that as a part of the industry characteristics, high R&D 
intensity environment lead to the target firms experience more significant and positive 
ARs. On the other hand, the R&D spending cannot explain the market behaviour at the 
firm level. This result may suggest that investors price the targets’ M&A announcement 
by their perception of the target’s future R&D spending. Thus, the realized R&D 
spending has less explanatory power compared with the industry R&D spending.  
 
We also notice that the sample size can be a weakness in this test. Many firms do not 
report their R&D spending in their annual reports. The relatively small sample size may 
reduce the power of the statistical test.   
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Table 5.6.5 The ARs and CARs for high and low R&D spending firms 
The US and Japanese AR and CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. The M –W U denotes the 
Mann–Whitney U test. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.   
 
5.7 Market liquidity and the returns of target firms 
 
In Chapter 4, we present that the market liquidity status imposes insignificant effect on 
the acquirer returns. Although the previous studies (see, e.g., Amihud, 2002; Pastor and 
Stambaugh, 2003; Bekaert et al., 2007) indicate that the illiquidity compensation may 
lead to the investors of the high illiquid firms experience more positive returns, the 
informational effect of illiquidity may be less significant in the cross-border M&As. 
Since most cross-border M&As are financed by cash, the market liquidity status of 
acquirers may impose weak influence on the bargaining power.  
The US high R&D spending targets The US low R&D spending targets ARs CARs 
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP M-W U M –W U 
-5 1.6893 1.35 1.6893 1.45 -0.3203 -1.76 -0.3203 -1.99 -1.31 -1.31 
-4 -0.3707 -0.43 1.3186 1.00 1.2137 1.30 0.8934 0.32 1.20 -0.71 
-3 0.7340 1.07 2.0526 1.51 -0.0717 -0.48 0.8218 0.21 -0.55 -1.68c 
-2 -0.6190 -0.79 1.4335 0.65 1.7038 3.08a 2.5255 1.53 2.80a -0.03 
-1 3.7733 3.14a 5.2068 1.86c 0.5971 1.81c 3.1227 1.66c -1.76c -0.59 
0 6.7970 2.00b 12.0039 2.57a 12.5045 4.94a 15.6272 4.13a 1.00 0.51 
1 4.1295 1.67c 16.1334 3.27a 1.6316 -0.06 17.2588 4.99a -0.28 -0.15 
2 0.8000 -0.10 16.9334 3.95a -0.6981 -0.81 16.5607 4.00a -0.44 -0.44 
3 0.3465 0.35 17.2799 3.93a 0.7123 1.01 17.2730 4.85a 0.73 -0.28 
4 2.3010 2.23b 19.5810 5.11a 0.6320 0.31 17.9050 4.80a -2.24b -0.79 
5 0.1732 -0.61 19.7541 4.29a -1.0200 -1.08 16.8850 3.25a 0.32 -0.48 
Japanese high R&D spending targets Japanese low R&D spending Targets ARs CARs 
-5 -1.5175 -0.90 -1.5175 -1.14 0.4176 -0.07 0.4176 0.09 0.75 0.75 
-4 -0.1453 1.08 -1.6628 -0.52 -0.3644 -0.41 0.0532 -0.28 1.06 0.15 
-3 0.9181 0.95 -0.7447 -0.13 -0.5098 -0.59 -0.4566 -0.49 1.21 0.23 
-2 0.6733 1.38 -0.0714 0.33 2.9550 0.29 2.4984 -0.53 0.83 0.34 
-1 12.6758 2.05b 12.6044 1.55 2.6089 0.96 5.1074 -0.38 0.07 0.75 
0 1.8508 -0.08 14.4553 0.95 3.2485 1.37 8.3559 0.36 0.72 0.23 
1 -4.1602 -0.73 10.2950 0.78 0.2015 1.29 8.5574 0.67 0.79 0.45 
2 -1.7656 -0.96 8.5294 0.42 -1.1082 -1.68c 7.4492 0.23 0.42 0.49 
3 -1.3097 -2.18b 7.2197 -0.13 1.4879 1.91c 8.9371 1.29 -2.34b 0.98 
4 1.6466 0.73 8.8663 0.28 -0.6504 -0.32 8.2866 1.10 1.06 0.68 
5 0.3375 1.18 9.2038 0.82 -1.1223 -1.99b 7.1643 0.39 1.02 0.04 
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However, the market liquidity status of the targets may impose a more significant effect 
on the targets’ ARs and CARs. The illiquid stock may increase the difficulty for the 
acquirers to sell the purchased shares in the future. Thus, the illiquidity of the target 
share may reduce the targets’ bargaining power and result in the wealth shift from target 
to acquirers. In order to test the effect of the liquidity status of the targets, we compare 
the ARs and CARs of high illiquid, mid illiquid and low illiquid targets. Following 
(Amihud, 2002), we use the average ratio of absolute stock return to the trading volume 
in 250 trading days before the announcement as the proxy of the illiquidity.  
 
Table 5.7.1 presents the ARs and CARs of the high illiquid, mid illiquid and low illiquid 
targets. Our sample consists of 97 the US targets with low illiquidity, 129 with medium 
illiquidity, and 97 with high illiquidity; and 45 Japanese targets with low illiquidity, 61 
with medium illiquidity and 45 with high illiquidity.      
 
We find that the US targets in all the panels experience significant and positive ARs on 
the announcement day. The Kruskal Wallis test also shows that the ARs are not 
significantly different across the three groups on the announcement day. On the other 
hand, the Kruskal Wallis results on day t=-2, t=-1 and t=1 are significant. This is likely 
to be contributed by the different AR patterns shown in the low and mid- illiquid panels.  
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Table 5.7.1 Abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns for the US and Japanese low illiquidity, medium illiquidity and high illiquidity targets 
 The US targets 
The US targets 
The US targets 
The US targets 
The US targets 
The US targets 
The US targets 
The US targets 
 Low Illiquidity Medium Illiquidity high Illiquidity  Low Illiquidity Medium Illiquidity high Illiquidity  
Days ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP Kruskal Wallis CARs adj.-
BMP 
CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP Kruskal Wallis 
-5 1.1528 2.62b 0.7151 1.22 0.7691 1.84c 1.76 1.1528 1.62 0.7151 0.92 0.7691 1.47 1.76 
-4 0.5782 1.69c -0.3382 -0.69 0.3539 1.58 3.64 1.7310 2.41b 0.3768 0.18 1.1229 2.05b 3.50 
-3 0.3590 1.65c -0.6301 0.53 0.2825 1.66c 0.72 2.0899 2.64b -0.2533 0.50 1.4054 2.72a 5.22c 
-2 0.4566 1.07 0.6158 3.68a 0.2729 -0.60 5.83c 2.5465 2.88a 0.3625 2.00b 1.6783 1.68c 1.15 
-1 1.4350 3.39a 1.7608 4.14a 0.6466 1.05 6.09b 3.9815 3.94a 2.1233 3.22a 2.3249 1.33 3.18 
0 6.5762 4.16a 5.9126 5.59a 5.4936 6.01a 
1.84 
1.58 
1.66 
-0.60 
1.05 
6.01 
0.88 
1.16 
0.78 
0.44 
0.94 
 
0.40 10.5577 5.78a 8.0358 6.02a 7.8185 4.41a 2.44 
1 2.5396 2.78a 1.7355 2.82a 1.2082 0.88 4.80c 13.0972 7.34a 9.7714 7.70a 9.0267 4.19a 3.84 
2 -0.2553 -0.65 1.4639 0.54 0.3188 1.16 2.21 12.8420 6.81a 11.2352 7.54a 9.3455 4.66a 2.38 
3 -0.6259 -1.40 0.0136 1.04 0.3050 0.78 7.74b 12.2161 5.35a 11.2488 7.67a 9.6505 4.73a 1.74 
4 0.1687 0.22 -0.2369 0.67 0.2779 0.44 0.00 12.3847 5.68a 11.0119 7.69a 9.9285 4.56a 1.95 
5 -0.4358 -0.81 0.0106 -0.26 0.3119 0.94 2.04 11.9489 4.88a 11.0225 7.18a 10.2403 4.13a 1.58 
            Japanese targets 
Days ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP Kruskal Wallis CARs adj.-
BMP 
CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP Kruskal Wallis 
-5 0.6598 1.11 0.4338 0.63 0.0841 -0.83 2.26 0.6598 0.46 0.4338 0.45 0.0841 -0.75 2.26 
-4 -0.0705 -1.05 0.4387 0.91 0.2915 0.71 2.92 0.5893 -0.46 0.8725 0.98 0.3756 -0.06 0.99 
-3 -0.4834 -0.76 0.3653 0.94 0.9079 1.15 3.40 0.1059 -0.68 1.2378 1.08 1.2835 -0.16 1.32 
-2 -1.1553 -1.23 0.5122 1.38 0.4405 0.34 2.19 -1.0494 -1.51 1.7500 1.54 1.7240 -0.06 6.37b 
-1 1.4739 2.36b 3.4493 3.32a 2.7117 2.53b 2.27 0.4244 -0.16 5.1993 2.63b 4.4357 0.79 5.17c 
0 2.8760 3.09a 5.7122 2.03b 3.8015 2.97a 0.79 3.3004 1.56 10.9115 3.42a 8.2372 2.10b 5.54c 
1 -0.9460 -1.78c 1.2518 0.29 -0.7658 0.82 1.58 2.3544 0.93 12.1633 3.13a 7.4713 2.85a 8.40b 
2 -0.1726 -0.54 -0.3596 0.71 -4.3406 -0.87 0.95 2.1818 0.58 11.8037 3.04a 3.1307 2.20b 7.81b 
3 -0.2760 -0.86 0.0962 0.19 1.9099 0.33 0.60 1.9058 0.46 11.8999 2.84a 5.0406 2.48b 8.05b 
4 -0.2357 -0.64 -0.5522 -0.86 1.8586 0.92 3.57 1.6701 0.26 11.3478 2.55b 6.8992 2.69a 7.53b 
5 0.4685 1.64 1.0591 1.07 1.1589 0.94 0.60 2.1386 1.22 12.4069 2.84a 8.0580 2.95a 6.29b 
The US and Japanese AR and CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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In both low and mid-illiquid panels, we have observed significant and positive ARs on 
day t=-1 and day =1, which can be a result of the pre-announcement anticipation and 
post announcement return continuation. However, the different return patterns impose 
insignificant effect on the US target CARs. We have observed the pre-announcement 
anticipation and post-announcement return continuation in all panels. Notice that, 
although the CAR on day t=-1 is insignificant in the high-illiquid panel, the CAR on 
day t=-2 is significant and positive. The Kruskal Wallis statistic for the CARs of US 
targets in the three panels is insignificant.  
 
Unlike the US targets, the ARs of Japanese targets show the same significant pattern 
across all three panels. Kruskal Wallis test also confirms that the ARs of Japanese 
targets are insignificantly different. However, surprisingly, we find that the CARs of 
the low-illiquid targets are insignificant over the announcement period. It leads to the 
significant Kruskal Wallis results from day t=-2 to day t=5. The insignificant CARs 
from the announcement day to day t=5 can be influenced by the pre-announcement 
negative (but insignificant) AR on day t=-2, which is more likely to be a market noise.  
 
Overall, we suggest that the market liquidity status of the targets imposes insignificant 
effect on the target returns during the announcement period. We observe that the US 
targets show different AR patterns in the different panels. However, the compensation 
theory suggested in the previous studies may not be able to explain the different patterns 
shown in our study. Thus, the liquidity status may be a proxy of other factors, for 
instance, the industry characteristics. The ARs of the Japanese targets are 
insignificantly different across the three panels. Although the CARs in the low-liquid 
panel are insignificant, they are more likely to be influenced by the unrelated market 
noise.  
 
5.8 The targets’ ARs and CARs in different time period  
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Consistent with Chapter 4, we examine whether the ARs and CARs of targets are stable 
in different time periods. Since our sample period is over 20 years, the economic and 
market conditions can change over time. Thus, the interpretation of portfolio and deal 
characteristics may be inconsistent in different time periods. Thus, this test may show 
how robust the effect of portfolio and deal characteristics is.  
  
Consistent with Chapter 4, we compare the ARs and CARs for the M&As initiated from 
1990 to 1998 with the ones from 2007 to 2015. As we discussed in Chapter 4, the two 
periods cover important phases of the globalization period and M&A cycles. Table 5.8 
presents the pre-1998 and post 2007 ARs and CARs of the US and Japanese targets. 
Our sample consists of 216 the US targets taken over before 1998 and 87 taken over 
after 2007; and consists of 39 Japanese targets taken over before 1998 and 81 after 2007.  
 
The ARs and CARs of the US targets are significant on the announcement day in both 
1990 to 1998 and 2007 to 2015 periods. Although the significance interval of the targets 
ARs and CARs reduced in the 2007 to 2015 period, the result of the Mann–Whitney U 
test is not significant. Notice that, although the CAR on the announcement day in the 
2007 to 2015 period is insignificant, the Mann–Whitney U test also do not support that 
in 2007 to 2015, the US targets experience significantly higher CAR on the 
announcement day than in 1990 to 1998.  
 
In the 1990 to 1998 period, the US targets experience continuously significant and 
positive ARs from day t=-3 to day t=1, and the CARs are significant from day t=-5 to 
day t=5. In contrast, the US targets only experience significant and positive ARs on day 
t=0 and day t=1 during the 2007 to 2015 period. The CARs are not significant before 
the announcement day. The Mann–Whitney U test also shows that the US targets 
experience significantly different ARs on day t=-2 and CARs on day t=-2 and t=-1. Our 
result shows that the anticipation behaviour becomes less significant in the late period. 
In addition, it implies the existence of insider trading behaviour in the 1990 to 1998 
period. 
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Table 5.8 ARs and CARs of the US and Japanese targets of different period of time 
The AR and CAR measures are in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. The M –W U denotes the Mann–Whitney U 
test. a, b and c denote statistical significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
For Japanese targets, the ARs and CARs in both periods are significant and positive on 
day t=0. The Mann–Whitney U test also shows that the ARs and CARs are 
insignificantly different in the two periods. The result might suggest that the insider 
trading behaviour is still significant in the 2007 to 2015. The result may also be 
interpreted as the Japanese stock market being more efficient than the US market. 
However, Otsubo (2014) find that the stock market in Japan do not incorporate the 
information as efficient as the US market. Thus, it may be less possible that the different 
ARs and CARs pattern of the US and Japanese targets in the 2007 to 2015 period are 
contributed by the difference in market efficiency.  
The US Targets in 1990 to 1998 The US Targets in 2007 to 2015 ARs CARs 
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP M-W U M –W U 
-5 0.8462 2.87a 0.8462 2.03b 0.3794 0.38 0.3794 -0.45 0.40 0.40 
-4 0.2736 1.53 1.1198 2.09b 0.3556 0.84 0.7349 0.64 0.38 0.43 
-3 -0.0881 1.67c 1.0317 2.72a -0.0781 0.29 0.6569 0.62 0.55 1.21 
-2 0.6628 3.03a 1.6945 3.78a -0.3133 -0.25 0.3435 -0.21 1.97b 1.90c 
-1 1.3186 5.23a 3.0131 5.14a 1.2318 1.18 1.5753 -0.25 1.47 2.31b 
0 5.3414 7.11a 8.3545 8.13a 8.1757 6.10a 9.7509 3.51a 1.09 0.69 
1 1.8309 3.11a 10.1854 9.72a 1.9993 2.23b 11.7503 3.94a 0.40 0.26 
2 0.0986 0.11 10.2841 9.83a 1.0842 -0.23 12.8345 3.68a 0.02 0.05 
3 -0.0745 0.73 10.2096 9.19a -0.0604 -0.29 12.7741 3.52a 0.56 0.25 
4 0.2306 0.68 10.4402 9.26a 0.1321 1.47 12.9062 3.83a 0.65 0.08 
5 0.0039 0.32 10.4440 8.62a -0.0541 -0.31 12.8521 3.28a 0.87 0.06 
Japanese Targets in 1990 to 1998 Japanese Targets in 2007 to 2015 ARs CARs 
-5 0.6553 0.24 0.6553 0.13 -0.0021 -0.12 -0.0021 -0.12 0.09 0.75 
-4 0.0962 0.20 0.7515 0.29 0.1244 -0.19 0.1223 -0.21 1.75c 1.08 
-3 0.5654 1.18 1.3169 0.24 0.1355 -0.21 0.2578 -0.30 0.24 1.60 
-2 -0.7492 -0.47 0.5677 0.16 -0.4069 -0.65 -0.1492 -0.59 1.79c 1.23 
-1 3.0543 2.54b 3.6220 2.08b 1.6414 2.79a 1.4923 1.23 0.53 1.54 
0 3.0167 2.55b 6.6387 4.23a 2.7293 2.57b 4.2216 2.65a 0.41 1.23 
1 0.6843 0.15 7.3229 4.12a 0.2254 -0.22 4.4470 2.36a 1.40 1.42 
2 -0.5730 -0.21 6.7500 3.43a 0.7504 0.18 5.1973 2.23b 0.38 1.25 
3 0.2247 -0.16 6.9747 3.33a 0.1239 -0.41 5.3213 2.00b 0.17 1.28 
4 0.2718 0.17 7.2465 3.18a -0.0115 -0.45 5.3097 1.86c 0.91 1.53 
5 0.5734 1.08 7.8199 4.11a 0.9572 1.91 6.2669 2.40a 0.20 1.51 
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5.9 Conclusion and evaluation  
 
This chapter presents the ARs and CARs of the US and Japanese target firms. Our result 
is consistent with the previous studies, which indicate that target firms experience 
substantially positive returns during the announcement period. We also try to explain 
the ARs and CARs. Following the previous studies, we test i) the ARs and CARs in 
different time periods; ii) acquirers and target industry relationship, iii) listed and 
unlisted bidders, iv) industry of the targets, v) liquidity status of the targets. Notice that, 
we find that most public targets are purely financed by cash. Even though many 
previous studies indicate that the method of payment can influence the resistance of the 
target and thereby change the bargaining power, we cannot test the information effect 
of the payment method in this study.  
 
Overall, we find that merger relationship, public status of bidders, industry 
characteristics have an impact on the magnitude of target ARs and CARs. Our test 
results imply that the synergy related factors determine the investor behaviour during 
the announcement period. Our test results may also provide some inspirations for 
explaining the acquirer returns. We suggest that the insignificant ARs and CARs 
observed in Chapter 4 should be resulted by the weak synergistic effect instead of high 
premium considerations.  
 
We also notice that this chapter has several weaknesses. Firstly, due to the sample size 
of listed targets, we cannot test the corresponding acquirer AR in each of our test. This 
weakens the power of our test in explaining the investor behaviour associated with 
acquirer AR. Secondly, this chapter only uses an indirect proxy (the covariance between 
acquirer and target AR) to measure the premiums paid by the acquirers. This is because 
in our sample events, most cross-border M&A announcements do not report the 
proposed transaction value. 
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Chapter Six 
The financial characteristics and acquirer returns 
 
6.0 Introduction  
 
In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we have systematically examined whether the market 
efficiently incorporates the risks and synergetic value into the cross-border M&A 
announcement returns. Following previous studies, we have tested the explanatory 
power of the acquirer and target characteristics (e.g. industry characteristics, R&D 
intensity) and M&A deal characteristics (e.g. merger relationship, public status of 
acquirers and targets). We find that investor behaviour can be influenced by their 
perception of the degree of synergy and risks in the M&As. However, our study may 
over-simplify the investor behaviour, as investors may anticipate the success of M&A 
based not only on potential synergy creation, but on the capability of acquirers to deliver 
such synergistic effect. Thus, we should be able to assume that the market behaviour 
during the announcement period, at least partially, influenced by the previous 
performance of both acquirers and targets. Failed to capture effect of acquirers’ previous 
performance may lead to some of our earlier tests lack of power to explain ARs. In 
order to overcome this weakness, this chapter tests the effect of financial characteristics 
of acquirers and targets on acquirer’s returns.  
 
We use financial ratios as proxies of financial characteristics. The M&A literature 
suggest that a firms’ financial characteristics explain the acquirers’ announcement 
returns in two ways. Firstly, some financial ratios (e.g. the capital structure) can be used 
as an indicator of the management entrenchment. When investors assess the agency 
motive from the financial information, the M&A announcement may result in negative 
stock returns as agency costs are likely to increase on account of the M&A (Jensen, 
1986). Secondly, financial characteristics indicate the acquirers’ capability to create 
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values from synergistic effects and market for corporate control. The M&A between 
profitable acquirers and growth targets can create more financial synergy by reducing 
the funding cost and financial contains in the targets. In addition, M&As increase the 
target value by replacing less efficient target management with more efficient 
management from the acquirers, and thereby benefit acquirers by market for corporate 
control. Denis et al. (2003) suggest that high profitable firms tend to have more efficient 
management. In addition, Gompers et al. (2003) and Bebchuk et al. (2004) find that 
Tobin’s Q has significant correlation with corporate governance quality.    
 
Although the relation between firm’s financial characteristics and M&A announcement 
returns has been studied for decades, there is still a knowledge gap in our understanding 
of the role that a firm’s financial characteristics play in investor’s pricing behaviour. 
Firstly, previous M&A studies show inconsistent results for the correlations between 
financial ratios and announcement returns (see, e.g. Mantecon, 2008; Dong et al., 2006). 
Hence the empirical support provided by previous studies is still ambiguous. Secondly, 
some previous M&A studies tend to bind each financial ratio with only one theory (see, 
e.g. Jensen, 1986). The more recent corporate finance studies show that financial ratios 
should be assessed in a more dynamic model (see, e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1995).57 
In addition, previous studies do not show a consistent interpretation of ratios. For 
instance, Tobin’s Q has been interpreted as a proxy of growth opportunity by 
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013), whereas Masulis et al. (2007) use Tobin’s Q as a sign 
of stock overvaluation. Thirdly, the effect of financial characteristics is rarely tested in 
the context of the cross-border M&A. When cross-border M&As involve higher 
information asymmetry and potential synergy, we do not know whether the effect of 
financial characteristics in the cross-border M&As is still consistent with that in the 
domestic M&As. In order to address the knowledge gap, this chapter is also designed 
to answer the following questions: i) whether investors use financial ratios to price the 
                                                   
57 For instance, Jensen (1986) the free cash flow explains the agency motive in the M&As. However, 
the later capital structure studies (e.g. McConnell and Servaes, 1995) show that the growth opportunity 
influences the investors’ interpretation of free cash flow.  
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acquirers shares for cross-border M&A announcements; ii) whether the effect of 
financial ratios is consistent when acquirers and M&As show different characteristics; 
iii) whether the effect of financial ratios is consistent across different countries.58 This 
chapter is organised as follow: Section 6.1 introduces the explanatory variables 
employed in this chapter. Section 6.2 introduces the control variables. Section 6.3 
presents the test model. Section 6.4 specifies the data used in this chapter. Section 6.5 
presents the statistical summary. Section 6.6 presents the empirical results associated 
with the US acquirers. Section 6.7 presents the empirical results associated with 
Japanese acquirers. Section 6.8 presents the empirical results associated with the US 
and Japanese targets. Section 6.9 analyses the effect from Sarbanes-Oxley act.   
 
6.1 Determinants of financial characteristics  
 
In this section, we discuss the explanatory variables we employ in the following 
empirical tests. Following the previous studies, we measure the financial characteristics 
by using profitability ratios, growth opportunity ratios, leverage ratio, and dividend 
ratio. Through the discussion of the theories and test methods used in the previous 
studies, we justify our choices of the financial ratios.   
  
6.1.2 Profitability ratios   
 
The previous studies interpret the profitability ratios from two perspectives. Firstly, the 
profitability tends to be used as a measure of management efficiency (see, e.g. Denis et 
                                                   
58 Gorton et al. (2009) indicate that the bad performance firms tend to be the potential target in M&As. 
Once market captures this information, these firms can experience positive ARs. Thus, as a target, the 
influence of its financial performance can be ambiguous. A good performance target can create high 
synergy with acquirers. A bad performance target can have high potential for the value creation though 
the market for corporate control.  Thus, we only test the acquirers’ announcement returns in this 
chapter. 
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al., 2003). Considering market for corporate control suggests that acquirers can benefit 
from replacing inefficient management in targets (see, e.g. Wang and Xie, 2009), high 
profitability acquirers should experience more positive announcement returns.  
 
Secondly, previous studies use profitability as one of the indicators of free cash flow 
(see, e.g. Golubov et al., 2015).59 As free cash flow can help management empire 
building, (see, e.g. Jensen, 1986), the profitability ratio can be negatively correlated 
with announcement return. It is worth noting that when Golubov et al. (2015) use net 
profit after tax as the proxy of free cash flow, the study does not find significant 
correlation between free cash flow and CARs.60 In addition, the leverage ratio, as 
another free cash flow indicator, is commonly observed to have a positive correlation 
with CARs (see, e.g. Jensen, 1986; Masulis et al., 2007). 61  Thus, compare with 
leverage ratio, profitability is a less effective proxy for the management entrenchment.  
 
There are two common ratios are used in previous studies to measure the profitability: 
earnings per-share (EPS here after) and gross profit-to-assets (or called return on assets 
in some previous studies). Even though EPS is a common corporate efficient estimator 
(e.g. Huang et al., 2014), it is known to contain several weaknesses as a profitability 
indicator. The numerator of EPS is net income after preferred dividend. Novy-Marx 
(2013) argue that the items lower down in the income statement are “polluted” by 
unrelated accounting information such that EPS has less predicative power to the stock 
returns. He finds that the gross profit shows more significant explanatory power to the 
stock returns.62 However, Ball et al. (2015) suggests that the lower items in the income 
                                                   
59 We will further discuss the indicator of free cash flow in the following sections.  
60 The profit tends to be the numerator of profitability. As the profit is correlated with free cash flow, 
the profitability should also be correlated with free cash flow.  
61 We will further discuss the effect of leverage ratio in section 6.1.4.  
62 This study also reviewed the regression analysis of Fama and French (2006), which finds 
insignificant correlation between net profit and ARs. However, Novy-Marx (2013) argues that the 
insignificant correlation is resulted miss-using the “polluted” net profit. In his study, he re-tested the 
Fama-French regression with gross profit and find significant correlation with ARs.  
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statement are not pure noise to the stock returns but contain explanatory power. In order 
to capture the explanatory power from the gross profit and net profit (the lower item in 
the income statement), we employ both EPS and gross profit-to-assets in our study. A 
second weakness of the ESP measure is that the denominator of EPS is number of shares 
outstanding, which does scale net income by firm size. This identity leads the EPS to 
be a less appropriate profitability indictor in the cross-sectional test. On the other hand, 
the EPS may provide a better indication to the stock return compare with gross profit-
to-assets. This also justify the reason for using both gross profit-to-asset and EPS to 
explain the announcement returns.   
  
6.1.3 Growth opportunity  
 
Arikan and Stulz (2016) find that firms’ growth opportunities are positively correlated 
with announcement returns. They suggest that firms with less growth opportunity tend 
to have higher agency cost and firms with low growth opportunity are more likely to 
initiate M&As motivated by management entrenchment. However, Dong et al. (2006) 
and Margisr et al. (2008) suggest that the options of internal growth and M&A tend to 
be exclusive. Both studies interpret the growth opportunity as the opportunity cost of 
M&As. Margsiri et al. (2008) find that high growth firms are more likely to choose 
internal investment instead of M&As. Dong et al. (2006) show that high growth 
acquires tend to experience lower ARs after the M&A announcement. Even though the 
previous studies show inconsistent evidence on the relationship between the acquirers’ 
growth opportunity and the announcement returns, we should expect that the growth 
opportunity influence the investor’s interpretation to the M&A announcement.  
  
Bessembinder and Zhang (2013) use Tobin’s Q as the proxy of growth opportunity. 
 146 
 
They find that acquirers’ Tobin’s Q is positively associated with their ARs.63 However, 
Chan et al. (2003) find that investors are more likely to be over optimistic, and the 
market value of firms show weak predictability to the earning’s growth. In addition, 
Dong et al. (2006) indicate that Tobin’s Q also contains potential market misevaluation 
before the announcement and acquires’ stock prices tend to be revalued afterwards. 
Thus, the Tobin’s Q can be negatively correlated with announcement return if acquirers 
have been overvalued before the announcement.   
 
Following the previous studies (see, e.g. Almazan et al., 2010; Arikan and Stulz, 2016; 
Chan et al., 2003; Mantecon, 2008), we use Tobin’s Q as the proxies of growth 
opportunities. In addition, in order to overcome the weakness of Tobin’s Q (e.g. the 
inconsistent interpretation of Tobin’s Q), we also employ earning’s growth as second 
proxy of growth rate. 64  We adjust the inflation based on the sample company’s 
financial year when we estimate its earning’s growth. Compared to Tobin’s Q, earning’s 
growth has weaker correlation with firms’ market value. Thus, as a growth opportunity 
indicator, the earning’s growth may overcome the bias from market misevaluation.  
 
6.1.4 Leverage ratio 
 
In the previous studies, interpretations of the leverage ratio have been from two 
perspectives: free cash flow and defensive mechanism. The low debt usage (low 
leverage ratio) tends to be positively associated with free cash flow (see, e.g. Almazan 
et al., 2010) and target firms can use high leverage ratio to reduce the threat from hostile 
takeover (see, e.g. Garvey and Hanka, 1999).  
                                                   
63 The study tests the relationship between book to market ratio (BM) and ARs and find negative and a 
significant correlation. BM is likely to be negatively correlated with Tobin’s Q. Since we use Tobin’s 
Q, this implies a positive correlation between Tobin’s Q and acquirers’ ARs.  
64 We notice that some studies (see, e.g. Gorton et al., 2008) use asset growth as a proxy of growth 
rate. However, we suggest that the asset growth may also be influenced by retention rate and leverage. 
Thus, we suggest that the earning’s growth is a more valid proxy for the growth rate.  
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A large number of previous studies interpret acquirer’s leverage ratio from the free cash 
flow perspective. For instance, Jensen (1986) suggests that by issuing debt, managers 
are bonding their promise to pay-out future cash flows and thereby reduce the free cash 
available for spending on negative NPV projects. Masulis et al. (2007) apply the 
concept put forward by Jensen (1986) in the context of M&A and suggest that the cash 
flow slack depicted by low leverage ratio can incentivise managerial power and thereby 
increase the agency cost or hubris in the M&A. Edmans et al. (2012) also suggest that 
the high leverage ratio can reduce acquirers’ agency cost, and thereby reduce the share 
value discount in the M&A. McConnell and Servaes (1995), however, indicate that 
investors’ reaction to the leverage ratio should follow a dynamic model, which is 
determined by the growth opportunity of a firm. If a firm has low growth opportunity, 
in order to prevent the overinvestment, investors tend to appreciate high leverage 
structure. If firms have high growth opportunity, investors tend to appreciate low 
leverage to reduce the possibility of underinvestment. Applying this theory in the 
context of M&As, we may observe the negative effect of leverage ratio on 
announcement returns when investors expect high synergy or growth opportunities 
created by the M&As.   
 
Previous studies interpret the target leverage ratio from both defensive mechanism and 
agency cost perspectives. Chung et al. (2013) find that firms fail to take advantage from 
tax deductibility of interest expense with low leverage ratio tend to have strong agency 
costs. Thus, these firms are more likely to be the targets for takeovers. Garvey and 
Hanka (1999) indicate that firms can increase their leverage to reduce the threat from 
hostile takeover. Israel (1991) also indicates the target firms can increase their leverage 
to boost their bargaining power in the M&As. Even though target leverage ratio can be 
interpreted from two perspectives, both interpretations predict a negative correlation 
between target’s leverage ratio and acquirers’ return.  
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6.1.5 Dividend pay-out ratio 
 
Dividend payment can be interpreted from two perspectives. DeAngelo et al. (2004) 
and Floyd et al. (2015) indicate that dividend payments are often used as a more explicit 
signal showing the confidence in the future growth. Khatami et al. (2015) interpret 
dividend as a proxy of free cash flow. Edmans et al. (2012) further indicate that dividend 
payment ratio should mitigate the agency problems from the free cash flow perspective. 
Thus, investors should expect less agency cost in the M&As when acquirers have high 
dividend payment in the past.  
  
Following the previous studies, we employ the dividend pay-out ratio as the proxy of 
dividend payment. Notice that some previous studies (see, e.g. Lewellen, 2004) employ 
dividend yield to explain the stock returns. However, in our sample, we find that the 
dividend pay-out ratio and dividend yield have strong correlation. 65  In order to 
maintain the stability of our regression analysis, we only employ dividend pay-out ratio 
as the proxy of dividend payment. In addition, since the dividend yield and dividend 
pay-out ratio are highly correlated, excluding dividend yield should not lead to a 
significant decrease in the explanatory power of our regression.   
 
Notice that, as a financial characteristic indicator, dividend payment and its effect on 
announcement return tends to be ambiguous (see, e.g. Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013; 
Floyd et al., 2015). Firstly, there is still controversy on the reason why firms pay 
dividends. Secondly, the dividend change tends to be rather insensitive compared with 
other financial indicators.66 Thus, investors may prefer to use other ratios when they 
interpret the M&A announcements.  
 
                                                   
65 In an unreported test, we find that the correlation between dividend pay-out ratio and dividend yield 
is 0.76 for the US acquirers and 0.75 for the Japanese acquirers.  
66 For instance, Floyd et al. (2015) show that dividend per share tends to be insensitive to the change in 
the profitability of firms.  
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6.2 Control variables 
 
In section 6.1, we introduce the explanatory variables that we use in this chapter. In 
addition, we also point out that these variables can be interpreted from various 
perspectives. Thus, the relationship between our dependent variable and explanatory 
variables can be influenced by factors that can inspire investors to interpret the financial 
ratios from a certain perspective. In order to capture these factors, we employ acquirer-
target merger relationship, the relative size of the deal and the R&D expense as our 
control variables.  
 
6.2.1 Merger relationship with targets  
 
Doukas and Kan (2008) find that the profit reduction in core business encourages firm 
to acquire targets from unrelated industries to develop their business model. In contrast, 
if a firm experiences high profit and growth in its core business, they tend to initiate 
horizontal M&As to apply their competitive advantage in a larger scale. In the former 
scenario, the profitability and growth opportunity ratios tend to be interpreted as a 
threshold of initiating M&As and show negative correlation with announcement returns. 
In the later scenario, the profitability and growth ratios are more likely to be interpreted 
as the management efficiency and thereby positively correlated with announcement 
returns.   
 
Different to the horizontal and conglomerate M&As that motivated by business 
development, vertical M&As tend to be motivated by reducing the contract cost and 
cash flow uncertainty (Acemoglu et al., 2009; Beladi et al., 2013). Thus, firms with 
higher financial constraints may potentially experience higher benefit from vertical 
M&As. When investors price the vertical M&A announcements, they may use the free 
cash flow indicators (e.g. leverage or dividend pay-out ratio) to explain the motive of 
vertical M&As. Beladi et al. (2013) further suggest that the vertical M&As can benefit 
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the future expansion, and acquirers tend to experience more positive announcement 
returns after they initiate a vertical M&A. Thus, the vertical M&As may also influence 
the interpretation of the growth opportunity ratios.  
 
Consistent with our Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, we classify our M&A events into 
horizontal, vertical, conglomerate and increase of corporate control (ICC).  
  
6.2.2 Size effect 
 
Previous studies find that the size of acquirers and targets can be used to determine the 
bargaining power, agency cost and financial synergy. Thus, the size should also be able 
to influence the interpretation of the financial characteristics.   
 
As size can indicate the motives and risks for M&As (see, e.g. Humphery-Jenner and 
Powell, 2011; Alexandridis et al., 2013), we expect that investors may interpret the 
financial characteristic indicators in different ways. Following Fuller et al. (2002), we 
employ the relative size (deal value to acquirer’s total assets) as a control variable. The 
reason we use deal value instead of target asset value is because the majority of targets 
are not 100% acquired in our sample events. However, we notice that the relative size 
may not capture the potential agency cost and cost of restructuring as suggested by 
Moeller et al. (2004). Thus, we also employ acquirers’ total asset value and deal size as 
alternative measures of the size effect. We define the highest and lowest 30 percentiles 
as the high and low size.   
 
6.2.3 R&D spending of acquirers 
 
Higgins and Rodriguez (2006) find that acquirers’ pre-announcement R&D expense can 
help investors to determine the motive of M&As. They find that investors tend to 
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appreciate the M&A announcements when acquirers are lack of R&D resources and use 
M&As as a method of R&D outsourcing. Bena and Li (2014) and Phillips and Zhdanov 
(2012) also find that the large and mature firms tend to acquire high R&D spending 
targets to reduce their risk in the R&D competition. However, Eun et al. (1996) find 
that Japanese acquirers in R&D intensive environment experience significantly higher 
returns than acquirers from other countries. They suggest that the high R&D spending 
help Japanese firms to efficiently internalize the targets’ R&D assets.   
 
If we assume that the R&D expense of acquirers is not only influenced by their intention 
but their capability and industry environment, the R&D spending may also influence 
investors’ interpretation of acquirers’ financial characteristics. When acquirers are not 
capable to invest in R&D to redevelop their existing business, the low profitability and 
growth rate may be interpreted as a low cost of capital. Investors may expect the low-
profit firms to initiate M&As to seek the opportunity to redevelop their business. On 
the other hand, if a firm is capable to invest in R&D, its high profitability and growth 
rate may be interpreted as the outcomes of the successful R&D investments. In which 
case, investors may expect acquirers to transfer the R&D resources to targets. Thus, 
when acquirers have high R&D expense, their profitability ratio should have a positive 
correlation with their announcement returns.     
 
In this study, we measure the R&D by using two methods. The first method is to scale 
the acquirer’s R&D expense by their total revenue. We suggest that the revenue may 
be a better proxy of the size of the current business than total assets. Thus, the R&D 
expense to total revenue can show the scale of R&D input in the acquirers’ current 
business.67 The second method is to scale the acquirer’s R&D expense by deal value. 
                                                   
67 Due to the fact that R&D intensity varies across different industries, we should expect that firms in 
different industries have different R&D expenses. In addition, in R&D intensive industries, a less R&D 
intensive firm may still show a higher amount of R&D spending compared to firms in the less R&D 
intensive industries. However, as we cannot find the average R&D expenses for each industry, we are 
not able to classify the relative high and low R&D expense based on the industry average. In the 
absence of industry characteristics, our classification of high and low R&D spending may contain 
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If we assume that acquirers can transfer their R&D results to targets’ business, this 
measurement of R&D may show the potential synergy created by acquirers’ R&D. We 
use 30 percentiles to define the high and low R&D cost.  
  
6.3 Measurement of announcement returns and regression model 
 
Following Eun et al. (1996), we measure the announcement returns by SCARs over a 
3-day window (i.e. from -1 day to the announcement to 1 day after the announcement).68 
The 3-day window can capture the pre-announcement anticipations and the delayed 
responses. Notice that, in Chapter 4, we show that ARs outside the -1 and +1 day range 
can still be significant. Consistent with the previous chapters, our SCARs are estimated 
using F-F-C four-factor CAPM, and standardized by the standard deviation of ARs over 
the estimation period.  
 
We employ the following regression model for coefficient estimation:  
 
SCAR(−1.1) = α + β1(𝐸𝑃𝑆) + β2(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑠𝑠 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓ⅈ𝑡 − 𝑡𝑜 − 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) + β3 (𝑇𝑜𝑏ⅈ𝑛𝑠
′𝑄) +
β4 (𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑛ⅈ𝑛𝑔
′𝑠 𝑔𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ) + β5(𝑙𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒) + β6(𝑑ⅈ𝑣ⅈ𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑝𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑢𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡ⅈ𝑜)+µ 
 
(6.1) 
The explanatory variables in Eq. (6.1) are the important ratios that investors commonly 
use in assessing firm performance (see, e.g. Bessembinder and Zhang, 2013; Floyd et 
al., 2015; Huang et al., 2014). The regression analysis is performed under least square 
                                                   
weaknesses. However, we also suggest that to employ the industry average R&D may also contain 
weaknesses. In Chapter 4, we find that acquirers in the high technology industries tend to experience 
higher ARs during the announcement period. Thus, investor response to the industry characteristics can 
also be a proxy of the R&D spending. For this reason, we cannot justify whether the relative R&D 
spending (based on industry average) is better than our method.  
68 Although some studies (see, e.g. Masulis et al., 2007) use -2 to +2 window to capture the 
announcement effect, the majority of studies (see, e.g. Mantecon, 2009) tend to use -1 to +1 window 
that may reduce biasness due to market noise.  
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method. In order to address the potential autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity in the 
error terms, we have employed Newey-West procedure for our OLS models.     
 
6.4 Data  
 
The financial data of acquirers and targets are captured from DataStream. Following 
the previous studies, the financial characteristics are measured based on yearly data.69 
In order to explain the investor behaviour during the announcement period, we use a 
lag of one year of the financial ratios.70 We find that some firms in our sample initiate 
multiple M&As in a single financial year. In order to avoid the duplication of 
explanatory variables, we only include the first M&A of any given year in our sample. 
As a result, we have 363 listed US firms acquiring the Japanese targets during 1990 to 
2015, of which 54 Japanese targets are listed. We have 617 listed Japanese firms 
acquiring the US targets during 1991 to 2013 where 102 US targets are listed.  
 
As our M&A samples are across 1990 to 2015, we notice that the EPS can be 
significantly affected by inflation. Thus, we adjust the EPS by using the local consumer 
price index (CPI) to the base year. In addition, as our test is designed to explain how 
investors’ perception of synergy is influenced by pre-announcement financial 
characteristics, we assume that investors in acquirer’s country are less likely to measure 
the profitability of acquirer based on target country’s currency. We also convert the 
targets’ EPS to the acquirers’ local currency to tolerate the influence from the short-run 
volatility of currency market. Following Danbolt and Maciver (2012), we use 12-month 
average exchange rate prior to date of the M&A announcement as our exchange rate 
                                                   
69 In the DataStream, most financial data is obtained from annual reports. However, EPS is computed 
based on the quarterly period and dividend is based on half-yearly period. In this case, we will convert 
the quarterly and half-yearly data to annually base on the financial year end of each company.   
70 We assume that the announcement return should not be affected by the financial information 
published after the M&A announcement. In other words, we expect that corporate insiders cannot 
determine the announcement returns.  
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measurement period.   
 
6.5 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Table 6.5.1 provides the descriptive statistics of the samples of the US and Japanese 
acquirers and targets. Notice that, due to the data missing in the DataStream, we cannot 
report the Japanese targets’ leverage ratios and dividend pay-out ratios in our test.71 
  
Panel A and B show the CARs and SCARs of the US and Japanese acquirers. We find 
that the SCARs are significant and positive in Panel A and Panel B. Even though Kolari 
and Pynnonen (2010) suggest that SCARs should show a better statistical property over 
CARs, our results are mixed. We find that the Jarque-Bera test of SCARs is insignificant 
for Japanese acquirers, and it is significant for the US acquirers.72 Panel C to F show 
the firm characteristics of the US and Japanese bidders and targets. We find that the 
Jarque-Bera statistic is significant for most measures.      
 
                                                   
71 This sample size is smaller than the ones used in the previous chapters. There are two reasons lead 
to reduce the sample size. Firstly, to match the annual financial data we employed, we only include the 
first M&A if the acquirers initiate multiple M&As in a year. Secondly, we find that some financial data 
of the acquirers are not available from DataStream.    
72 Notice that the significance test is only based on the t-statistic of the SCARs, which is the standard 
BMP t-statistic test. As is indicated by Kolari and Pynnonen (2010), the BMP t-statistic can over reject 
the null hypothesis due to presence of cross-sectional correlation. Jarque-Bera confirms that the 
observations are not normally distributed. This means that t-statistic can be biased. However, the study 
in this Chapter is mainly focusing on the relationship between the financial characteristics and SCARs.  
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Table 6.5.1 Summery statistics                                                                   
Variable Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Jarque-Bera 
Panel A: The US Acquirer CARs   
CARS-1,1 0.1901c 0.1348 11.0649 -16.3899 2.1131 2506.859a 
SCARS-1,1 0.0918b 0.0905 3.0566 -4.4821 0.8357 353.9963a 
Panel B: The Japanese Acquirer CARs 
CARs-1,1 0.2307a 0.1844 9.2724 -11.2068 1.7552 830.863a  
SCARs-1,1 0.1130a 0.1165 2.0867 -2.0654 0.6413 1.535  
Panel C: The US Acquirers Characteristics 
EPS ($) 1.167 1.095 4.536 -3.908 1.285 16.399a  
Gross profit-to-assets 0.256 0.247 0.757 -0.353 0.157 16.792a  
Tobin’s Q 1.115 1.090 5.387 -0.217 0.631 478.656a  
Earning’s growth -0.084 -0.068 1.025 -1.150 0.206 1052.263a 
LEVERAGE 0.319 0.344 0.813 0.000 0.177 4.059  
Dividend pay-out 0.243 0.160 0.933 0.000 0.267 39.461a  
Panel D: The Japanese Acquirers Characteristics 
EPS (¥) 333.016 118.066 0.029ml 0.228 1552.103 2.061ml 
Gross profit-to-assets 0.252 0.218 1.133 0.003 0.169 713.298a  
Tobin’s Q 2.207 1.562 44.564 0.350 2.995 0.224mla 
Earning’s growth 0.001 0.000 0.260 -0.019 0.011 6.10mla 
LEVERAGE 0.427 0.450 0.968 0.000 0.256 21.010a  
Dividend pay-out 0.280 0.249 0.982 0.000 0.210 73.232a  
Panel E: The US Targets Characteristics 
EPS (¥) 335.411 248.311 8155.627 0.557 849.689 23710a 
Gross profit-to-assets 0.304 0.266 1.004 -0.467 0.216 30.504a  
Tobin’s Q 1.206 1.564 18.378 0.525 11.218 23970a 
Earning’s growth 0.051 0.000 1.592 -0.571 0.307 442.179a  
LEVERAGE 0.363 0.311 4.171 0.000 0.462 9631.681a  
Dividend pay-out 0.140 0.000 0.761 0.000 0.226 27.367a  
Panel F: The Japanese Targets Characteristics 
EPS ($) 3.054 0.705 110.912 0.032 15.274 5463.280a  
Gross profit-to-assets 0.293 0.247 1.277 -0.004 0.198 306.004a  
Tobin’s Q 3.878 1.719 79.470 0.323 10.969 4457.408a  
Earning’s growth 0.000 0.000 0.011 -0.013 0.004 3220.193a  
The sample consists of 363 US-JP M&As (US acquirers bid Japanese targets) and 617 JP-US M&As. All the M&As are initiated 
between 1990 and 2015 and covered by DataStream database. ml denotes million. 
 
In panel C to F, EPS tends to have larger standard deviation than other ratios, perhaps 
because the EPS is not scaled by firm size. Note that EPS for Japanese acquirers is 
higher than EPS for US targets is because the measures are not in the same currency.  
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Table 6.5.2 presents the shows the Spearman ranked-order correlations. EPS and gross 
profit-to-assets are negatively correlation in (see, Panels A, C and D). This result may 
be due to the clean nature of gross profit-to-assets relative to EPS as it is based on a 
residual measure.  
 
In theory, the profitability ratios should be negatively correlated with leverage, as high 
profitable firms have higher cash flows and have less need for external financing. In 
Panels A and C, however, we find that the EPS has a positive correlation with the 
leverage ratio, whereas the gross profit-to-assets has a negative correlation with the 
leverage. The inconsistent relationship between profitability and leverage ratio should 
also be resulted by the noise in EPS and/or the effects of discretionary items on some 
of the measures. 
  
The earning’s growth is negatively correlated with gross profit-to-assets in Panel A, but 
positively correlated with gross profit-to-assets in Panel C. The inconsistent correlation 
may show the different retained profit of the US and Japanese acquirers in the year 
before the announcement. The result may imply that the US acquirers are more likely 
to use their profit to increase their total assets, whereas Japanese acquirers tend to 
distribute their earnings to shareholders.  
 
The Tobin’s Q in Panel A shows significant correlation with gross profit-to-assets but 
insignificant correlation with earning’s growth. The result may imply that the US 
investors tend to use current profitability ratios instead of the earning’s growth ratio to 
anticipate the growth opportunities. In Panel B, we find that the Tobin’s Q is 
significantly correlated with both gross profit-to-assets and earning’s growth ratios. The 
result suggests that Japanese investors have different interpretation of the earning’s 
growth. 
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Table 6.5.2 Spearman rank correlation estimates for measures 
The sample consists of 363 US acquirers and 53 Japanese targets in the US-JP M&As (US acquirers bid Japanese targets), and 617 Japanese acquirers and 93 US targets in the JP-US M&As. t-
statistic are shown in parentheses. a, b, and c stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. Variable definitions are in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: The US acquirers 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel C: The US targets 
 
 
 
 
 
  
EPS 
Gross profit-to-
assets 
Tobin's Q 
Earning's 
growth 
Leverage     EPS 
Gross profit-to-
assets 
Tobin's Q 
Earning's 
growth 
Leverage  
Gross profit-to-assets -0.350a       Gross profit-to-assets -0.164      
 (-7.08)        (-1.58)      
Tobin's Q 0.018  0.310a      Tobin's Q 0.229b  0.047     
 (0.34)  (6.19)       (2.24)  (0.44)     
Earning's growth 0.222a  -0.187a  -0.068     Earning's growth 0.188c  -0.064  0.162    
 (4.33)  (-3.61)  (-1.29)      (1.82)  (-0.60)  (1.56)    
Leverage  0.263a  -0.502a  0.062  0.148a    Leverage  0.239a  -0.155  -0.156  0.127   
 (5.18)  (-11.02)  (1.17)  (2.85)     (2.34)  (-1.49)  (-1.50)  (1.21)   
Dividend pay-out ratio 0.178a  -0.068  -0.032  -0.012  0.175a   Dividend pay-out ratio 0.294a  0.292a  0.272a  0.165  0.162  
  (3.43)  (-1.29)  (-0.61)  (-0.23)  (3.37)     (2.91)  (2.90)  (2.68)  (1.59)  (1.55)  
             
Panel B: Japanese acquirers 
 
 
 
 
 
 Panel D: Japanese targets 
 
 
 
 
 
  
EPS 
Gross profit-to-
assets 
Tobin's Q 
Earning's 
growth 
Leverage     EPS 
Gross profit-to-
assets 
Tobin's Q 
Earning's 
growth 
Leverage  
Gross profit-to-assets 0.150a           Gross profit-to-assets -0.302b          
 (3.77)        (-2.24)      
Tobin's Q 0.019  0.148a      Tobin's Q 0.116  -0.062     
 (0.46)  (3.71)       (0.83)  (-0.44)     
Earning's growth -0.002  0.130a  0.108a     Earning's growth 0.118  0.054  -0.220    
 (-0.05)  (3.24)  (2.70)      (0.84)  (0.38)  (-1.60)    
Leverage  -0.279a  -0.524a  0.032  -0.055    Leverage  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
 (-7.21)  (-15.24)  (0.81)  (-1.36)     n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  
Dividend pay-out ratio -0.032  0.080b  -0.100a  -0.090b  -0.074c   Dividend pay-out ratio n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
  (-0.79)  (2.00)  (-2.49)  (-2.25)  (-1.83)     n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
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The dividend pay-out ratio in Panel A is positively correlated with the leverage ratio, 
which is against the theory that the dividend pay-out ratio may be related with the free 
cash flow status of a firm (see, e.g. Edmas et al., 2012; Khatami et al., 2015). This result 
may explain the reason why dividend pay-out ratio of the US acquirers show 
insignificant explanatory power to the announcement returns. 
6.6 The US acquirers’ financial characteristics and announcement returns 
 
In this section, we test the correlation between the US acquirer’s financial ratios and 
their announcement returns. Table 6.6.1 reports the regressions results associated with 
the US acquirers. The dependent variable is the 3 days SCARs from day t=-1 to day t=1 
(day 0 is the announcement day). In the regression model (1), we report the coefficients 
based on full sample size. We report the coefficients separately controlling for the low 
and high R&D expense to earning in model (2) and model (3), respectively. We report 
the coefficients separately for the low and high R&D expense to the deal values in 
model (4) and model (5), respectively. The Jarque-Bera statistic is significant across all 
five models. This indicates that the parameter estimates are not efficient although they 
are BLUE.  
 
In model 1, the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is positive and significant. The result suggests 
that the US acquirers with high growth opportunities tend to experience positive 
announcement returns. Our result is consistent with early M&A studies (see, e.g. Lang 
et al., 1989; Servaes, 1991) showing that the high Tobin’s Q acquirers tend to 
experience high announcement returns. In contrast, our result is inconsistent with more 
recent studies (see, e.g. Bhagat et al., 2005; Masulis et al., 2007) which suggest the 
insignificant or even negative correlation between Tobin’s Q and CARs. It might be 
because in later domestic M&As, more acquirers can finance the M&A with their 
overvalued stocks. Thus, the M&A announcement can lead the investors to justify 
acquirers’ stock prices. As we find that most cross-border M&As are financed by cash, 
investors are less likely to analyse the overvaluation of acquirers’ stock price when they 
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analyse the M&A announcements. This might be the reason why our result is more 
consistent with earlier M&A studies.  
 
Surprisingly, we find that the coefficients for the two profitability ratios are 
insignificant. Our result is in line with Golubov et al. (2015), who find the profit of 
acquirers is insignificantly correlated with CARs. The result can be explained by its 
joint information signalling of management efficiency and the free cash flow holding. 
 
Table 6.6.1 Regression controlling for R&D expense 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
 Overall sample Low R&D 
to revenue  
High R&D to 
revenue 
Low R&D to 
deal value 
High R&D to 
deal value 
EPS -0.110 -0.766 -0.007 -0.004 0.070 
 (0.12) (0.46) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) 
Gross profit-to-assets -0.091 0.513 0.005c 0.289 0.543 
 (1.60) (0.67) (0.00) (0.75) (0.94) 
Tobin's Q 0.368b 0.086 -0.003c 0.143 0.097 
 (0.17) (0.13) (0.00) (0.11) (0.07) 
Earning’s growth -0.071 -0.576c 0.005 0.285 -1.245 
 (0.49) (0.33) (0.00) (0.48) (1.36) 
Leverage 0.026 1.095b 0.004 0.827c 0.793 
 (0.65) (0.43) (0.00) (0.49) (0.87) 
Dividend pay-out -0.543 0.134 0.000 -0.282 0.448 
 (0.53) (0.28) (0.00) (0.67) (0.44) 
Intercept -0.046 -0.603b -0.267 -0.875 -1.430b 
 (0.63) (0.30) (0.20) (0.53) (0.70) 
Observations 363 90 90 40 40 
Adjusted R2 0.296 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Jarque-Bera 1058.75a 171.62a 170.51a 10.44a 111.94a 
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) of the regression 6.1. The sample consists of 363 US-
JP M&As between 1990 to 2015. The dependent variable is the bidder’s 3 days SCARs as a percentage. a, b, and c stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
Model 2 shows that the coefficients for the two profitability ratios are not significant. 
As Bena and Li (2014) and Phillips and Zhdanov (2013) find that the low R&D 
intensive firms tend to be mature and large firms, the free cash flow is more likely to 
be interpreted as agency cost instead of a provision of underinvestment. This may 
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explain why profitability ratios show insignificant coefficients. The significant and 
positive coefficient of leverage ratio may also confirm this point of view. Model 3 
shows that the gross profit-to-assets ratio is positively correlated with SCARs. It may 
suggest that when high R&D spending firms initiate M&As, investors interpret the 
existing level of profitability as a positive performance indicator. the insignificant 
coefficients for leverage and dividend pay-out ratio indicate that investors do not 
consider free cash flow to impact on the M&A value. 
 
Surprisingly, we find that the growth opportunity ratios show significant and negative 
effect in both model 2 and model 3. The result implies that the growth opportunity is 
more likely to be interpreted as a substitute of M&A regardless of the R&D intensity of 
acquirers. However, this result is against the threshold hypothesis proposed by Doukas 
and Kan (2008). When low R&D acquirers experience low growth, investors should 
appreciate M&A as a method of R&D outsourcing. Alternatively, when acquirers have 
high R&D expense, their growth opportunity may be resulted from their R&D output 
and should be positively correlated with the value creation from the M&As. Thus, the 
coefficients of growth opportunity ratios for high R&D acquirers should either be 
positive or insignificant. One of the possible explanations is that investors may 
overvalue the high R&D acquirers. Thus, the premium of their stock value reduces 
when acquirers announce the M&A.  
  
In model 4 and 5, we find that the coefficients of most financial ratios are insignificant. 
The only significant coefficient is the leverage ratio in model 4. Consistent with model 
2, the significant and positive coefficient of leverage ratio may suggest that investors 
expect low R&D acquirers to have strong agency motives. Overall, the insignificant 
results imply that R&D to deal value cannot determine the potential synergistic effect 
of the M&As.  
  
Table 6.6.2 reports the coefficients of financial ratios by controlling the size effect. 
Table 6.6.2 reports the regression coefficients separately for the high and low relative 
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size between acquirers’ total assets and deal value, high and low acquirer’s asset value 
and high and low deal value in model (1) to model (6), respectively.73  
  
In model 1, we find that all coefficients are insignificant. In model 2, the coefficient 
EPS is significant and positive. This result is in line with Alexandridis et al. (2013), 
who indicate that the small target size can reduce post-acquisition restructuring costs 
and allow acquirers to transfer their corporate resources to targets more easily. Thus, 
high profitable acquirers can experience higher value increases after the integration. In 
addition, we find the earning’s growth in model 2 shows significant and negative effect 
on SCARs. When the relative size of a target is small, the M&A may be interpreted as 
an alternative choice of internal growth. Thus, the earning’s growth can be a threshold 
of initiating M&As. 
 
In both model 1 and model 2, the coefficients of the leverage ratio and dividend pay-
out ratio are insignificant. The result implies that the relative size can only capture the 
size effect that associates with synergy but cannot capture the size effect associates with 
management entrenchment. In order to test the relationship between size effect and 
investor’s interpretation of management entrenchment, we further employ acquirers’ 
asset values and deal values to separate our sample group.  
 
In model 3, we find that the coefficient of EPS is significant and positive, but the 
coefficient of gross profit-to-assets is negative. Thus, the significant coefficient of EPS 
can be partially affected by the noise exists in EPS. 
 
                                                   
73 Model 1 and 2 have more observations than model 3 and 4. It is because some M&As do not 
announce the deal value but we still can find the acquirers’ total asset value.  
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Table 6.6.2 Regression controlling for size effect 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 High Rev. 
value 
Low Rev. 
value 
High asset 
value 
Low asset 
value  
High deal 
value 
Low deal 
value 
EPS 0.000 0.016a 0.005a 0.014a 0.005 0.029b 
 (0.01)  (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) 
Gross profit-to-assets 0.124 1.042 -0.189 0.804a 0.200 0.725 
 (0.66)  (0.71) (0.42) (0.16) (0.86)  (0.59) 
Tobin's Q 0.183 -0.066 0.083a 0.034b 0.068 0.011 
 (0.19)  (0.21) (0.03) (0.01) (0.04)  (0.06) 
Earning’s growth 0.205 -1.637a 0.839 0.774a 0.004 0.729 
 (0.41)  (0.45) (0.85) (0.07) (0.44)  (0.51) 
Leverage 0.354 0.282 1.032b 0.191 0.586 0.323 
 (0.44)  (0.48) (0.43) (0.13) (0.73)  (0.38) 
Dividend pay-out  0.111 0.148 0.153 -0.380c -0.053 0.182 
 (0.46)  (0.25) (0.21) (0.22) (0.39)  (0.32) 
Intercept -0.489 -0.578c -1.023a -0.375a -0.677 -0.352 
 (0.40)  (0.35) (0.28) (0.09) (0.47)  (0.39) 
Observations 72 72 121 121 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.181 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Jarque-Bera 118.22a 1.59 0.73 188.88a 31.28a 173.26a 
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) of the regression 6.1. The sample consists of US-JP 
M&As between 1990 and 2015. The dependent variable is bidder’s 3 days SCARs as a percentage. a, b, and c stand for statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
In Model 4, the coefficients of both the EPS and gross profit-to-assets are significant 
and positive. The result is consistent with the size effect shown in the study of Moeller 
et al. (2004), who indicate that M&As initiated by small firms are more likely to gain 
synergistic effect and the acquirers are less likely to suffer from management hubris. In 
model 3, we find that the coefficient of leverage ratio is significant and positive. In 
addition, in model 4, we find that the coefficient of dividend pay-out ratio is significant 
and negative. If we assume both leverage ratio and dividend pay-out ratio are associated 
with free cash flow (see, Jensen, 1986), the two results are also in line with size effect 
hypothesis.74 When acquirers have large asset value, the M&A announcement returns 
                                                   
74 We notice that our interpretation has a weakness. If both leverage and dividend pay-out ratio are the 
proxy of free cash flow, then we should see two ratios have significant coefficients in model 3 and 
model 4. Our results might imply that the leverage ratio and dividend pay-out ratio have different 
explanatory power when firms are of different sizes. In this case, when a firm is large, the leverage 
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may be reduced with the potential cost of over-investments. Thus, the acquirers with 
low free cash flow (high leverage ratio) tend to experience higher SCARs. When 
acquirers have small asset values, where acquirers can be benefit from less management 
hubris and high synergy, investors may require acquirers to hold more free cash flow to 
prevent under-investment. The coefficients of Tobin’s Q are significant and positive in 
both model 3 and model 4. This result indicates that investors always give positive 
response to the high growth opportunity US acquirers regardless their size.  
 
Table 6.6.3 reports the regression results controlling for the type of bidder-targets 
merger relationship. It reports the regression coefficients separately for the horizontal 
M&As, vertical M&As, conglomerate M&As and increase of corporate control (ICC) 
in model 1 to model 4, respectively.   
 
We find that the financial ratios cannot explain the acquirer returns in the horizontal 
and ICC acquisitions. It may be because in horizontal and ICC M&As, synergy may be 
a more important determinant than the potential agency cost, and thereby investors do 
not use financial ratios to anticipate the M&A outcomes.  
 
The coefficient of Tobin’s Q is positive and significant in model 2. The coefficient of 
dividend pay-out ratio is also significant but negative. The two results are in line with 
the empirical evidence of Acemoglu et al. (2009) and Beladi et al. (2013) suggesting 
that the vertical M&A reduces cash flow uncertainty and lower the barrier for future 
investments in the target country. Thus, vertical M&As may create more value for the 
acquirers with higher growth opportunities and investors may support acquirers to 
retain more cash for the future investments.   
 
Model 3 shows that the coefficient of Tobin's Q is significant and negative. This result 
                                                   
ratio is a better proxy for free cash flow than dividend pay-out ratio, and vice versa. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, there is no study that discusses the explanatory power of free cash flow proxies 
when firms have different sizes.  
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is in line with Doukas and Kan (2008), who indicate that the reduction in growth 
opportunity encourages firms to initiate conglomerate M&As. In addition, we find that 
the leverage ratio shows positive and significant effect in the conglomerate M&As. As 
Moeller, et al. (2005) suggest that conglomerate M&As can be motivated by empire 
building, our result may suggest that investors use leverage ratio to identify the agency 
cost of acquirers on conglomerate M&As. We suggest that the joint effect of 
conglomerate M&A announcement explains the inconsistent empirical evidence in the 
studies of Moeller et al. (2005) and Villalonga (2004) as both studies have not 
controlled the financial characteristics of acquirers.75  
 
Table 6.6.3 Regression controlling for acquirers-targets relationship  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate ICC  
EPS 0.001 -0.081 -0.003 -0.001 
 (0.00) (0.10) (0.01) (0.01) 
Gross profit-to-asset 0.084 2.066 0.231 0.036 
 (0.53) (1.44) (0.65) (0.47) 
Tobin's Q -0.007 1.097b -0.005a 0.011 
 (0.02) (0.54) (0.00) (0.04) 
Earning’s growth 0.067 -0.725 -0.482 0.272 
 (0.50) (0.98) (0.61) (0.35) 
Leverage 0.517 -0.927 0.938c 0.178 
 (0.43) (1.22) (0.54) (0.35) 
Dividend pay-out 0.120 -5.277a -0.151 0.108 
 (0.28) (1.11) (0.22) (0.21) 
Intercept -0.249 -1.922 -0.218 0.010 
 (0.27) (1.55) (0.31) (0.29) 
Observations 70 115 88 90 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.009 0.000 
Jarque-Bera 29.91a 286.45a 6.45b 0.46 
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) of the regression 6.1. The sample consists of 363 US-
JP M&As between 1990 and 2015. The dependent variable is the bidder’s 3 days SCARs as a percentage. a, b, and c stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
                                                   
75 Moeller et al. (2005) find that the cross-border M&As with industry diversifications destroy 
acquirers’ values whereas Villalonga (2004) find that acquirers’ stock values change insignificantly 
after the diversification M&As.  
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6.7 Japanese acquirers’ characteristics and announcement returns 
 
In this section, we test how Japanese acquirers’ financial ratios can explain their 
announcement returns. Consistent with the tests in section 6.6, we use a similar research 
design as in the case of US acquirers. Table 6.7.1 reports the regressions results 
separately for overall sample, firms with low and high R&D expense to revenue and 
firms with low and high R&D expense to deal value in model (1) to model (5), 
respectively.  
 
Table 6.7.1 Regression controlling for R&D expense  
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) 
 Overall sample Low R&D to 
revenue 
High R&D to 
revenue 
Low R&D to 
deal value 
High R&D to 
deal value 
EPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gross profit-to-asset -0.198b 0.249 0.481 0.121 -0.587 
 (0.08) (1.93)  (1.44) (0.51) (0.58) 
Tobin's Q 0.000 -0.029 0.080c 0.020 0.037 
 (0.00) (0.16)  (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) 
Earning’s growth -1.727b -30.67b 36.77 -1.032 4.759 
 (0.79) (12.33)  (22.91) (9.89) (5.36) 
Leverage -0.045 2.122c 0.749 -0.119 -0.644c 
 (0.08) (1.21)  (0.70) (0.35) (0.34) 
Dividend pay-out -0.251a -0.643 -0.628a -0.267 -0.013 
 (0.08) (0.55)  (0.15) (0.47) (0.38) 
Intercept 0.255a -0.554 -0.303 0.239 0.501c 
 (0.06) (0.81)  (0.49) (0.27) (0.27) 
Observations 617 144 144 160 160 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.000 0.033 0.000 0.170 
Jarque-Bera 1.79 152.79a 57.23a 0.59 0.53 
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) of the regression 6.1. The sample consists of 617 JP-
US M&As between 1990 to 2015. The dependent variable is Japanese acquirers ’s 3 days SCARs in percentage. a, b, and c stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The coefficients of gross profit-to-assets and earning’s growth reported in model 1 are 
significant and negative. This result is consistent with the US acquirers (see, table 6.6.1) 
and suggests that the profitability and growth opportunity are likely to be interpreted as 
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thresholds for the Japanese acquirers. The coefficient of the dividend pay-out ratio is 
also negative and significant. The result may suggest that investors show more positive 
response to the Japanese acquirers who hold higher amount of free cash. Compare with 
the insignificant coefficients of the leverage ratio and dividend pay-out ratio in table 
6.6.1, the result implies that cross-border M&A can create higher growth opportunity 
for Japanese acquirers than the US acquirers.  
 
In model 2, the coefficient of earning’s growth is significant and negative. In addition, 
the coefficient of leverage ratio is significant and positive. This result is consistent with 
the coefficients in model 2 of table 6.6.1. The significant and negative coefficient of the 
earning’s growth may imply that investors appreciate low R&D acquirers to initiate 
M&As to realize further growth. In addition, the positive and significant coefficient of 
leverage ratio suggests that the low R&D acquirers may have high agency cost. 
  
In model 3, the coefficient of Tobin’s Q is significant and positive. The negative 
coefficient of earning’s growth in model 2 and the positive coefficient of Tobin’s Q in 
model 3 can be explained by the threshold hypothesis (see, Doukas and Kan, 2008). 
When firms have high R&D costs, their growth opportunities are no longer interpreted 
as a threshold of the M&A but the outcome of their R&D expenses and the increase in 
the synergy effect. In model 3, the coefficient of dividend pay-out ratio is negative and 
significant. The result suggests that investors may believe high R&D firms have low 
agency costs and low R&D firms have high agency costs (i.e. the positive and 
significant coefficient of leverage ratio in model 2). Notice that, the R&D intensity 
should not be a proxy of firm size (as some studies may assume that large and mature 
firms may not want to participate in R&D competition). It is because in the following 
section, we show that Japanese investors are less likely to anticipate the agency costs 
based on the size effect.  
 
In model 4 and model 5, when we measure the R&D expense by R&D to deal size 
instead of R&D to total revenue, the explanatory variables become less effective to 
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explain SCARs. This result is consistent with the result in model 4 and model 5 in table 
6.6.1.  
 
Table 6.7.2 reports the regression results controlled by the size effect. The table reports 
the regression coefficients separately for the high and low relative size between 
acquirers’ total assets and deal value, high and low acquirer’s asset value and high and 
low deal value in model (1) to model (6), respectively.  
 
Table 6.7.2 Regression controlling for size effect 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) Model (5) Model (6) 
 High Rev. 
value 
Low Rev. 
value 
High asset 
value 
Low asset 
value  
High deal 
value 
Low deal 
value 
EPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gross profit-to-assets -0.676 -0.521 -1.014 0.166 -0.676 -0.244 
 (0.42) (0.39) (1.05) (1.00) (0.42) (0.52) 
Tobin's Q 0.022 -0.019 0.090b 0.072a 0.022 -0.021 
 (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.03) 
Earning’s growth 6.880 2.562 -1.683 -1.759 6.880 2.899 
 (17.26) (4.41) (7.43) (23.75) (17.26) (4.57) 
Leverage -0.325 -0.140 0.355 -0.467 -0.325 0.001 
 (0.31) (0.21) (0.66) (1.18) (0.31) (0.25) 
Dividend pay-out  -0.340 -0.304 -1.012a 0.465 -0.340 0.306 
 (0.32) (0.25) (0.30) (0.34) (0.32) (0.28) 
Intercept 0.582c 0.447b 0.162 -0.163 0.582c 0.157 
 (0.31) (0.19) (0.47) (0.59) (0.31) (0.22) 
Observations 108 108 206 206 108 108 
Adjusted R2 0.008 0.000 0.058 0.000 0.008 0.000 
Jarque-Bera 2.86 0.94 6.51b 704.62a 2.86 0.30 
The table reports the coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) of the regression 6.1. The sample consists of 617 JP-
US M&As between 1990 and 2015. The dependent variable is the bidder’s 3 days SCARs as a percentage. a, b, and c stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
The coefficients of Tobin’s Q are significant in both model 3 and model 4. The result 
suggests that acquirer’s size does not influence investor’s interpretation of the growth 
opportunity. This finding is consistent with the results of table 6.6.2. In model 3, the 
coefficient of dividend pay-out ratio is negative and significant. In model 4, both 
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coefficients of leverage and dividend pay-out ratio are insignificant. The result suggests 
that Japanese investors may think the large acquirers have low agency cost. The result 
is opposite with table 6.6.2. This may be because the close interaction between large 
Japanese firms and their banks (the main bank system) lead to investor’s confidence to 
the large Japanese firms (see, e.g. Pinkowitz and Williamson, 2001; Kand et al., 2000).   
 
Table 6.7.3 reports the regression results controlling for the type of bidder-target merger 
relationship. It reports the regression coefficients separately for the horizontal, vertical, 
conglomerate and increase corporate control in Model 1 to Model 4.  
  
Table 6.7.3 Japanese acquirers’ return controlled by type of relationship 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 Horizontal Vertical Conglomerate Increase control  
EPS 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gross profit-to-assets -0.376 0.172b -1.544 0.066 
 (0.30) (0.08) (1.62) (1.15) 
Tobin's Q -0.014 0.024a -0.053 -0.072 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.05) (0.07) 
Earning’s growth 13.70 6.465b -15.67c -14.28 
 (16.13) (3.00) (8.06) (71.04) 
Leverage 0.083 0.150 0.090 -0.040 
 (0.23) (0.10) (0.72) (0.59) 
Dividend pay-out -0.254 -0.235c -1.039a -0.560 
 (0.27) (0.13) (0.27) (0.46) 
Intercept 0.386c -0.000 0.915 0.368 
 (0.21) (0.07) (0.64) (0.53) 
Observations 99 221 250 47 
Adjusted R2 0.000 0.001 0.089 0.000 
Jarque-Bera 8.84a 0.05 133.72a 0.13 
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) of the regression 6.1. The sample consists of 617 JP-
US M&As between 1990 and 2015. The dependent variable is the bidder’s 3 days SCARs as a percentage. a, b, and c stand for 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
All coefficients in model 1 and model 4 are insignificant. This result is consistent with 
the results in table 6.6.3, and indicates that the financial characteristics of acquirers 
cannot explain their SCARs in the horizontal and ICC M&As.   
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In model 2, the coefficients of gross profit-to-assets, Tobin’s Q and earning’s growth 
are significant and positive. In addition, we find that the coefficient of dividend pay-
out ratio is significant and negative. This result is consistent with the result in table 6.63 
suggesting that investors give more positive response to the acquirers with high 
profitability and growth opportunity when they initiate vertical M&As. As Acemoglu 
et al. (2009) and Beladi et al. (2013) suggested in their studies, vertical M&As can 
reduce the cash flow uncertainty and increase future investment opportunities. Thus, 
this type of M&As can create highest value for acquirers with high cash flow 
(profitability) and growth opportunities.  
 
In model 3, we find that the coefficient of earning’s growth is significant and negative. 
This result is in line with Doukas and Kan (2008) who suggest that the profit reduction 
encourages acquirers to initiate conglomerate M&As. We also find that the coefficient 
of dividend pay-out ratio is significant and negative. This result matches the implication 
of the negative earning’s growth coefficient, and implies that investors encourage 
conglomerate acquirers to hold more cash for the future investments. On the other hand, 
the coefficient of dividend pay-out ratio has an opposite implication to that of the US 
investor’s behaviour, where the leverage ratio of the US conglomerate acquirers has 
significant and negative coefficient (see, table 6.6.3). The result may suggest that 
Japanese investors have higher risk tolerance, and are more likely to accept low growth 
acquirers to make conglomerate investments. This result may also explain the higher 
ARs experienced by the Japanese conglomerate acquirers during the announcement 
period (see, table 4.2.1).     
 
Overall, we find that the merger relationship can influence the investors’ interpretations 
to the financial characteristic indicators. As the financial ratios can often be interpreted 
in multiple ways, the merger relationship can inspire investors to use a particular theory 
to interpret the ratio. Interestingly, we find that if we employ full M&A samples, the 
interpretation of financial ratios tends to be inconsistent across countries. However, if 
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we control for the type of acquirer-target relationship, the interpretation of the financial 
ratios tends to be more consistent across the US and Japan.   
 
6.8 Targets’ financial characteristics and acquirers’ returns 
 
In this section, we test whether the financial characteristics of targets will influence 
acquirers’ announcement returns. If the market for corporate control explains the 
investor behaviour, we should observe the targets with low profitability or high free 
cash flow leading to higher acquirers’ SCARs. In addition, in order to capture the 
relative difference in the financial characteristics, we follow Bris et al. (2008) and 
employ the absolute ratio differences (numerical difference) between the acquirers and 
targets to estimate the financial characteristics differentiation. 
 
In this section, we still use the acquirer’s SCARs as the dependent variable and target’s 
financial ratios as independent variables (see, regression model 6.1). As we indicate in 
section 6.5, we convert the targets EPS to the acquirers’ local currency. 
 
Table 6.8.1 reports the regression estimates of targets’ financial ratios against the 
acquirers’ SCARs. The table reports the regression coefficients separately for the 
Japanese targets’ financial ratios against the US acquirers in model 1, the absolute 
difference of US-JP (the US acquirer minus Japanese target) against the US acquirers 
in model 2, the coefficients of the US targets’ financial ratios against Japanese acquirers 
in model 3 and coefficients of the absolute difference (Japanese acquirers minus the US 
targets) of the financial ratios against the Japanese acquirers in model 4.  
 
Model 1 shows that the coefficient of target’s EPS is significant and negative. If the 
earning is associated with management efficiency, the negative coefficient is consistent 
with the theory of market for corporate control. If investors anticipate the replacement 
of the less efficient management in targets, they will show positive response to acquirers’ 
 171 
 
M&A announcements. In model 2, we find that the coefficient of EPS difference 
between the acquirers and targets is significant and. This result also provides a 
consistent implication, where investors show positive response when acquirers have 
higher profitability than targets. 
 
In model 1, the coefficient of target’s Tobin’s Q is significant and positive. In addition, 
model 2 shows that when the target has a higher Tobin’s Q (i.e. when the US acquirer’s 
Tobin’s Q minus Japanese targets’ Tobin’s Q is negative), acquirers tend to experience 
more positive SCARs. This result is consistent with the previous studies (see, e.g. 
Rhodes–Kropf et al., 2005; Chung et al., 2013) suggesting that M&As are motivated 
by internalizing target’s growth opportunities. 
 
In model 3 and model 4, we find that the coefficients of US targets’ profitability ratios 
are negative but insignificant. Compared with model 1 and model 2, the insignificant 
result may imply that Japanese acquirers are less likely to be benefit from market for 
corporate control.      
 
The coefficient of Tobin’s Q is significant and positive in model 3. In model 4, the 
coefficient of Tobin’s Q difference (i.e. the Japanese acquirers’ Tobin’s Q minus the US 
target’s Tobin’s Q) is also significant and positive. The results in model 3 and model 4 
are consistent with the results in model 1 and model 2, and suggest that acquirers may 
use M&As as a method to develop their business. 
 
Surprisingly, we find that the coefficients of leverage and dividend pay-out ratios are 
insignificant across all four models. The result implies that the free cash flow of targets 
has an insignificant effect on the acquirers’ SCARs. It may be because the co-existence 
of agency and defensive signal effect (see, Chung et al., 2013; Garvey and Hanka, 1999; 
Israel, 1991) reduce the explanatory power of the two ratios.    
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Table 6.8.1 Targets financial characteristics and the acquirers’ announcement returns 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 Japanese targets US-JP difference  The US targets JP-US difference  
EPS -0.008a 0.007a 0.000 0.000 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Gross profit-to-assets -0.714 0.355 -0.134 -0.268 
 (0.60) (0.44) (0.30) (0.29) 
Tobin's Q 0.010b -0.008b 0.013a -0.011a 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Earning’s growth 30.490 0.135 0.035 0.022 
 (20.13) (0.27) (0.21) (0.20) 
Leverage n.a. n.a. -0.010 0.010 
 n.a. n.a. (0.11) (0.10) 
Dividend pay-out  n.a. n.a. -0.287 0.409 
 n.a. n.a. (0.30) (0.21) 
Intercept 0.257 0.023 0.185 0.044 
 (0.38) (0.08) (0.14) (0.08) 
Observations 53 53 102 102 
Adjusted R2 0.065 0.000 0.011 0.037 
Jarque-Bera 1.38 0.35 2.53 1.66 
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) of the regression 6.1. The sample consists of 52 US-
JP and 93 JP-US M&As between 1990 and 2013. The dependent variable is the bidder’s 3 days SCARs as a percentage. a, b, and c 
stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. EPS are converted to acquirers’ local currency. 
6.9 The effect from Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
In this section, we test whether our results are affected by the information transparency, 
for the periods before and after the Sarbanes-Oxley act (SOX) implementation.  
 
The SOX is a most widely studied event in finance and accounting. By imposing the 
requirement of additional internal monitoring by the audit committee, disclosures on 
internal-control practices, and restrictions for insider misconduct, SOX improves the 
accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures. In addition, with the change of the 
board structure, SOX is expected to reduce agency costs and correspondingly, the cost 
of capital of firms (see, Cicero et al., 2013). Thus, in the context of M&As, if the 
financial ratios show inconsistent effect in the pre-and post- SOX periods, we will argue 
that the investors’ interpretation is more likely to be influenced by the information 
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transparency associated with SOX.   
 
In the US, SOX act was passed in 2002, whereas a version of SOX (some refer to it as 
J-SOX) was passed in 2006. Considering that firms tend to experience frequent board 
structure changes before SOX (Cicero et al., 2013) and significant short-term costs after 
implementing SOX (Anwer et al., 2010), we set a two years gap just before the SOX 
act in each country and a further two-year gap after its passing. In this case, we define 
the US pre- SOX period as 1990 to 2000, and post-SOX period as 2003 to 2015 and 
Japanese pre- SOX period as 1990 to 2004, and post- SOX period as 2007 to 2015. As 
a result, we still retain 181 US-JP M&As announced before the SOX and 157 
announced after the SOX, and 286 JP-US M&As announced before J-SOX, and 275 
announced after J-SOX.  
 
Table 6.9.1 reports the US and Japanese acquirers’ ARs and CARs of M&As announced 
pre- and post- SOX. Consistent with the methods in Chapter4 and Chapter 5, we employ 
adj.BMP to identify the significance level of the ARs and CARs. We also employ 
Mann-Whitney U test to identify the different ARs and CARs in the pre- and post- SOX 
periods.  
 
We find that acquirers in the pre-SOX period experience significantly higher ARs and 
CARs during the announcement period. In Panel A, we find that the US acquirers 
experience significant and positive AR on day t=-1 in the pre-SOX, and experience 
significant and negative AR on day t=-1 in the post-SOX period. The CARs in the pre-
SOX are significant from day t=-1 to day t=5, and become insignificant in the post-
SOX period. The Mann-Whitney U test also shows that the ARs and CARs in the pre-
SOX period are significantly higher than post-SOX period. Consistent with the US 
acquirers, in Panel B, we find that the Japanese acquirers only experience significant 
and positive ARs and CARs on the announcement day in the pre-J-SOX period and 
experience insignificant ARs and CARs in the post-J-SOX period.  
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One of the possible explanation for this result is that as information transparency 
increases under the SOX, firms may disclose more risks in the cross-border M&As. 
Thus, even though the SOX can reduce agency cost in the acquiring firms, the cross-
border M&As may still result in negative ARs. This result may be in line with 
Hammersley et al. (2008), who find the increase in information transparency by SOX 
leads to negative price reaction to firms with internal control weaknesses. 
  
Table 6.9.1 Acquirer ARs and CARs in the pre- and post- SOX period 
 Pre-SOX  Post-SOX   Pre-SOX Post-SOX   
DAYs ARs adj.-BMP ARs adj.-BMP M-W 
U 
CARs adj.-BMP CARs adj.-BMP M-W U 
Panel A: The US acquirers 
-5 0.5155 0.74 0.0952 1.25 1.25 0.5155  0.74 0.0952 1.25 1.25 
-4 -0.1743 -0.76 0.1393 -0.68 0.53 0.3412  0.31 0.2345 1.08 0.46 
-3 0.2690 0.94 -0.1605 -0.24 2.25b 0.6102  0.94 0.0740 0.51 1.65c 
-2 0.3004 1.12 -0.1940 0.41 1.63 0.9106  1.27 -0.1200 0.54 2.38b 
-1 0.8433 1.95c -0.6088 -1.72c 2.98a 1.7539  2.08
b -0.7288 -0.62 2.98a 
0 0.3726 0.57 -0.0750 -0.41 0.42 2.1265  2.11
b -0.8038 -0.74 2.38b 
1 0.1019 1.15 0.3494 0.95 0.56 2.2285  2.80
a -0.4544 -0.22 2.42b 
2 -0.0402 -0.73 0.4220 1.39 0.86 2.1882  2.29
b -0.0324 0.38 1.82c 
3 0.2383 -0.06 0.1908 1.49 0.08 2.4265  2.16
b 0.1584 0.62 1.78c 
4 0.0688 0.49 -0.2953 -1.51 0.13 2.4953  2.25
b -0.1369 0.18 1.86c 
5 -0.0232 -0.41 0.2203 1.21 0.46 2.4721  1.85
c 0.0834 0.51 1.82c 
Panel B: Japanese acquirers 
-5 -0.0270 0.14 0.1252 1.42 1.45 -0.0270 0.14 0.1252 1.42 1.45 
-4 -0.1700 -1.39 -0.1534 -1.66 0.34 -0.1970 -0.79 -0.0283 -0.13 0.81 
-3 0.2210 1.65c 0.0059 -0.61 1.35 0.0240 0.24 -0.0224 -0.45 0.16 
-2 0.0051 0.14 -0.1153 -1.35 1.04 0.0291 0.27 -0.1377 -0.98 0.89 
-1 0.2851 1.60 -0.0968 -0.86 0.95 0.3142 1.00 -0.2345 -1.21 1.43 
0 0.5691 2.78a 0.0500 0.29 1.86c 0.8833 2.10b -0.1846 -0.92 1.87c 
1 0.1753 1.32 0.3795 3.04a 0.92 1.0586 2.46a 0.1949 0.20 1.17 
2 0.0332 0.50 0.2508 1.94c 0.67 1.0918 2.42a 0.4458 0.81 0.81 
3 -0.1510 -0.70 -0.0459 -0.35 0.09 0.9409 1.97b 0.3999 0.67 0.81 
4 0.0429 0.22 0.2338 1.41 1.44 0.9837 1.92c 0.6338 0.99 0.51 
5 -0.0920 -0.46 -0.2064 -1.53 0.11 0.8917 1.64 0.4274 0.51 0.72 
The AR and CAR are measured in percentage. adj-BMP denotes the adjusted BMP t-statistic. a, b and c denote statistical 
significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. M-W U denotes Mann-Whitney u test. 
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In table 6.9.2, we report the regression estimation of the acquirers’ financial ratios 
against their SCARs. The table reports the regression coefficients of the US acquirers’ 
financial ratios for the M&As announced in the pre-SOX period in Model 1, reports the 
coefficients of the US acquirers’ financial ratios for the M&As announced in the post-
SOX period in model 2. Model 3 reports the coefficients of Japanese acquirers’ financial 
ratios for the M&As announced in the pre-J-SOX period, and model 4 reports the 
coefficients in the post-J-SOX period.   
 
Table 6.9.2. The acquirer’s financial characteristics in pre- and post- SOX period 
 Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4) 
 The US pre-SOX The US post-SOX  Japanese pre-SOX Japanese post-SOX  
EPS 0.033c 0.053a 0.000 0.000 
 (0.02) (0.02) 0.00 0.00 
Gross profit-to-assets 1.701 3.970a -2.064c 3.148b 
 (2.44) (0.81) (1.22) (1.53) 
Tobin's Q 0.125 -0.153c -0.058a -0.061 
 (0.09) (0.08) (0.02) (0.07) 
Earning’s growth 1.683 -0.759 -1.061 5.033 
 (1.03) (0.82) (5.21) (34.47) 
Leverage 1.467 -1.198 -0.410 1.384 
 (2.14) (1.14) (0.34) (0.88) 
Dividend pay-out  -0.574 -0.240 -0.917a -0.472 
 (0.89) (0.27) (0.34) (0.31) 
Intercept -1.476 -0.684 1.244a -1.275b 
 (1.78) (0.65) (0.36) (0.64) 
Observations 181 157 286 275 
Adjusted R2 0.071 0.512 0.073 0.141 
Jarque-Bera 549.84a 698.61a 116.94a 79.31a 
The table shows the coefficients and standard errors (shown in parentheses) of the regression 6.1. The sample consists of 363 US-
JP and 617 JP-US M&As between 1990 to 2015. The dependent variable is the bidder’s 3 days SCARs as a percentage. a, b, and c 
stand for statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
When we compare four models, we find that the coefficients of profitability ratios in 
the post-SOX period are more positive than the coefficients in the pre-SOX period. In 
model 1 and model 2, we find that the coefficient of gross profit-to-assets is 
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insignificant in model 1 but significant and positive in model 2.76 In model 3 and model 
4, we find that the coefficient of gross profit-to-assets is significant and negative in the 
Japanese pre-SOX period and is significant and positive in the Japanese post-SOX 
period. The result implies that investors may adjust their pricing strategy after SOX due 
to better accessibility to the corporate information. Considering the investor behaviour 
reported in table 6.9.1, we suggest that market become more efficient after the SOX. 
The higher synergy and lower agency cost is anticipated in the cross-border M&As 
initiated by more profitable firms. 
 
In model 1 and model 2, we find that the coefficient Tobin’s Q is more negative in the 
post-SOX period, and in model 3 and model 4, the coefficient Tobin’s Q is more 
negative in the pre- SOX period. Tobin’s Q can be interpreted as acquirers’ growth 
opportunities, and suggest that the investors show inconsistent interpretation to the 
growth opportunities in the pre- and post- SOX periods across different countries. A 
more possible explanation is that the stock price premium is inconsistent in different 
time periods, and the market may adjust the premium after analysing the announcement. 
Thus, the inconsistent market response to the Tobin’s Q in the pre- and post- SOX 
periods across different countries can be a coincidence resulted by the stock price 
premium. 
 
6.10 Conclusion and discussion 
 
In this chapter, we have analysed the investor behaviour associated with financial 
characteristics. We find that the interpretation of the financial ratios can change when 
we control for the acquirers’ deal conditions (e.g. R&D intensity, size effect and merger 
relationship with targets). Therefore, financial characteristics can affect the extent of 
value creations and potential risks. It is because when we control for such variables, it 
                                                   
76 Although both models show significant and positive EPS coefficients, the gross profit-to-assets may 
be a better proxy of profitability than EPS.  
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allows us to get better insights into the attributes of returns around the announcement 
dates.  
 
We find that in general, the financial characteristics are interpreted inconsistently 
between the US and Japan. However, when we control for the deal characteristics, the 
interpretations of financial characteristics become more consistent. In addition, we find 
that investors tend to show positive response to the high free cash flow holding for 
Japanese acquirers. It may be because the main bank system makes the Japanese 
investors more optimistic than the US investors.  
 
We have also tested the investor behaviour and the interpretation of financial 
characteristics during the pre- and post- SOX periods. We find that the existence of 
SOX does not lead to higher ARs for the acquirers. On the contrary, the prices tend to 
be more efficient after the SOX, and the returns are more strongly associated with the 
acquirers’ profitability ratios in cross-border M&A announcements.  
 
Overall, this chapter suggests that investors tend to interpret financial ratios from 
different perspectives according to their expectation to the M&A value creation. This 
result is against the assumptions from many previous studies, which employ financial 
ratios to represent one specific financial characteristic of the acquirers (e.g. use Tobin’s 
Q as the quality of performance). Our findings may also explain the inconsistent results 
in the previous empirical studies.  
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Chapter Seven  
Conclusion and Evaluation 
 
7.1 Summary and Conclusion 
 
This study presents the empirical tests on the ARs of acquirers and targets associated 
with the cross-border M&A announcements. We find that the US acquirers do not 
experience significant ARs during the announcement period, whereas Japanese 
acquirers experience significant and positive ARs. Our test result is inconsistent with 
previous cross-border M&A studies. We suggest that the less significant ARs we find 
in our study is mainly resulted by our test method. We employ F-F-C four-factor CAPM 
with GJR-GARCH in estimating the ARs. We also employ adj.BMP-t. statistic to 
measure the significance level of the ARs. As our test method can overcome the 
potential upward bias introduced by single-factor CAPM and standard t-statistics, our 
test can provide more reliable evidence to the wealth effect of the cross-border M&A 
announcements.  
  
Consistent with previous studies, we find that both the US and Japanese targets 
experience significant and positive ARs during the announcement period.  
 
This study also tests the explanatory factors of ARs associated with cross-border M&A 
announcements. We find the explanatory factors such as method of payment and 
illiquidity proposed by domestic M&A studies cannot explain the ARs in the cross-
border M&As. We suggest that the factors associated with synergistic effect have higher 
explanatory power in the cross-border context. By comparing the ARs of acquirers and 
targets, we suggest that the positive target AR is mainly resulted from the synergistic 
effect instead of bidding premium.  
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We also find inconsistent investor behaviour associated with M&As initiated by 
acquirers from different countries. We find that country specific economic and market 
environment (e.g. main bank system, R&D intensity) can explain the inconsistent 
across the US and Japan. However, more importantly, we also find that the inconsistent 
investor behaviour is mainly resulted by the choice of targets (i.e. merger relationship) 
and industry specific factors (e.g. R&D intensity). When we control for these factors, 
we show that investor behaviours become consistent across two countries.  
 
7.2 Limitations of this study 
 
This study contains several limitations. Even though we argue that the limitations of 
this study do not deny the contribution of this study, further improvement may be 
considered in the future works.  
 
Firstly, the limited sample size and data availability may cause problems in this study. 
For instance, in Chapter 5, our sample size of the Japanese targets in the finance 
industry does not meet statistical requirements to perform the test. As a result, we are 
not able to compare the ARs the US and Japanese targets. The limited sample size may 
also explain our weak evidence in Chapter 4. In Chapter 6, due to the data missing, we 
cannot test the explanatory power of the dividend pay-out ratio and leverage of Japanese 
targets to the US acquirers. Indeed, this problem seems unavoidable in the event study. 
The sample size may increase if we extend our event period. However, this may also 
reduce the power of the test as we have shown that average ARs are inconsistent in 
different period. Moreover, we can increase the sample size by incorporating more 
cross-border M&As initiated outside the US and Japan. However, the data may still be 
influenced by various country and market specific factors. Thus, the test result can be 
less robust. 
  
Secondly, more recent M&A studies (see, e.g. Mantecon, 2009; Shahrur, 2005) tend to 
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use the single factor CAPM to generate ARs. The use of single factor CAPM is against 
the widely perceived equilibrium concept proposed by Fama and French (1992). In this 
study, we have citied the evidence from Carhart (1997), Fama and French (1993) to 
justify the choice of F-F-C CAPM. However, it can be important to compare the 
estimation results from F-F-C CAPM and single factor CAPM in the M&A study.   
     
Thirdly, in Chapter 6, we employ the least square method to perform the regression 
analysis. Although in theory, the scaled cumulative abnormal returns (SCARs) has not 
causality to the financial characteristics, the financial characteristics may be correlated 
with omitted variables (e.g. corporate governance structure, firm’s fixed effect) and 
thereby cause endogeneity bias (see, e.g. Cunat et al., 2012; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 
2009). However, despite introducing more control variables (see, e.g. Wang and Xie, 
2009), previous studies have not provided widely accepted instrument variables (IV) to 
solve the endogeneity problem.      
 
Finally, although this study has tested the effect of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, we are not yet 
able to test to which extent the corporate governance quality can influence investor 
interpretations to the cross-border M&A announcements. 
 
7.3 Recommendations for future research   
 
There are serval ways to extend our study. Firstly, the effect of corporate governance 
quality can be used to further analyse the investor behaviour associated with cross-
border M&As. Secondly, a further comparative studies for contrasting different cross-
border M&A pairs can give more insight for the investor behaviour. For instance, by 
comparing the abnormal returns of the US acquirers when they acquire targets from the 
Europe and Asia, researchers can identify the influence of information asymmetry from 
geographical and cultural distance.     
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